




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STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC LAW

EDITED BY THE FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE OF
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Volume XXXIX]

[Number 1

Whole Number 102

THE MAKING OF THE
BALKAN STATES

BY

WILLIAM SMITH MURRAY, Ph.D.



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PREFACE

WITHIN the past hundred years Turkey has lost somewhat more than two-thirds of her European territory and population. Much the larger part of this loss has gone to make up the four constitutional monarchies that are commonly called the Balkan States.

This study aims to give a brief account of the peoples in these four groups so long under Ottoman rule, and to trace somewhat in detail the movements that have led to their independence. Parts of this field already covered by special treatises have been passed over here quite briefly. The works giving the fuller treatment have usually been cited.

Only incidental references are made in this sketch to the other three groups (in Greece, Bessarabia and Bosnia-Herzegovina) that have also been completely separated, more or less in the same connection, from Turkey. The chief effort here has been to show the actual working of the forces that have finally added Roumania, Bulgaria, Servia and Montenegro to the family of European nations.

I gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness to Professor William M. Sloane and Professor James T. Shotwell, who have aided me with most helpful advice and criticisms.

W. S. M.

NEW YORK CITY, APRIL 18, 1910.

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
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CHAPTER I

WALLACHIA, MOLDAVIA, SERVIA AND MONTENEGRO, UP TO THE TREATY OF PARIS—1856

THE interference of nations in the internal affairs of other countries, although once a more common thing than it is to-day, has continued to play an important role in the creation of new states. This has happened despite the tendency of leading nations in recent times to take more and more account of the principle of non-intervention. Certain changes in ideas and conditions during the past century have, no doubt, had a most decided bearing in that connection. Keeping pace with increasingly rapid and suitable means of communication, the widening range of trade and travel has so spread out the interests of civilized countries that most nations have come to be scrupulously sensitive to the policies and practices of many others. Then too the aggressive and propagandist character of democracy and the efforts among those of the same race to achieve political unity have helped now and then to produce complications that have afforded more or less plausible excuses for intervention.

There has been, meanwhile, no lack of imperative calls for the readjustment of political relations established as a result of conquest. For various reasons, it would seem, these manifestations of discontent, especially in the Turkish empire, have been quite generally seized upon as pretexts for interference from without. It is in this connection that

the suspected national ambitions of some of the European governments and the lingering faith in the balance-of-power principle have quite frequently carried so-called friendly interpositions over into destructive wars.

The anomalous conditions so long existing in Turkey have laid that country open in recent times to the application of what may be called exceptional principles of intervention. Nowhere else since the close of the French Revolution has intervention been so constant and in one sense so effective. Although the peace of Europe has often suffered by reason of the resulting complications, all this has been a most important factor in the creation of the four constitutional monarchies in the Balkans.¹

The Ottoman empire was built up by a series of conquests that made subjects of peoples who either could not or would not be one with the conquerors or with each other, hence patriotism there, in relation to the whole state, has been one-sided, to say the least. Religious differences and accompanying prejudices have ever been operative; while national and racial ambitions, together with the pressing need and the burning desire for a larger measure of liberty and security, have fostered there a spirit of jealousy, of discontent and of disunion. With these influences at work and with the increasing probability that a determined struggle would eventually receive the support of one or more of the great powers of Europe, the discontented nationalities under Turkish rule have succeeded for nearly a century in keeping up almost a constant strain on the

¹ Phillimore, Sir R., *Commentaries upon International Law* (London, 1879), vol. i, pp. 553 *et seq.*; Holland, T. E., *Studies in International Law* (Oxford, 1898), chs. xi-xii; Moore, J. B., *International Law Digest* (Washington, 1906), vol. i, ch. xix.

forces that were calculated to hold the empire together.¹ Yet this very clashing of interests, ambitions, and aspirations—to be seen as well in the consequent strivings of the interested powers—and the apprehension in Europe of grave and far reaching consequences likely to result from the impending conflict, have given a semblance of solidarity and a measure of perpetuity to what has come to be called the “Concert of Europe.”²

THE WALLACHIANS AND THE MOLDAVIANS—UP TO THE GREEK INSURRECTION (1821)

The beginning of a continuous control, under treaty rights, in the affairs of the Ottoman empire by one of the great powers of Europe, was in 1774. Six years previous, in connection with Russian interference in Poland, Turkey declared war against Russia. After several other nations became involved, this struggle resulted in the first partition of Poland, and in the acquirement by Russia of a protectorate over a part of the Ottoman subjects. In the treaty of peace (Kutschouc-Kainardji, 1774) the Porte agreed that a permanent Russian embassy might be established at Constantinople, and that Russia should have the right of free navigation in Turkish waters; and, most important of all, the Sultan promised “to protect constantly the Christian religion and its churches,” and “to keep religiously” to a list of conditions under which Russia restored Wallachia and Moldavia to Turkey.³ Also, as the circumstances of these

¹ Odysseus, *Turkey in Europe* (London, 1900), *passim*; Seignobos, *Political History of Europe since 1814* (New York, 1900), trans. by MacVane, ch. xxi.

² De Worms, *England's Policy in the East* (London, 1877), *passim*; Dennis, *Eastern Problems at the Close of the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge, Mass., 1901), ch. ii.

✓ ³ Duggan, *The Eastern Question* (New York, 1902), ch. ii; Menzies, *Turkey Old and New* (London, 1883), pp. 293-308.

two principalities might require, the Russian ministers resident at Constantinople were to be permitted to intercede in their favor. This treaty which expressed the agreement of the two empires "to annihilate and leave in an eternal oblivion all the treaties and conventions" previously made between the two states (some reference to boundaries was excepted), marks the beginning of a Russian régime, so to speak, in Turkish affairs, which was only brought to an end when the armies and navies of England and France joined with those of Turkey against Russia, in 1853-6.¹

Wallachia and Moldavia already had a history of nearly five hundred years, and the two principalities had now (1774) been tributary to the Porte for more than three centuries.² A few descendants of the Latin-speaking Roman colonists in that part of Europe are supposed to have survived from the third century, A. D., and about the end of the thirteenth century these were joined by other Roumans (more or less Latinized peoples of eastern Europe) and thus were formed the two Rouman principalities. The southern—Wallachia—took its name from that by which its people were known to their neighbors, and the northern—Moldavia—was called by the name of its principal river.³ During the fifteenth century, these principalities were brought under the supremacy of the Ottoman government,

¹The treaty of Kainardji (1774) was written in Italian, and may be seen in that language and in French also in Martens, *Recueil de Traités* (Göttingen, 1817), vol. ii, pp. 286 *et seq.* Copies of principal treaties between the Porte and Russia (1774-1850) may be seen in *Parliamentary Papers* (1854), vol. lxxii (French and English).

² De Testa, *Recueil des Traités de la Porte Ottomane* (Paris, 1882), vol. v. (Four treaties between Sultans and Moldavia and Wallachia—1392-1529.)

³ Noyes, *Roumania, The Border Land of the Christian and the Turk* (New York, 1858), pp. 156-59; Walsh, *From Constantinople to England* (London, 1831), ch. xiii.

but by paying a yearly tribute they retained, for a long period, practical independence in internal affairs and were governed down to 1720 by native hospodars (governors) of their own choosing.¹ Unlike the social conditions in other Balkan provinces, however, the old nobility in Moldavia and Wallachia managed to perpetuate itself, and all governmental affairs administered by the principalities were controlled for centuries by the aristocracy.²

Although the Treaty of Kainardji professed that there would be cultivated between the two sovereigns—the Empress and the Sultan—, as well as between the two empires, a “sincere union and a perpetual and inviolable friendship,” with a careful “accomplishment” and maintenance of the Articles, yet within ten years Russia annexed the Crimean peninsula and some nearby territory, and the Porte promptly responded by undertaking another war against the Czarina.³ This struggle was brought to an end in 1792 by the treaty of Jassy, which ceded to Russia some sections of Turkish territory, and reaffirmed all the former stipulations respecting Wallachia and Moldavia, beginning with the treaty of Kainardji.⁴

The principalities suffered for a century (1720-1820) from their relations with the Phanariot Greek governors, who were sent to them by the Porte. As each appointment added somewhat to the income of the Sultan, it became customary to change these hospodars frequently.⁵ But every

¹ Wilkinson, *Wallachia and Moldavia* (London, 1820), ch. i.

² Noyes, *op. cit.*, *passim*.

³ Holland, *The Treaty Relations of Russia and Turkey, 1774-1853* (London, 1877).

⁴ Martens, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 291; Menzies, *op. cit.*, pp. 315 *et seq.*

⁵ Wilkinson, *op. cit.*, ch. vi; Tennent, *History of Modern Greece* (London, 1845), vol. vii, pp. 41-54; *cf. infra.* pp. 22, 36.

such change added greatly to the burdens of the principalities; and, mindful of her treaty rights, Russia induced the Sultan to issue a Hatti-cheriff, in 1802, fixing the terms of office for these officials at seven years, and making the consent of the Russian minister necessary to their removal.¹ This promise was made while the Tsar was posing as the friend of Turkey, by helping to drive the French army out of Egypt. Only three years later, however, the great victory at Austerlitz, and the treaty that followed, making France through her new possessions—the Illyrian provinces—a neighbor to the Ottoman empire, inclined the Sultan and his advisers to put themselves again under the guidance of the French.²

In his efforts to remain neutral in the European conflict just ended, the Sultan had taken the precaution to make some warlike preparations along the lower Danube; and that led the Tsar to increase his influence over Ottoman subjects in that territory. Urged on now by the representations of the French minister, Sebastiani, and disregarding his agreement of four years previous, the Sultan permitted himself to be so deeply moved by the traitorous attitude of the governors of Wallachia and Moldavia in favoring Russian intrigue, that he removed these officials without the consent of Russia.³ The ambassadors of England and Russia then determined to force the Sultan to reinstate the governors, and he yielded, after a time; but, notwithstanding his submission, Russia moved her army into the principalities.⁴ England's threatening attitude failed before the end of the year (1806) to prevent the Porte from declaring war against Russia. With a British fleet anchored a

¹ De Testa, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 288.

² Menzies, *op. cit.*, p. 329.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 331.

⁴ Lane-Poole, *Life of Stratford Canning* (London, 1888), vol. i, p. 37.

few miles from Constantinople (February, 1807), the Sultan's government seemed inclined to yield to the English ambassador's ultimatum, that Sebastiani be at once dismissed from the city; that the Porte renew the treaty of alliance with England and Russia; that the Bosphorus and Dardanelles be open to Russian ships of war; and that the Turkish navy be held by the English until the return of peace.¹ Time was gained at Constantinople by delaying negotiations with England, and under the encouragement and direction of the French ambassador the defenses of the city were made ready to withstand an attack. Within two weeks the idea of an assault was abandoned by the British and their fleet sailed away; but they then made an unsuccessful attempt to invade Egypt, and as a result the Porte declared war against England (March) and formed an alliance with France.

The Russian forces being mostly engaged with the Prussians at this time against the French, made the outlook quite promising for the Turks. But the deposition of Sultan Selim (May, 1807) and the prospect, after the French won the battle of Friedland (June), that Napoleon and the Tsar Alexander would settle their differences served to bring about an entire change in the situation. The disorders in Turkey, culminating in the Sultan being set aside on the charge of "combating the religious principles consecrated by the Koran," seemed to cause Napoleon to feel that the Osmanlis were hopelessly unstable, and that the fall of their empire was inevitable. He therefore all the more readily abandoned Turkey when he formed his alliance with the Tsar (July, 1807).² The treaty of Tilsit, setting forth

¹ Menzies, *op. cit.*, p. 335.

² Sloane, W. M., *Life of Napoleon Bonaparte* (New York, 1896), vol. iii, ch. iv; Menzies, *op. cit.*, p. 343.

the terms of this alliance, stipulated that Russia should evacuate the Danubian principalities, but that the Turks were not to be allowed to enter that territory until a treaty of peace should be made between Russia and the Porte. The Tsar and Napoleon secretly agreed, however, that the Porte must accept the mediation of France, and that a satisfactory result must be reached within three months after negotiations were commenced, else France and Russia would make common cause in leaving to the Porte simply Constantinople and the province of Roumelia.¹ This treaty led to an armistice between Russia and the Porte (August), which continued for two years. France and Russia joined in another alliance in October, 1808, to be kept secret for at least ten years, in which France promised to aid Russia in annexing Wallachia and Moldavia.² At the beginning of the next year, friendly relations were resumed between England and the Porte.³

Russia continued to occupy the principalities; and when Turkey tried to come to terms with the Tsar Alexander, his demands were such that the Porte renewed hostilities (April, 1809). Although the Tsar was soon obliged to begin preparations for an impending struggle in his own country against the French, still the Russians continued, in general, to be successful against the Turkish forces.

Influenced by England's ambassador, Stratford Canning, and, doubtless, by a general distrust of France, the Porte finally accepted the offer of Russia to give back all but about half of Moldavia, and the terms of peace were signed at

¹ De Clercq, *Recueil des Traités de la France* (Paris, 1888), vol. ii, pp. 207-14.

² *Ibid.*, p. 284.

³ Martens, *Nouveau Recueil de Traités*, vol. i (Göttingen, 1817), p. 160.

Bucharest in May, 1812.¹ Menzies expresses the opinion that “Turkey had committed suicide in not having seconded Napoleon in his audacious invasion of Russia;” and that in signing the treaty of Bucharest, the Porte “missed the most brilliant opportunity which ever presented itself to repair the losses of Turkey.”² All of the former stipulations between Russia and the Porte, back to 1774, in respect to Wallachia and Moldavia, were again reaffirmed; but most important of all, perhaps, was the article of this treaty relating to Servia.

THE SERVIANS—UP TO THE GREEK INSURRECTION—1821

The treaty of Bucharest marks the beginning of a Russian protectorate over another portion of the Ottoman population. In this treaty the Tsar and the Sultan came to “a solemn agreement” respecting the security of the Servians; and though the terms were somewhat indefinite, still Russia could now demand and exact, under treaty right, that a fairly well-defined policy should be followed by the Porte in dealing with these people. The Sultan was to proclaim a general amnesty to the Servians; and he was to leave to them the administration of their internal affairs, and to exact only moderate taxes which were to be paid direct to the Porte. But the Turks were still allowed to garrison the Servian fortresses; and that opened the way for troubles that soon followed.³

These stipulations gave a new anchorage to the hopes of

¹ For the text of the treaty of Bucharest, see Martens, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 397; and for a glance at the diplomatic policies of the time, see Mr. Canning’s efforts to release Russia, and at the same time prevent an alliance between the Sultan and Napoleon, Lane-Pool, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, ch. iv.

² Menzies, *op. cit.*, p. 350.

³ See Treaty of Bucharest, article viii.

the Servians for reasonable security and increasing liberty in a portion of the territory which had been occupied by their race for centuries. Back in the ninth century, A. D., the Serbs had taken possession of that part of Europe at the close of the period of migrations and were already making a start toward forming political institutions.¹ They early embraced the Christian faith, and being within the Roman Empire of the East they acknowledged the emperor's supremacy, on condition that their rulers should be native chiefs, of their own choosing. Thus their early patriarchal form of government was preserved. In the eleventh century, however, the Greeks made an armed attack in order to force the Servians to accept a Greek governor. The attempt failed and only served to establish on a firmer basis the princely power of the native rulers.

The Servians were not long in discovering the advantages of being alongside of Western Christendom. By the prospect of support from the West—from the Pope as well as from the Western emperor—the Servians were from time to time encouraged in resisting the encroachments of the Eastern Empire. During a considerable part of the fourteenth century, Servia was the strongest power in south-eastern Europe; and her last and only great king, Stephen Dushan (1333-56), even besieged Constantinople, with the idea, it is said, of destroying the Empire of the East.² Under Dushan, the clergy elected their own patriarch, thus completing the independence of the Servian empire, which then comprehended the larger part of the Balkan peninsula.³ An

¹ Ranke, *History of Servia*. Translation by Kerr. (London, 1847), ch. i.

² Menzies, *op. cit.*, p. 47.

³ Freeman, *Historical Geography of Europe* (London, 1881), vol. i, p. 424.

Assembly composed of clergy and laity, under the presidency of the king and patriarch, exercised legislative and other functions, but the laws continued in keeping with the more or less primitive ideas of these people.¹ As the Servians most nearly represent the unmixed Slavic race, so their system of laws is, of all the Slavonic systems, the most national.²

After the death of Dushan (1356), a half-century of internal struggle left Servia once more a small kingdom. The Osmanlis were already overrunning that part of Europe, and the battle of Kosova (1389) brought Servia under tribute to the Sultan; then the great victory for the Turks at Varna (1444) made the Servians defenceless rayahs—non-Moslem subjects under Ottoman rule. A century of comparative quiet then followed in Servia. The Christian Servians were not allowed to hold office, or to carry arms; but, as time went on, some of their most illustrious families turned Mohammedans, and thus it was that now and then the people of this province were governed by officials united with them in race, but separated from them by religion.³

For more than four centuries the Servian Church remained independent; the native patriarchs paying the Porte, meanwhile, an annual tribute of something like sixty-three thousand asperes (about \$650.00). Finally, when the struggle began which tore Hungary from the Turkish empire, the Servian patriarch joined the Austrian forces. By the end of the war (1699) thirty-seven thousand families from Servia had migrated with him to Hungary. The Porte appointed another Servian patriarch. But the people who re-

¹ Ranke, *op. cit.*, pp. 19–20.

² Macieowski, *Sclavische Rechtsgeschichte*, vol. i, part ii, section v. (Quoted by Ranke, *op. cit.*, p. 20.)

³ Ranke, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

mained in Servia now saw a part of their race enjoying a good degree of freedom outside of Turkish territory. So when another opportunity came to aid Austria against the Porte, they joined with the enemies of the Sultan, and in the Peace of Passarowitz (1718) Turkey was forced to cede to Austria a large part of Servia. European politics, however, soon restored this territory to the Ottoman empire (1739); and then it was that the Servians lost the privilege and the inestimable advantage of having a native patriarch, and were given over, in relation to the many interests then centered in the Church, to the domination of the Greek patriarch at Constantinople. Servia thus lost the last vestige of self-government, and became doubly dependent; for the people must now struggle against the Greeks as well as the Osmanlis. All through the eighteenth century the Greeks exercised a wide influence, especially in European Turkey; and now, with a Greek Metropolitan in Servia, the Phanariots could also extend their influence over that province.¹ Wherever the Greek patriarch exercised complete ecclesiastical authority over those who were not of the Greek race, his priests and teachers were sure to labor assiduously in transferring their own language and ideas to the people. It may be added, also, that the more educated Greeks hoped for the restoration of the Byzantine Empire, and that their views respecting the union of Church and State naturally made them feel certain that, in such an event, political power would go hand in hand with ecclesiastical authority, and that the Greeks would thus become the dominant race.²

¹ Ranke, *op. cit.*, ch. ii. The buildings of the Greek Patriarchate have long been in the part of Constantinople called Phanar. As early as the seventeenth century that quarter of the Turkish capital was principally inhabited by Greeks. So many of these played such an active and influential part in Turkish and Greek affairs that they are now commonly referred to as Phanariots. Odysseus, *op. cit.*, p. 306.

²Finlay, *History of Greece* (Oxford, 1877), vol. vi, p. 7.

Later on, in the Servian crisis (1805-12), Russia sent a councillor and various supplies to them, promising to support their cause if they would accept the Russian protectorate with a Phanariot prince. But the Servians soon came to distrust their Greek Metropolitan, who kept up familiar relations with the Russian councillor; and the fear of Greek influence had much weight, during that struggle, in keeping Servia from forming a closer alliance with Russia.¹

When Austria joined with Russia back in 1788, preparatory to a decisive struggle against Turkey, the Servians again readily volunteered against the Porte, and many of them fought in a body, under Austrian commanders.² Jealousy among the maritime powers and fear occasioned by the upheaval in France hurried the conclusion of peace (1791-92), however, and, in keeping with England's demands, the treaty was on the basis of the strict *status quo ante bellum*.³ Again, and quite contrary to expectations, Servia was left to form a part of the Ottoman territory, but under a general amnesty, nevertheless, for Servians who had fought against Turkey, and with the agreement that those who had left the principality or had been driven from their homes might return to their estates. The intervention of the European powers had at least rendered their return to the dominion of the Porte a *fait accompli*. But many of them had received a training in the Austrian service, nevertheless, that was soon to be turned to account.⁴

The next two Pashas of Belgrade endeavored to rule in a way that would naturally lead the Servians to favor the Turkish administration, and there was a beginning now

¹ Odysseus, *op. cit.*, p. 308; Finlay, *History of Greece*, vol. v, pp. 2, 4; vol. vi, pp. 2, 6, 7.

² Holland, *op. cit.*, p. 12; Menzies, *op. cit.*, p. 319.

³ Ranke, *op. cit.*, pp. 93-105.

⁴ Menzies, *op. cit.*, p. 324.

among these people of contentment and prosperity. This brief period of ten years followed the expulsion of the Janisaries from Servian territory because they would not give up their opposition to the Pasha, and their habits of plundering the rayahs. In the general weakness of the Ottoman empire at that time, groups of brigands began to overrun European Turkey, and it was not long before the expelled Janisaries united with one of these bands and made an effort to force their way back into Servia (1804). The Turkish Pasha of Belgrade now took an unprecedented step in calling the Servian rayahs to arms, and they fought side by side with their Mohammedan neighbors, against the invaders. This united force continued to be victorious until the Sultan weakened, and ordered the Pasha to reinstate the Janisaries.¹ It was not long, however, before one of these who had returned shot a former Servian leader for refusing to comply with his unjust demand, and when the Pasha undertook to punish the murderer the Janisaries quickly united and the Pasha was slain. The supreme authority in Servia was then taken over by four chiefs of the Janisaries, and they sent others of their number into the provincial towns, where they were unmerciful in their exactions, and exercised the power of life and death. When the Sultan hinted that he would send an army against them if they did not modify their conduct, the Janisaries felt sure that it must be the purpose at Constantinople to arm the Servians against them. Accordingly, they at once fell to killing off all the possible leaders among the natives (1804). In sheer desperation, the Servian leaders quickly roused their people, and within a few weeks the Janisaries were driven out, and the native leaders and their followers were left in control.

¹ Ranke, *op. cit.*, ch. vi; Menzies, *op. cit.*, p. 324.

It was at this stage that the Servians determined to make an appeal to some Christian power to intervene in their behalf.¹ At different times, they had fought with and for Austria; but Austria, they remembered, had always returned conquered territory and its inhabitants to the Porte. They were fully aware, also, of the effectual way in which the Tsar of Russia had cared for the interests of the Wallachians and the Moldavians. So they were not long in deciding to apply to Russia; and accordingly, in August, 1804, three Servian representatives were sent to St. Petersburg. These returned the next February, to say that Russia would help in Constantinople to secure compliance with their requests, so soon as these were laid before the Ottoman government. Deputies were then sent to Constantinople (1805), where they were soon imprisoned; and the Sultan sent a pasha to assume control in Servia.

But the Serbs already had a native leader, Kara George, a simple peasant; and they determined that they would not surrender their country to the Sultan's representative until they were given some reason to hope for some amelioration of their former condition. From that time the Servians were fighting, not a party, but the Ottoman empire, and they looked to Russia for support.² However, they began the struggle alone, and by the middle of the next year (1806), excepting the fortresses, their territory was free from Ottoman soldiers. An embassy was again sent to Constantinople. Realizing now the danger of a closer alliance between the Servians and the Russians, the Porte agreed to concede all the requests of the Servians on condition of being paid a fixed annual tax and having an official

¹ Ranke, *op. cit.*, ch. vi; Menzies, *op. cit.*, pp. 144-5.

² Menzies, *op. cit.*, pp. 330-351.

in Belgrade with one hundred and fifty Turks.¹ These promised concessions would have made the country practically independent; but late in the autumn the Porte refused to ratify the terms already agreed upon, and the Servians then fought their way into the fortresses.²

There was already a sort of representative central government among the Servians, carried on by two groups of native councilors. Each of the twelve districts into which their territory was divided had a military chief, and these leaders held an assembly (*Skupschtina*, from *skupti*, to assemble) each year, soon after New Year's Day, and made necessary plans for war and attended to matters relating to finance and judicature. The need of another council, however, was soon apparent, and in 1805, a Senate (*Sowiet*) composed of one elected representative from each district, had begun its meetings. This body began at once to establish schools and courts of justice, and undertook to care for the civil affairs of the whole country.

The success of Kara George as a leader in the field, however, soon laid the foundation for his real leadership in both civil and military matters. As the war went on, there were instances of merciless vengeance; and cruel jealousies among native leaders bore deadly fruit. The Tsar sent companies of soldiers, and gave aid to the Servians from time to time in various other ways; so when Turkey made liberal proposals to Kara George (1811), with the idea of inducing him to renounce the protectorate of Russia, he communicated with the Russian headquarters and then informed the Porte that he would accept such terms as might be agreed upon between the Sultan and the Tsar.³ The treaty of peace that followed (Bucharest, 1812) was undoubtedly

¹ Ranke, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

² *Ibid.*, p. 200.

³ Ranke, *op. cit.*, chs. xii, xiii; Menzies, *op. cit.*, pp. 351-352.

a disappointment to the Servians.¹ It stipulated, nevertheless, that their peace must not be disturbed; and Turkey agreed, “as a mark of her generosity,” to come to an understanding with them in the matter of regulations for carrying out this promise.

Throughout the career of Napoleon, affairs in Turkey were a sort of barometer of many of his undertakings; and at this time the Tsar’s necessity for concentrating all his forces in Russia against the invading army of the French left the Servians without any material support.² In fact, the turn in the great conflict in the West in 1813 might well have led them to despair of receiving any aid until that struggle should end. Because of the general indefiniteness of the terms of the treaty of Bucharest relating to Servia, and also owing to the prevailing conditions, it is not strange that the two parties differed in interpreting the promises that had been made. The Ottomans claimed that the treaty of Bucharest required the Servians to surrender the fortresses and their arms and ammunition, and to allow the banished Turks to return. The Servians were not willing to accept that interpretation; but after a Turkish army reached their frontier (May, 1813), Kara George offered his submission, on condition that the expelled Ottomans should not be allowed to return.³ Their return, he held, would be sure to disturb the peace of the country. But the Porte would delay no longer, and the Turkish forces pressed on into Servia.⁴ French influence at Constantinople, and the expectation of receiving the assistance of France, are claimed to have influenced the Turks in hurrying forward what proved to be

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 19.

² Dennis, *Eastern Problems at the Close of the Eighteenth Century*, ch. iii.

³ Ranke, *op. cit.*, p. 270.

⁴ Menzies, *op. cit.*, p. 352.

a successful attempt to reconquer that territory.¹ On the third of October, Kara George, abandoning his countrymen, fled from Servia. His example was quickly followed by the senators and many of the other Servian leaders, and resistance to the Turks was soon abandoned. The Servians as a whole had made a good effort to defend their country; but their warrior chiefs who had so often led them to victory during the eight years before the treaty of Bucharest (1812), for one cause and another, were now no longer in command. The changes incident to the acquirement of monarchial power by one chief—Kara George—had driven away a number of the former leaders and had lessened the spirit of self-reliance in the several districts.² Ranke has most carefully traced the history of Servia, and he tells us that in this struggle, “from some incomprehensible cause,” Kara George did not appear upon the scene of battle.

One of the native leaders, however, Milosh Obrenovitch, would not desert his countrymen, and he was soon recognized by the Ottoman authorities as a man who could aid the Porte in pacifying the country. Accordingly they promised to make him governor of a district if he would help toward that end. Milosh accepted the proposal, and was at once appointed governor of three districts. For two years he kept his promise; but the increasing atrocities perpetrated by the Turks upon his people, the fear for his own life and very probably the utter defeat of the French, finally induced him to become the leader of his people (Palm Sunday, 1815) in still another attempt to throw off the severe burdens imposed upon them by the local Turkish misrule.³ Within a year the Ottomans outside the fortresses were conquered, and the Porte then dispatched two large armies against the

¹ Ranke, p. 274.

² *Ibid.*, ch. xiii.

³ Ranke, *op. cit.*, pp. 299–302.

insurgents. But these forces were very cautiously halted at the Servian frontier. The Russian ambassador at Constantinople had already inquired of the Sultan: “What war is this now going on in Servia, contrary to the stipulations of the treaty?” and the members of the Hetaeria (a secret political society of Greeks) were spreading their doctrine of the possibility, through opposition to the Sultan and loyalty to the Tsar, of freeing the Greeks from Ottoman rule.¹ There was fear also among the Turkish leaders that the Holy Alliance threatened dire consequences to the Mohammedan government.² The commanding pasha led the Servians to hope for liberal concessions; and representatives of both sides returned in about a month from Constantinople with the Sultan’s firman of peace. In this imperial decree, the pasha was appointed to the pashalic of Belgrade and simply instructed “that as God had entrusted the Servians to the Sultan, so the Sultan recommended them to the pasha, and that by kind treatment towards these people he would best perform his duty.”³ This new Turkish governor then proceeded to Belgrade. After a little time Milosh and the other chiefs appeared before him, and to his thrice-repeated question, “Are ye Servians subject to the Grand Signor (the Sultan)?” Milosh answered each time, “We are subject to him;” and it was sixty years before the Servians took up arms again against the Constantinople government.

The Servians were now allowed to retain their arms and were themselves to collect the taxes and administer justice for their people in the provincial towns. A National Assembly was formed, similar to the former senate, which exercised the functions of a national chancery court. The Turkish authorities also granted a number of important

¹ Ranke, *op. cit.*, p. 323; Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. vi, p. 98.

² Ranke, *op. cit.*, p. 336.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 327.

privileges to Milosh, personally; and in 1817 the chiefs of the several districts agreed to recognize him as the supreme chief (*knes*) and to make his official position hereditary. Milosh thus possessed a double authority, and he went on taking more and more power unto himself from both sides, until his downfall in 1839.

The government and the territory of the Ottomans were important factors in nearly all the movements connected with Napoleon's campaigns. Nevertheless, that empire and the appeals of some of its people—the Greeks and the Serians, especially—were wholly ignored in the many conferences which undertook, in connection with the series of treaties of 1814-1815, to provide for the “peace”, the “repose”, and the “tranquillity”, of Europe.¹ That there was no discussion of Turkish affairs in these conferences is claimed to have been due to the influence of the Tsar, Alexander I.² Russia was thus left with greater freedom of action in that part of Europe.

Through the activity of the Tsar, Russia certainly played a very important rôle in the overthrow of the Napoleonic régime, as well as in the attempt to solidify and perpetuate the territorial and governmental regulations established in the reorganization of Europe (1814-15). Among all his associates in these various efforts to provide for lasting peace in Europe, Alexander was for a time pre-eminent in the field of what his guide-to-be, Metternich, called “wrong ideas of liberalism and philanthropy—erroneous theories in themselves, and ridiculous in their application.”³ For nearly a decade after the Congress at Vienna, Europe was

¹ Hertslet, *Map of Europe by Treaty* (London, 1875), vol. i.

² Metternich, *Memoirs*, translated by Napier (New York, 1880), vol. iv, p. 63; Wilkinson, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

³ Metternich, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 317.

largely under the control of these two personalities; but the ultra-conservative Count Metternich, as Austria's prime minister, was so resourceful and relentless that his was the dominant influence. He tells us that the Tsar's judgment was always influenced by fanciful ideas, and that his strength of character was not sufficient to maintain the balance of his different inclinations. Metternich knew how and when to fill Alexander's mind with forebodings of the machinations of secret societies and the horrors of revolutions, and thus win the emperor's support in furthering his own reactionary policies.¹

When the conference of Aix-la-Chapelle (1818) withdrew the allied troops from French territory, that act was considered by the Quadruple Alliance as the "completion of the political system destined to insure the solidity of the work of peace."² A new union, including France, was then formed, which Metternich called "the moral Pentarchy."³ This union, the five contracting powers affirmed, "is the more real and durable inasmuch as it depends on no separate interest or temporary combination, and can only have for its object the maintenance of general peace; and this intimate union," they continued, "established among the monarchs, offers to Europe the most sacred pledge of its tranquillity." These allies were to hold meetings from time to time. Lord Castlereagh, England's Foreign Secretary, was willing to say that he thought the "reunions to be a new discovery in the European government . . . , giving to the councils of the powers the efficiency and almost the simplicity of a single state."⁴ It was not long,

¹ Metternich, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 333; vol. iii, pp. 58, 665.

² Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 573.

³ Comprising Austria, England, France, Prussia and Russia.

⁴ *Correspondence, Despatches, and Other Papers, of Viscount Castle-*

however, before the two constitutional monarchies found themselves unable to follow the absolutists of the East in going to Naples (1821) simply to "fight against and repel rebellion," on the plea of going "to the assistance of subdued peoples," and going "in support of their liberty." The declaration of the allied sovereigns of Austria, Prussia and Russia, May, 1821, clearly stated that those countries intended to preserve "the independence and the rights of each State," as then recognized in existing treaties.¹

Such was the feeling of the allied monarchs of Europe toward all disturbers of the peace of nations, when an embassy of Servians arrived in Constantinople (1820) to demand of the Porte what they regarded as Servia's rights, granted in the Peace of Bucharest (1812). It was an inopportune effort to influence the Sultan's government, and the embassy had no other immediate result but the imprisonment of the Servian representatives soon after they reached the Turkish capital. About this time an armed rebellion against Ottoman authority was started by Greeks who were in Wallachia and Moldavia. Milosh then at once relinquished all efforts with the Porte, and turned his attention to the extension of his own authority throughout Servia. Fearing that the Servians might join with the leaders of the rebellion in the Danubian provinces, the Turkish governor in Belgrade offered little or no resistance to Milosh's aggressive policy. The chieftains in the several districts, however, and later on the peasants in general, forcibly resisted, for a short time,

reagh (Third series, London, 1853), vol. xii, p. 55. Prince Metternich's confidence in concerted efforts is clearly discernible in such expressions as the following: "The limits of states are of late years firmly and inviolably fixed by diplomatic negotiations . . . —political repose rests on fraternization between monarchs, and on the principle of maintaining that which is." Metternich, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 199.

¹ Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. i, pp. 664, 667.

the monarchial tendencies of their Grand Knes (Milosh). But the idea of their possible liberation from the Ottomans had already given life and abiding force to the spirit of nationality, and that bond of common aspiration and mutual sympathy triumphed for more than a decade over jealousies and disappointments. Under the authority of Milosh, there came to be a good degree of internal unity.

WALLACHIA, MOLDAVIA, AND SERVIA, IN CONNECTION WITH THE GREEK INSURRECTION, 1821-29

After the treaty of Bucharest was signed (1812) the Porte soon established its authority in the Danubian principalities, but the Turkish army was not withdrawn. This continued occupation of Wallachia and Moldavia and the atrocities perpetrated upon the Greeks in Constantinople, called forth from time to time unavailing remonstrances from the Russian ambassador. He finally delivered a note to the Porte (July 18, 1821) allowing only eight days for an answer. In brief his demands were: that the Greek churches that had been destroyed and plundered should immediately be restored; that the Christian religion should be restored to its prerogatives by granting it the protection it formerly enjoyed and by guaranteeing its inviolability for the future, and that the Turkish government should enable Russia, by virtue of existing treaties, to contribute to the pacification of the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia.¹ Two days before this note was handed to the Porte, Lord Castlereagh wrote the Emperor Alexander a long and interesting letter, pointing out that the dreadful events then afflicting Turkey were but “a branch of that organized spirit of insurrection which was systematically propagating itself throughout Europe,” and expressing his “sanguine per-

¹ Stapleton, *The Political Life of George Canning* (London, 1831), vol. i, ch. iv.

suasion" that the Tsar would determine to maintain "inviolably" the European System, as consolidated by the late treaty of peace.¹ The letter fully recognized the ample provocation that the Emperor had for intervening but suggested several reasons why he should not do so, and it concluded by urging that Alexander "could afford to temporize and to suffer the tempest to exhaust itself."² The Porte did not answer Russia's ultimatum within the specified eight days, and the Russian ambassador, who already had his instructions, left at once for Odessa, with the whole of his embassy. By this time the Greeks were already fighting with some success in their own country against the Turks.

A few days after the ambassador's departure, the Porte sent to St. Petersburg an unsatisfactory reply to the Russian demands. The Tsar's request for the "good offices of the other Christian embassies at Constantinople" followed, and called forth instructions from London and Vienna, directing the British and Austrian ambassadors at the Porte to urge upon the Sultan the need of making concessions. Russia soon renewed her demands at Constantinople (October, 1821), with some additions, and two months later the Porte made an unsatisfactory conditional promise to fulfil the Tsar's latest requirements.³ By this time, England and Austria had arrived at the conclusion that it was necessary that Russia should refrain from any hostile act against Turkey.⁴ Metternich used all his powers to induce the Russian government to delay any act of war; and when the Tsar consented to make further pacific efforts to arrive

¹ Meaning the European treaty, at the close of the Napoleonic wars—1815. See Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. i.

² *Correspondence and Despatches of Castlereagh*, vol. xii, pp. 403-8.

³ Stapleton, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 191.

⁴ Metternich, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 558.

at a good understanding with the Sultan, the proud minister of Austria considered that he had achieved “perhaps the greatest victory that one cabinet had ever gained over another” (May, 1822). Prince Metternich was far too sanguine, however, when he avowed his conviction that what he called the “mistakes of the Russian minister and the rectitude of the conceptions and conduct of the allied Cabinets” had destroyed the influence that the Russian cabinet had so long exercised over the Sultan’s government, and “that a new era had opened for the Turkish empire.¹

Although Russia had been checked in its policy of intervention the redoubled efforts of England and Austria soon began to have a more marked influence on the Sultan’s policies, and it was not long before he issued orders for his armies to evacuate the Danubian principalities. He determined now, likewise, to free those provinces from Phanariot rule, and appointed a native hospodar to govern in each principality.² Moreover, in relation to the other Russian demands, the Turkish ministers claimed that their government was proceeding to rebuild churches, and “that every degree of indulgence and forgiveness would be granted to the Greek people.”³ Thus, when the congress of the Allies, at Verona (1822), held a conference on the relations between Russia and Turkey, it appeared that the only matters still at issue were the need that the Porte should renew the amnesty to the Greeks, restore to Russia former privileges of navigation in the Black Sea, and make

¹ Metternich, *op. cit.*, pp. 609–50.

² A hundred years had passed since Moldavia and Wallachia were deprived of the privilege—or rather the treaty right—of having native governors. All this time these provinces had been administered by men selected by the Sultan from among the official aristocratic class of Greeks in Constantinople. *Cf. supra*, pp. 15 *et seq.*

³ Stapleton, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 203.

some conciliatory overtures to the St. Petersburg government with a view of re-establishing diplomatic relations between the two countries. In the Verona conference, interference in the struggle going on between Turks and Greeks was not even proposed; but the allies agreed to urge the Porte to concede Russia's demands and thus restore diplomatic relations with the Tsar.¹ Alexander, however, expressed the conviction that public opinion would, in time, compel the British ministry to take the condition of Greece into consideration; and he suggested that the utmost extent of his wishes would be to see the Greeks placed on the same footing as the inhabitants of Servia or of Wallachia and Moldavia.² For some time yet the one object and aim of English diplomacy, and of Austrian also, was the preservation of peace between the Turks and the Russians. France, however, was more anxious to aid the Greeks.³ Canning's main object was to avert the danger that "Russia would swallow up Greece at one mouthful and Turkey at another."⁴

In the early part of the year 1823, the Ottoman government assumed a more defiant attitude; and the aid given to the Greek cause by British subjects somewhat weakened the influence of the English ambassador with the Sultan's government. Nevertheless, on the demand of the ambassador, the Turkish ministers held a conference with him, with the result that the Ottoman government promised to concede the particular demands of Russia in respect to commerce.⁵ Throughout all these efforts to direct the action of both Russia and Turkey, England and Austria, in particular,

¹ Stapleton, *op. cit.*, p. 208 *et seq.*

² *Ibid.*, p. 213.

³ Debidour, *Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe* (Paris, 1891), vol. i, pp. 212 *et seq.*

⁴ Stapleton, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 377.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 388.

were most anxious to separate the question of Russia's grievances against the Porte, in connection with treaty rights, from the matter of giving help to the Greeks.

Russia obstinately refused to send an ambassador to Constantinople until the Turkish troops were all withdrawn from the Danubian principalities. The Porte learned, however, through the public prints, that Russia intended to bring about the pacification of Greece also. This led Turkey to determine, against the most urgent advice of Austria, that she would not evacuate the principalities until some settlement should be made including all her subjects then in revolt.¹

England was now invited by the Russian government to take part in a conference of the Allies at St. Petersburg on the affairs of Greece; and in January, 1824, a general scheme for the pacification of that territory was suggested by Russia. The main proposition was that the Porte should retain its sovereignty there and receive a fixed tribute but should allow continental Greece to be divided into three principalities and should grant to each a large measure of independence. England recognized Russia's right by treaty, if on friendly terms with the Porte, to interfere in behalf of the Greeks and to consult her allies in reference to the exercise of that right. But Russia had no minister at the Porte at this time, and therefore the British cabinet could not consent to take part in discussing the above propositions without renouncing its former attitude (1821-22), which was that the European Allies possessed no right of jurisdiction over the internal affairs of a sovereign state.² The plan adopted by the St. Petersburg conference for the

¹ Stapleton, *op. cit.*, pp. 397, 401.

² *Wellington's Dispatches, Correspondence and Memoranda* (London, 1868), vol. iii, p. 157.

pacification of Greece was prematurely published, and deeply offended both the Greeks and the Ottomans.¹ Under these circumstances, the Porte did not hurry forward the restoration of the *status quo* in the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, and Russia accordingly delayed sending a minister with full powers to Constantinople. A little later on, after the Turkish forces were mostly withdrawn from Wallachia and Moldavia (1824), Russia put forth the claim that the civil *status quo* had been a part of the requirement, and still refused to re-establish full diplomatic relations with the Sultan's government.²

The Greeks now turned to Great Britain, and voted to place themselves under the protection of that country (August, 1825); but the English government would only promise to contribute its good offices toward the termination of the contest. Alexander was exasperated by the failure of his allies to come to an agreement with him on an effective plan for settling his difficulties with the Porte. This was the situation when the Tsar died, in December, 1825. The successor, Nicholas I, promptly announced his intention to carry into execution the "last wishes and intentions" of the late emperor. At the same time, also, some who had been connected with the government under Alexander declared that his latest resolve had been upon immediate war with Turkey.³ Having been solicited by the provisional Greek government to mediate in behalf of the Greeks, Mr. George Canning, England's Foreign Secretary, now felt that his government had real grounds on which Greek af-

¹ Debidour, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 217.

² Wellington, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 470-82, 531.

³ Joyneville, *Life and Times of Alexander I* (London, 1875), vol. iii, p. 336; Stapleton, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 468; Wellington, *Dispatches, etc., op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 172 *et seq.*

fairs might be discussed with Russia. Accordingly, with the purpose of preventing Russia from going to war with Turkey, the Duke of Wellington was sent to St. Petersburg (February, 1826), and was instructed to offer the "single intervention" of Great Britain between the Tsar and the Sultan, and also between the latter and the Greeks. The Duke found that the Tsar Nicholas was not much concerned about the Greeks, but that he had already determined (March, 1826) to issue an ultimatum to the Porte, and to require an answer within a month. This was to be a peremptory demand for the execution of treaties respecting the Danubian principalities, and for the release of the Servian deputies, still imprisoned (since 1820) in Constantinople.¹ The ultimatum was to require, moreover, that Turkish plenipotentiaries should be sent to the Russian frontier in order to settle the arrangements for executing the treaty of Bucharest. Wellington tried to delay the sending of this note. Failing in this he finally made efforts to have the time allowed for an answer extended, and to have the demand relating to the meeting of plenipotentiaries left out.² The ultimatum was presented to the Porte (April, 1826), six weeks being now allowed to the Sultan in which to return an answer. At this juncture, France and Austria joined with England in urging the Sultan to concede the Tsar's demands; and before the time expired, Turkey promised that the three requirements would be fulfilled.³

The plenipotentiaries of the Sultan and of the Tsar met (July-October, 1826) and concluded the treaty of Ackermann.⁴ The treaty of Bucharest was thereby confirmed,

¹ Cf. *supra*, p. 32; Wellington, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 179 *et seq.*

² Wellington, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, pp. 172, 181, 224-33.

³ Stapleton, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 479, 494.

⁴ Menzies, *op. cit.*, p. 365.

and some important stipulations were added. According to the terms of the new treaty the hospodars of Wallachia and Moldavia were to be elected for seven years, and were to be selected in each province by the General Assembly of the nobles. The two governors thus chosen were to be required to "take into consideration the representations of Russian ministers on the subject of taxes, together with the maintenance of the privileges of the country." The nobles who had left during disturbances were to be permitted to return to their estates, and all the inhabitants were to enjoy liberty of commerce. A separate act, relating to Servia, set forth the interpretation of Article VIII of the treaty of Bucharest, as held by the Servians in 1813; and the Porte now promised to settle the Servian demands in concert with Servian deputies and to communicate the details of the settlement to the court of Russia within eighteen months.¹

The treaty of Ackerman temporarily separated the Greek question from other matters that had been in dispute between Russia and Turkey since 1821.² But even before the Porte promised to satisfy Russia in reference to the principalities and Servia, in particular, the English government had come to an agreement with the Tsar (April 4, 1826) regarding the pacification of Greece.³ The Greeks had asked England to interpose with the object of bringing about a settlement of their differences with Turkey, and hence Canning took the initiative, at this time, in coming to an understanding with Russia. These two powers agreed to try mediation; but whether the reconciliation should be brought about by intervention in concert, or separately, Greece was to be made a dependency of Tur-

¹ See *supra*, p. 27.

² For the treaty of Ackerman, see Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 474.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 741.

key, with an independent internal government. Neither England nor Russia was to seek in the settlement any territory or any exclusive influence. The Ottoman government continued, however, to reject every offer of mediation in relation to the Greeks. France then joined with England and Russia in the treaty of London (July, 1827). In the battle of Navarino, as is well known, the ships of these allies destroyed the Turkish and Egyptian fleets (October), but the Sultan now became even more defiant. Then Nicholas proposed more severe measures.¹ Wellington, now England's prime minister, was fearful of consequences and pleaded for delay of hostilities. But on the twenty-sixth of April, 1828, in a lengthy declaration of war, accompanied with a comprehensive manifesto accusing the Ottoman Porte of "trampling under foot the Convention of Ackerman, and therewith all preceding treaties," Russia reopened the entire Eastern question, and moved her armies into Turkish territory.² Moldavia and Wallachia were occupied (May, 1828) and administered by Russia; and when the Tsar's army reached Adrianople, the Porte asked for an armistice, and on September fourteenth, 1829, the treaty of Adrianople was signed.³

The terms of this treaty advanced the Danubian provinces and Servia a long way towards independence. Moldavia and Wallachia were left under the suzerainty of the Porte, but were granted independent national governments, and liberty of commerce. The hospodars of these provinces were to be elected as before, but with the term of office, hence-

¹ *State Papers—British and Foreign*—vol. xvii, p. 30.

² Wellington, *Dispatches, Correspondence and Memoranda*, vol. iv, pp. 204-5, 273 *et seq.* The declaration and the manifesto may be found in Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 777.

³ Hertslet, vol. ii, p. 813.

forth, for life. Turkey was required to give up every fortified place on the left bank of the Danube. After eighteen months no Moslems were to be allowed to reside in these two provinces, and none except merchants with special permits were even to visit that territory. Turkey relinquished all right, moreover, to demand supplies of any kind from Wallachia and Moldavia; and payment of taxes was not to begin there until two years after the Russians should evacuate the territory. Under some other specified circumstances, these two provinces were to pay definite sums to the Porte; but it was stipulated that, with the exception of these dues, "there should never be exacted from Moldavia or Wallachia, nor from the hospodars, any other tribute, contribution, or gift, under any pretext whatever." Russia exacted from Turkey a war indemnity, and payment for the losses of merchants, amounting to about \$28,000,000; and until full payment should be made—to be within ten years—Russia was to continue her occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia.¹

It was admitted that circumstances had kept the Porte from carrying out the terms of the treaty of Ackerman (1826), in reference to Servia. But now (1829) it was stipulated that the six districts previously detached from Servia must immediately become a part of that province; and the Porte was to have but one month in which to formulate the regulations and issue the necessary orders for carrying into execution in Servia the present stipulations confirming the rights of that province, as given in the treaty

¹The British Foreign Office complained of the excessive exactions of the treaty of Adrianople, and held that more liberal terms for Turkey might well have been expected. "The Treaty," wrote the Earl of Aberdeen (1829), "appears to vitally affect the interests, the strength, the dignity, the present safety, and the future independence of the Ottoman Empire." *Parliamentary Papers* (1854), vol. lxxii, p. 1.

of Ackerman. Moreover, it was required that within that time such regulations and orders should be communicated to the Court of Russia. Within half the time allowed the Sublime Porte issued to Servia the necessary Hatti-Sheriff, in which the Turkish governor and the Cadi of Belgrade were commanded to turn over to the Servians the administration of the internal affairs of the country, with the six districts annexed. These officials were likewise instructed to grant substantially the privileges that had been claimed by the Servians in 1813, under the treaty of Bucharest.¹ No Musulmans, except those left to guard the fortresses, were to be permitted henceforth to reside in this province; and as merchants, with their own passports, Servians were now to pass, at pleasure, throughout Turkish territory.

SERVIA—FROM THE TREATY OF ADRIANOPOLE TO THE TREATY
OF PARIS—1829-1856

Within a year following the making of the treaty of Adrianople, and after full consultation with Servian deputies at Constantinople, the Sultan issued a firman, which was ostensibly intended to insure to the Servian nation the "inviolability and stability" of all the privileges heretofore granted to that province.² In keeping with the request of

¹ The Pasha, or governor of Belgrade, was the Sultan's representative, charged with the duty of administering the province. After the Servian uprising in 1804, however, the jurisdiction of that official was cut down more and more, until, by the withdrawal of the last of the Turks in 1867, he was left without any place in Servia. The Cadi (or Kadi), in Turkey, is a town or village magistrate, who administers the religious law, under the Sheik-ul-Islam—the Sultan's representative for the realm in religious matters. Since the religious law of the Mohammedans (the Sheri) is extended so as to apply to nearly all the activities of Moslems, as well as to questions relating to real property in Turkey, the Sheik-ul-Islam and his subordinates exercise very important legal as well as ecclesiastical functions. For the text of this Imperial mandate (Hatti-Sheriff), see Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 832.

² *Ibid.*, p. 842. A firman is an edict of the Turkish government, and

the people, Milosh Obrenovitch was to continue to be the prince, that dignity now being made hereditary in the Obrenovitch family. Prince Milosh was instructed by the Sultan to rule in the name of the Sublime Porte, and to administer the internal affairs of the country, in concert with the Council and the Assembly of the chiefs and elders of the nation. The authorities of the Porte in Servia (the Governor and the Cadi) were now commanded by the Sultan not to interfere in the affairs of the country, and not to exact the smallest amount (even $1/10$ of one cent) beyond the permanently fixed tribute. A number of other privileges were likewise granted to the Servians, such as the right to establish printing offices, post offices, hospitals, schools, etc.; and the metropolitan and bishops that the Servians should appoint, were to be confirmed by the Patriarch of Constantinople, without their being obliged to go to the capital of the empire for confirmation. This privilege of electing metropolitans and bishops from their own nation, was looked upon by the Servians as a special blessing; and it was enacted that the bishops should now receive a fixed salary from the public treasury.¹ Turkish and Russian commissioners traveled over Servia at this time for the purpose of settling its boundaries. When their report was ready (1833), the Sultan issued another firman ordering the boundary to be fixed in accordance with the maps and information furnished, and also allowing the Turks five years more in which to sell their estates and leave Servia.² (Mus-

may be signed by a Minister of State; while a Hatti-Sheriff is in the nature of an irrevocable order or decree signed by the Sultan.

¹ Ranke, *op. cit.*, ch. xx.

² Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 929. Thirty years later this last part of the firman had not been carried out, and an armed struggle between the two races then led to all Mussulmans being withdrawn from Servia. Cf. *infra*, ch. ii, p. 77.

sulmans in the fortresses and in the city of Belgrade were to be permitted to remain).

The relations between the Servians and the Ottomans, as now adjusted left little cause for further agitation in Servia, at the moment, against the Turks. But some of Milosh's staff of officials were again displeased with his extreme monarchial tendencies. He failed to respect the private rights of his people, and he soon appeared to consider inferior officers as so many servants, with no other duty than to do his bidding. He spared the peasants many hardships, however, for he resolutely refused to distribute fiefs and thus to create a class of overbearing landlords. But early in 1835, the opposition to him became more aggressive, and was found to be so well organized that the prince promised to allow some limit to his personal rule. A charter was accordingly drawn up and duly accepted by Servians; but the Porte, and some of the other powers, would not permit the operation of anything like a constitution granted under the pressure of a popular uprising. In accordance with the wish of the Sultan, Milosh now visited Constantinople, and soon after his return his official Gazette announced that the people were happy in having the Prince as their master. Meanwhile, his monopoly of trade grew more and more extensive; and those who had opposed him were now sorely persecuted. Russia warned him, and the Sultan required him to send a deputation to Constantinople (1837). These deputies and the Porte, with the Russian court in full accord, were not long in preparing for Milosh and his people a charter that was very similar to the constitutions of Western states. Strangely enough, the absolute monarchies favored this constitution, with its limitations on the authority of the prince, while France and England opposed the grant of so much liberty to a people not yet ready, it was argued, for self-government.

Under this new constitution a senate of seventeen life members was created, together with courts and a central administration made up of four officers, who were to preside respectively over foreign affairs, home affairs, finance, and justice and education. All details were carefully worked out, and it may be said that the constitution of 1838 represents an excellent system of checks and balances.¹ The senate of seventeen members could exercise so much authority, however, that Milosh, in his disappointment at the loss of supreme leadership, early convinced some of his people that they would now be obliged to satisfy seventeen masters. A half-hearted revolt in favor of the prince was soon suppressed; and when Milosh would not consent to any division of authority, he was told by his rivals that he must leave. He resigned (June, 1839) in favor of his son and left his country. The eldest son, Milan, was already too ill to take the exiled father's place, and he died without knowing that he was really at the head of the government. Michael, a younger son, was then elected, and as he was but seventeen years of age, the Porte appointed two native chiefs to be his official counselors. With the support of his people, Michael rejected these counselors; but it was not long before he too fell into disfavor with some of the native leaders, who accused him, among other things, of giving too many places in the government to Austrian-Servians.²

The leaders of the opposition among the Servians soon joined with the Turks, who were displeased because the prince and his party rejected the counsel of the Sultan's appointees, and Prince Michael also was obliged to abdicate and to leave his country (August, 1842). The Skupschtna

¹ Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. i, p. 968.

² Ranke, *op. cit.*, ch. xxiii. Several of the Servian leaders were very anxious for the restoration of Milosh.

then promptly elected Alexander, son of Kara George, to fill the vacancy. Russia would not permit this change to be made, however, as a result of revolution, and demanded a new election, together with the deposition of the Pasha of Belgrade and the exile of the two counselors who had been leaders in the opposition to the late prince. Austria agreed with Russia that the concerns of Servia did not fall within the discussion of the five powers; so the Porte and Servia carried out the requirements of the Russian court, and Alexander was then regularly elected (June, 1843).¹ The movement thus culminated in the restoration of the Karageorgevich dynasty.

After these changes, Servia passed through a period of comparative quiet down to the Crimean War, and details may well be passed over.²

THE DANUBIAN PRINCIPALITIES — FROM THE TREATY OF ADRIANOPOLE TO THE CRIMEAN WAR—1829-1855

The treaty of Adrianople left Wallachia and Moldavia temporarily, as will be remembered, in the possession of Russia.³ The Tsar's government continued to occupy and administer these provinces for about six years, and during that time a constitution, commonly called the *Règlement Organique*, was framed for the government of the two principalities (1831).⁴ Unlike the conditions in Servia, these provinces had two quite distinct classes, the peasants and the so-called nobles. The *Règlement Organique* placed the government in the keeping of the nobles and the hospodars

¹ Russia, Prussia, Austria, England and France—Metternich's "Moral Pentarchy," formed in 1818. *Cf. supra*, p. 31.

² Ranke, *op. cit.*, pp. 383 *et seq.* *Cf. Minchin, Growth of Freedom in the Balkan Peninsula* (London, 1886), ch. iv.

³ *Supra*, p. 42.

⁴ Filitti, *Les Principautés roumaines sous l'occupation russe* (Bucharest, 1904), pp. 81 *et seq.*

for life whom they should elect. The common people shared in the affairs of their country simply by paying taxes. However, under Russian occupation, sanitation was greatly improved, and tribunals were created in order to secure a régime of justice between man and man. In the treaty of Adrianople, the Porte had agreed to confirm the administrative regulations which might be made in these principalities while they were occupied by Russian garrisons.¹ Accordingly, when Russia evacuated the two provinces (1834) the *Règlement Organique* was formally recognized by Turkey as the constitution of Wallachia and Moldavia. The boundaries and the amount of tribute to be paid to the Porte were also definitely specified.² A few months later the Sultan issued a Hatti-Sheriff guaranteeing the territory against incursions from the Turkish side, and giving the hospodars the right to regulate freely the internal affairs of the two provinces.

A national spirit was already manifest there in the movement for schools, and for the study of art and other branches. The hospodars and the nobles did not work together harmoniously, however, and the European revolutionary movement of 1848 found parties in these principalities, also, ready for revolt. Jealousies there among the nobles, together with the desire for freedom from Russian interference, and the wish for full political equality, were the underlying causes of the outbreak. Both Russia and Turkey promptly sent armies into these provinces and quickly restored order. In the treaty that followed (Balta-Liman, May, 1849), Russia and the Porte set aside some portions of the organic statute of 1831, and now appointed hospodars, not for life, but for a term of seven years. The two countries likewise

¹ Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 827.

² *Ibid.*, p. 936.

continued the suspension of the regular Assemblies, and sent a special commissioner from each Court to watch over the progress of affairs there, and to choose a commission of the most reputable nobles to revise the constitution.¹ This agreement between Russia and Turkey was for a term of seven years, and in the meantime each country was to keep in the province, or near by, a sufficient number of troops to maintain order and security in that territory. But before the seven years elapsed, however, the Crimean War began, and the whole situation was changed.²

MONTENEGRO—UP TO THE CRIMEAN WAR—1853

The latter half of the nineteenth century began with a series of events in southeastern Europe, which opened the way for still another group of the Sultan's people to steer toward statehood. Either because of the independent attitude of the Montenegrins, or because of their predatory practices, in 1852 the Porte sent an army against them. On the plea of avoiding the danger of consequent uprisings in her own neighboring territory, and supported by Russia, Austria promptly demanded and procured the withdrawal of the Turkish forces from Montenegro.³

The resolute resistance of the Montenegrins, together with the inaccessible nature of their country and the support of the Russians, coupled with the general confusion in Ottoman affairs, had enabled that little group of mountainers to withstand, for centuries, the many attempted invasions of the sultans, and to maintain throughout their history a large degree of liberty.⁴ When the Turks overran a

¹ Hertslet, *op. cit.*, p. 390.

² Menzies, *op. cit.*, pp. 389–90.

³ Denton, *Montenegro—Its People and Their History* (London, 1877), pp. 278–81.

⁴ Frilley & Wlahovitj, *Le Monténégro Contemporain* (Paris, 1876). Introduction.

part of the Balkan peninsula in the fifteenth century, some of the Servians found a safe retreat on the western slope of the Black Mountain (called by Venetians, Montenegro).¹ The extent of their territory was only something like sixty by thirty miles—sometimes more and sometimes less. From 1516 to 1851 they lived as a democracy of warriors, under the leadership of Vladikas, or prince-bishops.² It is said that down to 1800, these people had withstood attacks by Turkish armies in more than forty systematic campaigns.³ In 1711 they declared themselves subjects of Peter the Great, and from that time on, Russia assumed toward them the attitude of a protector, often aiding them, especially with money and counsel.⁴

THE CRIMEAN WAR AND SOME OF ITS IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES—1853-1856

The Roman Catholics at Jerusalem complained that the ecclesiastics of the Orthodox Greek church there had usurped some of the Holy Places which a century earlier had belonged to the Latins. The exclusive guardianship, it was claimed, of certain chapels which enshrined the monuments of some of the crusaders had, in course of time, passed from the Latins to the Greeks; and it was charged by the Latins that these chapels and monuments had been allowed to fall into a lamentable state of decay. The Latins expressed their anxiety to make the needed repairs, and, among other things, they asked for the vindication of their right to the possession of these chapels. The claims

¹ Freeman, *Historical Geography of Europe*, p. 428.

² Odysseus, *Turkey in Europe*, p. 276.

³ Edinburgh Review, vol. 109, p. 461.

⁴ Wilkinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 429, 482; Ranke, *op. cit.*, p. 215; DeTesta, *op. cit.*, vol. x, p. 373.

of the Roman Catholics were based on some stipulations in a treaty between France and Turkey (1740), and hence France took the lead (1850) in supporting the demands of the Latins. The Tsar of Russia very promptly made his influence felt at the Porte, also, in behalf of his co-religionists—the Greeks—and he soon demanded the maintenance of the *status quo* in respect to the Holy Places.

So it came about that while Austria was forcing the Sultan to abandon the attempt to punish the Montenegrins (1852-3), Russia was insisting that he should pronounce a verdict favoring a continuance of all the privileges heretofore possessed, at Jerusalem, by the Greek Church. Both France and Russia persistently pressed the Constantinople government for a settlement; and the Sultan found himself face to face with the unpleasant necessity of reconciling the rival claims of the two Churches, as well as the conflicting demands of the two great powers. Finally, in 1852, the Sultan issued a firman providing for a settlement in the form of a compromise. But the concessions thereby made to the Greeks and the Latins were soon found to overlap. Nevertheless, both France and Russia threatened demonstrations against Turkey unless the conflicting grants were carried into effect without delay.¹ Unremitting diplomatic efforts were kept up, however, especially on the part of England, and by the end of April, 1853, the Sultan issued another firman whereby the contradictory concessions were satisfactorily adjusted.²

But Russia had already (March 16 and April 19) requested from the Sultan a written Act that would afford the government of the Tsar “solid and inviolable pledges,” that, in the future, the Porte would protect the privileges and the immunities of the Orthodox Eastern church and its

¹ *Parliamentary Papers*, 1854, vol. lxxv, pp. 1 *et seq.* ² *Ibid.*, p. 183.

clergy.¹ The Sultan's government hesitated about the matter of pledges for the future. So within a few days after the privileges of the Greeks and Latins at Jerusalem had been harmonized, the Tsar's envoy to the Porte, Prince Menchikoff, demanded that within five days an answer should be given to Russia's request for guarantees.² Great Britain held that such a guarantee as was demanded would "extend the religious influence, and by that means the political power, of Russia, in Turkey," and determined that the Tsar should not receive from the Sultan any such pledges for the future.³

Russia contended, now, that she was not demanding a recognition of her right to protect the Christian subjects of the Ottoman empire, but that the requirement was merely a pledge for the future maintenance, by the Sultan, of the religious *status quo* of the Greek Church in Turkey. The Tsar professed to feel bound in honor to require, as a final demand, a "simple note," as "reparation for the past and a guarantee for the future." When, after much urging, it was seen that the "simple note" was not forthcoming, the Russian embassy was recalled from Constantinople, and Russian troops were sent to occupy and hold Moldavia and Wallachia, as a pledge for the desired guarantee (July, 1853).⁴ The hospodars departed, leaving the two provinces in the hands of the Russian generals. The Turkish declaration of war (October) was followed by that of Russia (November), and several battles ensued in these principalities. The next March (1854), England and France called on Russia to evacuate the two provinces; and when the Tsar refused to answer their communication, the two states, as the allies of

¹ *Parliamentary Papers*, 1854, vol. lxxv, pp. 160, 174. ² *Ibid.*, p. 182.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 179; Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 87.

⁴ *Parliamentary Papers*, (1854), vol. lxxi, pp. 209, 233, 243.

Turkey, began active operations against the Russians. Austria and Prussia were trying to avoid participation in the war, but becoming alarmed by the continued nearness of Russian troops in Moldavia and Wallachia, these two states formed an offensive and defensive alliance (April, 1854), and also summoned the Tsar to evacuate the two provinces (June 3).¹ Austria then entered into an agreement with the Porte (June 14), providing for Austrian occupation of Wallachia and Moldavia, until peace should be declared. During the period of such occupation, however, the local authorities in the principalities were to be free to govern in accordance with rights and privileges previously granted by Turkey.

The Servians had watched the warlike preparations in Austria, and becoming suspicious that there might be designs of invading their territory, they addressed a strong protest to the Porte, and promised to answer for the maintenance of tranquillity and public order in their country (April).² In December (1854), Austria, France and England entered into an alliance for concerted action in reference to possible terms of peace with Russia, and the occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia by Austrian troops. The sovereigns of these three states promised to each other, in the same connection, that they would join in an offensive and defensive alliance in case hostilities should break out, during the war, between Austria and Russia. The treaty was acceded to by Sardinia, in March, 1855.³

The death of Nicholas I (March 2, 1854) and the accession of Alexander II, together with the extended efforts of the warring powers to agree on terms of peace, did not have much bearing on the struggle that followed. It was not until after the inexpressible suffering and the bloody

¹ Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 1201.

² *Ibid.*, p. 1196.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 1221.

campaigns in the Crimea, that the Tsar bowed to the inevitable, and in the treaty of Paris (March, 1856) joined in the total annihilation of all the exclusive rights which his predecessors, in the struggles of three-quarters of a century, had wrung from the sultans.

Not long after the beginning of this contest, England, Austria and France declared (December, 1854) that the erroneous interpretation of the treaty of Koutchouk-Kainardji (1774) had been the principal cause of the war; and, at the same time, these powers determined that Russia must "renounce the pretension to take under an official protectorate" the Sultan's Christian subjects (Orthodox Greeks), and must also "renounce the revival of any of the articles of her former treaties" with Turkey, relating to Moldavia, Wallachia, or Servia.¹ The treaty of Paris (1856) satisfied these demands. Thus it was that the exclusive Russian protectorate over the Sultan's Christian provinces and the Greek Church in Turkey, was outlawed.

Whatever ambitions may have been cherished by Russia's rulers—from Peter the Great on—for more than half a century, by encouraging and in a large measure supporting and directing the efforts of groups of co-religionists in Turkey, that nation had helped these peoples to secure the privileges and the right of internal self-government.² Happily, the interdiction now of Russian interference in the Ottoman empire could not bring about the obliteration of what Russian diplomacy and Russian armies had helped to establish in the Danubian principalities, in Servia, and in Montenegro. Hopes and aspirations had been awakened in these provinces, looking toward a still more distinctively national life there. Nevertheless, the powers were content to do little more than

¹ Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 1225.

² *Parliamentary Papers* (1854), vol. lxxi, p. 845.

to stipulate in the treaty of 1856 that Wallachia, Moldavia, and Servia were to continue to enjoy such "rights and immunities" as they already possessed. Pledges were also given for the preservation in these provinces of independent and national administrations, as well as full liberty of worship, of legislation, of commerce, and of navigation; and there was to be no intervention without the previous agreement of the contracting powers.¹ A part of Bessarabia was taken from Russia and annexed to Moldavia, and provision was made for a commission charged with the duty of investigating the state of the Danubian principalities and of revising their laws and statutes. All the rights and privileges of the three provinces—Wallachia, Moldavia and Servia—were placed, by the treaty, under the guarantee, henceforward, of the contracting powers.²

While Montenegro was not mentioned in this treaty, it is significant that in the protocol of one of the conferences resulting in its formulation (March 25), the Sultan's plenipotentiary reiterated Turkey's claim to that province as an integral part of the Ottoman empire, and declared that the Porte had no intention of changing the *status quo* there. At the same time, also, Russia gave assurances that she did not claim any exclusively political relations with the Montenegrins.³

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¹ England, Russia, Austria, France, Prussia, Sardinia and Turkey.

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² For the general treaty of peace (Paris, March 30, 1856), see Hertslet, vol. ii, p. 1250. The Bessarabian territory taken from Russia was taken away from Roumania (united Moldavia and Wallachia) by the European powers in 1878 and restored to Russia.

³ *State Papers, op. cit.*, vol. xlvi, pp. 102, 104.

CHAPTER II

THE BALKAN PROVINCES UNDER THE PROTECTION OF THE EUROPEAN CONCERT—1856-1870

WELL might the treaty of Paris (1856) have seemed to inaugurate a new régime in relation to the affairs of the Ottoman empire. For the first time in its history that empire was now recognized as forming a component part of the great European system, and the Sublime Porte was formally “admitted to participate in the advantages of the Public Law and System (Concert) of Europe.”¹

In the famous Hatti-Humayoun (famous though futile) of February 18, 1856, the Sultan confirmed all the privileges and immunities heretofore granted to his non-Mussulman communities, and promised equal rights to all subjects, irrespective of race, religion or language.² Provision was also made in this imperial decree for needed reforms along various other lines; and we may discern in the firman the expression, at least, of a feeling that the empire had now been raised to a higher dignity, and had entered upon a new era.

The formulation and the promulgation of this definite and comprehensive Imperial edict was largely due to the untiring efforts of Stratford Canning (Viscount Stratford de Radcliffe). For sixteen years (1842-58), as England's ambassador at Constantinople, he kept up “active and friendly

¹ Peace of Paris (1856), Art. vii; Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 1254.

² *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 1243.

intervention" with the Porte, in order to bring about from within the reform of the Ottoman empire.¹

Mr. Canning felt very keenly, however, that unless some "force from without" should "keep up a steady animating pressure" on the Turkish authorities, this great Charter of Reforms would be merely "a lifeless paper, valuable only as a record of sound principles."² He tried to induce the London government to protest against placing in the treaty any promises or guarantees that would lead to the conclusion among Ottoman authorities that the Sultan was thereby rendered unquestionably secure in the possession of his dominions and in the exercise of absolute sovereignty. All his efforts in that direction, however, were unavailing. The powers that had conquered Russia were already committed to that policy; and such promises and guarantees were embodied in the treaty of Paris as would naturally inspire, at the Porte, an implicit confidence that the integrity and the independence of the empire had now become inviolable.³

Although the treaty of Paris lacks any specific guarantee that the signatories would defend the independence and territorial integrity of the Turkish empire, still there is in it engagements and guarantees that might well have seemed to free the Porte from all danger in this connection, because of coercion from without.⁴ Each of the contracting parties guaranteed the strict observance of its engagement to respect the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman empire, and any violation of the engagement was to be considered a "question of general interest." Moreover,

¹ Lane-Pool, *Life of Stratford Canning*, vol. ii, ch. xxii.

² Lane-Pool, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 437.

³ *Annual Register* (London, 1858), p. 183.

⁴ Moore, *International Law Digest* (Washington, 1896), vol. i, p. 20; Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 1281.

it was agreed that no one or more of the signatories should use force against the Porte without first giving the others an opportunity for mediation. Also, in recognizing the high value of the Sultan's communication to the powers (the Hatti-Humayoun of February 18, 1856), decreeing radical reforms, and "recording the Sultan's generous intentions toward the Christian population of his empire," it was expressly agreed that in no case could the communication of this edict give to the powers the "right to interfere, either collectively or separately, in the relations of the Sultan with his subjects, or in the internal administration of his empire."¹ Moreover, among other precautionary measures, the treaty neutralized the Black Sea, closed the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to foreign ships of war while the Porte was at peace, and provided for the free navigation of the Danube, under an international commission for improving and regulating the navigation of that river.² Then, also, before the ratifications of the treaty of Paris were exchanged (April 27, 1856), Great Britain, France and Austria signed a treaty of alliance (April 15, 1856), guaranteeing, jointly and severally, the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire recorded in the treaty of Paris, and agreeing to consider any infraction of the latter treaty as a *casus belli*.³

The treaty of Paris was a somewhat carefully devised system of checks and balances, with the primary purpose, it would appear, of providing for the peace and the perpetuity of the Ottoman empire.⁴ In general, the privileges of four

¹ Treaty of Paris (1856), arts. vi, ix.

² Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 1251; Holland, *The European Concert in the Eastern Question* (Oxford, 1885), p. 249.

³ Hertslet, vol. ii, p. 1280.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 1251. See especially the preamble and article i of the treaty of Paris.

parties are noted in the treaty: the Ottoman empire (politically and territorially); the contracting powers; the autonomous provinces; and all non-Moslem (but in particular the Christians) subjects of the empire. Of these four parties, the provinces seem to have been the least limited by either legal or circumstantial restrictions. It is true that the signatories guaranteed to these provinces only such privileges and immunities as they already possessed; but at the same time the Porte engaged to preserve in each (not including Montenegro) "an independent and national government."

One of the three "requisite levers" suggested by Mr. Stratford Canning for improvement within the Turkish empire was action prompted by "the right spirit" on the part of the provincial authorities.¹ But in undertaking to protect Turkey's semi-independent European provinces, the powers denied themselves everything except the right of collective intervention; and as disagreement respecting the necessity or the manner of coercion was probable, no really effective means remained for making the action of the provincial authorities conform to the chief aim of the treaty—the independence and integrity of the Turkish empire.²

Subsequent events indicate that the European powers were more inclined, all along, to induce the Porte to pacify the Balkan provinces by granting increasingly liberal concessions, than they were to hold in check the ambitions and aspirations of these groups of the Sultan's subjects. So one concession followed another, until racial sympathies were to lead Servia and Montenegro to join Bosnia and Herzegovina in a war against the Porte (1876), which in its turn was to lead on to other complications, thereby drawing the affairs of the Balkan territory into one general current of

¹ Lane-Pool, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 439.

² See the preamble of the treaty of Paris.

events that carried Roumania, Servia and Montenegro on to independence. This same struggle also virtually separated Bosnia and Herzegovina from Turkey, and created a semi-independent New Bulgaria and the partly autonomous province of Eastern Roumelia (1878).¹ In tracing somewhat in detail these political movements in Servia, Montenegro, and the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia (Roumania, after 1866), between the treaty of Paris and the treaty of Berlin (1856-78), it seems advisable to continue the method adopted in the first chapter and follow separately, for the most part, the course of events in each province. As in the previous chapter, the affairs of Wallachia and Moldavia (Roumania) first claim our attention.

THE FORMATION OF ROUMANIA

Provisions were made in the treaty of Paris for blocking Russia's supposed roadway to Constantinople. By requiring the Tsar to cede a part of Bessarabia to Turkey, the Russian frontier was pushed away from the Danube; and it was particularly stipulated that no exclusive protection by any one of the guaranteeing powers should be exercised over Wallachia and Moldavia.²

France, England and Russia were ready to proceed at once to organize these two principalities under one central government, but Turkey and Austria objected to such a procedure, and Prussia and Sardinia were more or less unconcerned.³ The result was that the treaty merely provided that the laws and statutes of these principalities should be revised; and that a special commission should proceed to Bucharest charged with the duty of investigating the con-

¹ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. lxvii, p. 1238.

² Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 1260.

³ *State Papers*, *op. cit.*, vol. xlvi, p. 80; *Parliamentary Papers* (1859), vol. lxi, p. 66.

ditions in the two provinces. This commission was expected, moreover, to ascertain the wishes of the people, as expressed in representative assemblies (*divans ad hoc*); to suggest bases for the future organization of the principalities; and to transmit a report, without delay, to Paris.¹ But there was delay and difficulty in getting at the wishes of the people through these constituent assemblies. After about a year (September, 1857) these bodies expressed a practically unanimous wish for a union of Moldavia and Wallachia under a foreign prince.² The next year, from May to August, the powers held conferences in Paris and finally agreed on a series of ordinances that were to constitute the definitive organization of these principalities. These "Articles" represented a very comprehensive scheme, according to which the people in the provinces were to carry on their own affairs under the suzerainty of the Porte.³

The peculiar features of this European plan for the government of these provinces resulted from the attempt to conform, as nearly as might be, to the wishes of all parties concerned. Turkey and Austria still continued to oppose the formation of one government for the two provinces, so the treaty powers worked out a sort of combination of union and separation.⁴ The name adopted was *The United Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia*, and a central commission was ordered. This commission was made up of eight members from each principality—four selected by the hospodar from among men who had served the people in high offices, and four by each Assembly from its own body. This

¹ Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, Treaty of Paris, arts. 23-25; *Annuaire Historique*, 1856 (Paris, 1861), pp. 57-60.

² *Ibid.*, p. 397.

³ Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 1329.

⁴ See Martens, *N. R. G. de traités*, tome xvi, p. 15; also pp. 16-50, for the Protocols of the conferences (19) at Paris, May 22-August 19, 1858.

so-called Central Commission was intended to be permanent during the life of the two provincial Assemblies (seven years). It was made the special duty of this central governing body to protect and revise the "Articles", together with the laws, so as to bring all except matters of purely local interest under the care and administration of this Central Commission.¹ Each principality was to have an Assembly, elected for seven years by voters twenty-five years old or more and having a fixed property qualification. Each Assembly was directed to proceed to the election of a hospodar for a life term. The hospodars were to keep agents at the suzerain court, and in case the Porte should not attend to the complaints of these agents respecting any violation of immunities, the hospodars were empowered to communicate their grievances directly to the representatives of the guaranteeing powers at Constantinople. It was distinctly stated also that before the Porte could interfere in the affairs of these principalities for the purpose of re-establishing order there, an understanding must be had with the treaty powers. At the same time it was stipulated that the regular militia required to be maintained in each of the two provinces should be given an "identic" organization, in order that they might readily co-operate as two corps of one and the same army. The new scheme provided for the equality, in the eyes of the law, of all Moldavians and Wallachians, and ordered that all privileges, exemptions, or monopolies enjoyed by certain classes, be abolished. This constitution, which was formulated in Paris by the concert of the powers, is a lengthy document (seventy-three articles), and it bears witness to the efforts of the contracting powers to give to

¹ It will be seen that this somewhat ingenious compromise was as artificial as it was complex. Cf. McCarthy, *A History of Our Own Times* (New York), vol. i, p. 502.

these people very comprehensive and explicit laws and directions for governing their provinces.

It has already been noted that the Moldavians and Wallachians requested the Paris conference to grant them a central government, under a foreign prince.¹ The powers, however, took no notice of their expressed desire for a foreign ruler; but finally, on the question of union, the compromise was effected which provided, as we have seen, for two governments, and also for the Central Commission, as the committee of sixteen was called, to attend to matters of common concern.

However, this detailed scheme of government which neither united nor separated the two peoples worked out very well from the standpoint of the local authorities. The next spring (1859) being the time for choosing new hospodars, Moldavia elected a Moldavian, Colonel Alexander Couza, and about two weeks later the Wallachian Assembly elected the same man.² While it is clear that the new constitution was drafted on the basis of there being two hospodars, it is equally clear that the document does not contain any statement that seems intended to prohibit the election of the same person to the hospodariat of both provinces.³ But the suzerain court contended that the double election was illegal, and called for a conference of the guaranteeing powers to deal with the matter. Accordingly, the plenipotentiaries in Paris, from these courts, held two meetings. April 7th and 13th, 1859. At the second sitting, and after listening to the protests of Turkey and Austria against the double election of Colonel Couza, the representatives of England, Russia, Prussia, France and Sardinia agreed to a resolution requesting the Porte to make an exception in the

¹ See *supra*, p. 61.

² Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 1335.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 1329.

case of the election already held, and recognize Prince Couza as the governor of both Moldavia and Wallachia. The Porte, on the other hand, urged military intervention for the purpose of enforcing strict conformity to the principles of the new constitution; but the five powers insisted that the suzerain court must take their resolution under careful consideration. The Central Commission met in June, and with the expression of an earnest desire for union, pledged its support to Prince Couza. Couza had already taken the name of Alexander John I, and he and the Commission now made free use of the terms "*Roumania*" and "*Roumanians*."¹

After the lapse of six months, another meeting of the powers was held, and the Porte then promised (September 6) to recognize Colonel Couza as being exceptionally called for that occasion to the government of both provinces, with the condition that he must maintain in each of the principalities separate and distinct administrations.² It was also understood among the guaranteeing powers that no further infraction of the administrative and legislative organization already given to the principalities would be permitted.³ The Sultan then sent to Colonel Couza two identical firmans of investiture in the two hospodarships (September 24).

The following year the prince urged the attention of the legislators to the need of reforms, especially in relation to the peasantry.⁴ He soon found great difficulty, however, in bringing his ministers and the members of the two Assemblies to his way of thinking. Consequently, at the beginning of 1861, he addressed a long letter to the Porte, explaining

¹ De Testa, *Recueil des Traités de la Porte Ottomane*, vol. v, p. 407; *Annuaire Historique*, 1859, p. 369.

² *State Papers*, *op. cit.*, vol. 49, pp. 454 *et seq.*

³ Hertslet, vol. ii, p. 1377.

⁴ De Testa, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 407.

fully the need of changes in the constitution. He requested at the same time that the electoral law be amended, and that there be but one ministry and one Assembly for both provinces.¹ Before the end of the year, and with the full consent of the powers, the Sultan granted Prince Couza's request, and issued a firman uniting the two ministries and also the two Assemblies, and suspending the jurisdiction of the Central Commission. This imperial decree likewise ordered that a Council be convoked regularly in each principality. The right of being consulted on all laws and regulations of local interest was given to these councils, and each was charged with the duty of controlling the administration of the funds of its own province.² The Sultan undertook to make it very clear, however, that other limits which had formerly divided the two principalities must be left in tact, and that as soon as Prince Couza should cease to administer the two, the constitution of 1858 must again become the law of the provinces. Austria was in full accord with this view of future procedure; but the other five powers offered the suggestion that favorable results might make it seem advisable to continue the union, and reserved the right, when a vacancy in the hospodariat should re-open the question, of considering with the Porte the course to be followed.³

As soon as the Sultan's firman was communicated to Prince Couza, he issued a proclamation (December 20, 1861) beginning with, "Roumanians! the union is accomplished! the Roumanian nationality is formed!" and ending with, "*Vive la Roumanie*".⁴

In opening the first session of the new Roumanian Assembly (February 5, 1862), the prince set before that body

¹ De Testa, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 408 *et seq.*

² Hertslet, vol. ii, p. 15.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. ii, p. 1499.

⁴ De Testa, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 445.

the most urgent needs of the country, and expressed his belief that "neither the Porte nor the guaranteeing powers would ever destroy the union."¹ But the new government failed to work harmoniously, and the following February (1863), the consuls in Bucharest, representing the powers in the European concert, were instructed to act collectively for the purpose of preventing all acts contrary to the constitution. They were instructed also to make an effort to restore harmony and to induce the Assembly to give first importance to questions of national interest.² A month later the Assembly addressed a lengthy communication to the prince, accusing him of unbounded caprice and with insincerity in relation to the intended constitutional régime.

The deadlock between the government and the legislative body led the prince, on May 14, 1864, to dissolve the Assembly. At the same time he called on the army to preserve order and proposed to the nation a series of ordinances, giving to the prince the sole initiative in proposing laws, and providing for universal suffrage, a senate and an elective assembly.³ The Porte reminded him that he had exceeded his authority; and he then went to Constantinople and came to an agreement with the Turkish government on an "additional act" to the constitution of 1858. The consent of the guaranteeing powers to these alterations was freely given. By these authorized changes all public and legislative power was vested in the prince, a senate and an elective assembly. The prince now acquired the right, also, to name each year the president of the Assembly, and to him was given, as well, the power to originate laws. It was required, nevertheless, that before any measure could become a law it must receive the sanction of prince, Assembly and Senate. Moreover, it

¹ De Testa, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 451.

² *Ibid.*, p. 450.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. v, pp. 465 *et seq.*

was made obligatory for every public functionary on entering office to swear submission to the constitution and the laws of the country, as well as fidelity to the prince. A council of state, to be formed by the prince, was also provided for. The duties of this council were to study and frame drafts of such proposed laws as might be referred to it by the head of the provinces. In addition to these duties, the members were empowered to represent the prince in the two chambers, where they would have the right to explain and defend such measures as they had proposed. The ministers were to have the right likewise of speaking in the senate as often as they might wish; and the suffrage was now made practically universal.

But the most important concession of all in this connection, perhaps, was the right now given to the Roumanians to change the laws governing their internal administration without any intervention from without. This they were empowered to do so long as the proposed changes should not affect the ties binding the principalities to Turkey, or violate the treaties between the Forte and other powers.¹

In proclaiming to his people (July, 1864) the success of his mission to the suzerain court, Prince Couza called special attention to the fulfilment of the desire of the Roumanians for internal autonomy.² A month later, he issued a proclamation liberating the peasantry from all feudal obligations, and providing a way whereby they might buy at low prices much of the land formerly held by the boyards (nobles).³

The Senate and the Assembly met in January, 1865, and there seems to have been a better feeling than formerly

¹ *Parliamentary Papers* (1867), vol. lxxiv, pp. 639 *et seq.*; De Testa, vol. v, p. 472.

² De Testa, vol. v, pp. 482-98.

³ For the settlement of the land question, see *Parliamentary Papers* 1870, vol. 64.

between the prince and the legislators.¹ But the boyards were not pleased with the rural laws which took from these former large landowners so many of their fields and deprived them at the same time of the labor of the peasantry. Accordingly, Prince Couza was severely criticised, and he was charged with being as despotic as he had been democratic.² The tobacco monopoly and the confiscation of the property of the monasteries helped also to render him extremely unpopular.

The feeling against the prince finally became so strong that a number of conspirators entered the palace, February 23, 1866, and forced him to abdicate.³ The same day a provisional government issued a proclamation referring to the "anarchy and corruption" that had existed during the seven years of Prince Couza's reign. This proclamation reminded the Roumanians, moreover, that the election of a foreign prince would be the consummation of their wishes, as expressed to the powers in 1857.⁴ The same day the two Assemblies elected Philip of Flanders, a brother of the king of Belgium, as prince of Roumania.

In view of the situation, the Porte communicated at once with the guaranteeing powers, and asked for a conference. Accordingly, from March 10 to June 14, 1866, ten conferences were held in Paris, but without any very positive results.⁵ The first sitting (March 10) merely resulted in a communication being sent through the foreign agents at Bucharest to the provincial government of the provinces, announcing that a conference of the powers—parties to the treaty of 1856—had been held, and recommending the pro-

¹ De Testa, vol. v, pp. 484-98.

² *Ibid.*, vol. v, p. 499.

³ De Testa, vol. v, p. 514. Couza went to Paris, and died at Heidelberg in 1873.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 514-15.

⁵ *Parliamentary Papers*, 1867, vol. 74, pp. 547-619.

visional government to maintain order and the administration, and "to abstain from any act that would prejudice the decision of the Conference."

But while the representatives of the powers at Paris continued to deliberate, the government and the people in Roumania proceeded to act. At the second conference (March 19) the representatives from Turkey explained that the Porte could not admit a foreign prince to be at the head of the principalities, because that would be "tantamount to declaring the independence of the two provinces." England's representative agreed that the government of a foreign prince there would be "incompatible with the integrity of the Ottoman Empire." The representative of France, however, was in favor of allowing the Roumanians to choose their own leader, and he did not hesitate to recommend that as the best way out of the difficulty. Italy's representative was of the same mind. But the Russian ambassador stoutly opposed the idea of a foreign prince, and he denied altogether that the population of the principalities, at that time, even desired union under a native governor.¹ It was finally agreed that the question of allowing a foreign prince should be reserved until the conference should determine whether or not the union of the principalities ought to be continued. Several times during the meetings the idea was advanced that there were two very important principles to be conciliated—the integrity of the Ottoman empire, and the "accomplishment of the wishes" of the people in the principalities.²

The Count of Flanders having declined the nomination tendered him on February 23, 1866, the Roumanians now proceeded by a plebiscite (April) to the election of Prince Charles Louis of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen.³ As a result

¹ *Parliamentary Papers*, 1867, vol. 74, p. 560.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 559, 583, 617.

³ De Testa, *op. cit.*, vol. v. p. 628.

of this universal male suffrage vote, it was claimed that Charles Louis was elected by 685,969 affirmative votes against 224 negatives. The man who was thus called to undertake the difficult task of guiding the destinies of the principalities was related to the royal family of Prussia, and at that time was an officer in the Prussian army.¹ On hearing of his election, the conference at Paris merely directed the attention of the provisional government at Bucharest to the constitution of 1858, which required that the prince, who must be a native, should be elected by the Assembly.²

Prince Charles sent in his resignation as an officer in the Prussian army, and reached Bucharest May 22nd.³ The Sultan was inclined to resort to military intervention but was informed that he could not do that without the consent of the signatories of the treaty of Paris (1856).⁴ In this connection, the plenipotentiary of Great Britain called the attention of the conference to the fact that there were in reality, neither disturbances nor troubles in the principalities. Meanwhile, however, the agents of the powers at Bucharest were instructed to refrain from doing anything that would imply the recognition of Prince Charles as having any authority in The United Principalities.

The last meeting of the conference (June 4) was called at the request of the Russian ambassador, and it was evident that Russia and Turkey were becoming more and more impatient. These two powers were now prepared to urge immediate diplomatic intervention, as provided for in

¹ De Testa, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 604, 608. ² *Ibid.*, vol. v, p. 609.

³ Prince Bismarck is said to have advised Prince Charles to accept the election and go to Roumania. Miller, *The Balkans*, p. 108; Damé, *Histoire de la Roumanie* (Paris, 1900), p. 162.

⁴ *Parliamentary Papers*, 1867, vol. lxxiv, p. 608.

the protocol of September, 1859.¹ They desired that the suzerain court should send to the principalities a commissioner, accompanied by representatives of the powers, for the purpose of informing the provisional government that unless the request of the guaranteeing powers should be complied with, measures of coercion would be considered. The right to intervene was unanimously conceded, but none of the powers except Turkey and Russia were convinced of its "desirableness."

When it was intimated in the conference that there was reason to believe that Prince Charles of Hohenzollern intended to free himself from the suzerain court, the representative of France explained that the Prince had already informed the Roumanian agent at Constantinople that the rights of the Porte would be maintained.² There was a general agreement among the five powers now striving toward off intervention, that the state of affairs in Europe, and the danger of insurrection among the Christian populations in Turkey, rendered it hazardous to undertake coercive measures, and made it seem to be the wisest course to permit Prince Charles of Hohenzollern to become the Prince of Roumania.³ These five governments went so far, at the

¹ Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 1378.

² *Parliamentary Papers*, 1867, vol. lxxiv, p. 617; De Testa, *op. cit.*, vol. v, p. 641.

³ While the Paris conferences were being held (March-June) to determine what course to pursue with the Roumanians, relations became very much strained between Prussia and Austria; and Italy likewise engaged in preparations for a struggle against Austria. Meanwhile, Russia, England and France were endeavoring by peaceful means to bring about a settlement of these differences. Hertslet, vol. iii, pp. 1655-85. *Staatsarchive*, vol. ii, (1866), p. 45.

For a further expression of the extreme disappointment felt in the St. Petersburg cabinet because Russia and Turkey were not supported in their desire to carry out the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris and the subsequent agreement of the guaranteeing powers in 1858, see De Testa, vol. v, p. 660.

same time, as to intimate that it might be well to recognize him as the head of the government of these provinces, so long as he should maintain order and respect the rights of the suzerain court and the integrity of the Ottoman empire.

Russia's plenipotentiary at Paris declined to refer to his government the question of the "desirableness" of coercive measures in Roumania, and hinted at the probability that he would be instructed to retire from the conference. The sitting of June 4th proved to be the last meeting, however, and so the question was left by the European concert without any definite settlement.¹ Fortunately, at this juncture the Porte opened negotiations with the Roumanians, and within ten days after the last meeting of the Paris conference, there were trustworthy rumors that the Sultan was disposed to come to an agreement with Prince Charles.²

The Paris, London and Berlin cabinets exerted their influence in order to secure the best attainable settlement for the Roumanians.³ A little later, (July 11) the Turkish government expressed a willingness to sanction, under certain conditions, the choice of the ruler that had been made in the United Principalities; and after three months of further negotiations a complete agreement was reached. Prince Charles now engaged on his own part, and in the name of his successors, to respect the Sultan's suzerain rights over the two provinces as an integral part of the Ottoman empire, and to accept as binding on these provinces Turkey's treaties with other powers.

Having given these promises, with some others of minor

¹ *Parliamentary Papers*, 1867, vol. lxxiv, pp. 615-18; Martens, *Nouveau Recueil Général de Traités* (Göttingue, 1826-), vol. xviii, pp. 166-220.

² *Parliamentary Papers*, 1867, vol. lxxiv, p. 619.

³ De Testa, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 680 *et seq.*

importance, the foreign prince—now a naturalized Roumanian—whom the people had selected to be their ruler, set out for Constantinople. There he was at once received by the Sultan, who put an end to the long and troublesome controversy and advanced the Roumanian population far on the way toward statehood, by conferring on Prince Charles of Hohenzollern the hereditary title of Prince of the United Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia.¹ Shortly afterwards all the guaranteeing powers concurred in this settlement.

From that time (October, 1866) the people of these provinces always referred to their country as "Roumania;" but it was more than a decade before the name received diplomatic recognition.²

During the time that the question of recognizing the foreign prince was pending, a new constitution of one hundred thirty-two articles, signed by Charles, had been promulgated at Bucharest (June 30). The first article very significantly declared the united principalities to constitute "one inseparable State," under the name of "Roumania." The country was divided into districts, which were organized on the French system. This constitution provided for a liberal form of government similar to that in most constitutional monarchies, with a responsible ministry, to be selected by the prince, and a parliament of two houses. The Orthodox religion of the Orient (Greek) was mentioned as the dominant religion of the state; and the Roumanian Orthodox Church, remaining with the "ecumenical Church" of the Orient in matters of dogma, was declared independent of all outside control. Taken all in all, it is clearly

¹ *Parliamentary Papers*, 1867, vol. lxxiv, pp. 621-28.

² Cf. Holland, *The European Concert in the Eastern Question*, (Oxford, 1885). p. 235.

evident that those who formulated this body of laws thought of Roumania as the land of only such as in blood, traditions and sympathies, should prove to be real Roumanians.¹

With a view of establishing public credit and of encouraging agriculture and foreign commerce, the new government set about the task of reorganizing the financial system.² During a part of the year 1867 Prince Charles was obliged, however, to listen to repeated and somewhat earnest protests from several of the great powers against the persecution of the Jews in his territory. The higher officials in the principality claimed that the hardships suffered by that part of the population were due to the lack of judgment on the part of subordinate employees in carrying out instructions respecting hygienic measures and the sending away of foreign vagabonds. It appears that the leaders in the persecution were not numerous, and that the principal agitators against the Israelites as a people, were, according to statements by some of the persecuted, "ignorant professors, briefless barristers, and small tradesmen." For a year or more the situation presented a menacing aspect, principally because of the disposition of Roumanian officials to minimize the acts of violence against the Jews and to emphasize the social bearing of the question to the exclusion of its racial and religious aspects.³ In his address to the Chambers, in January, 1868, Prince Charles made it very clear that the laws of the country furnished him sufficient means to learn the truth in relation to the whole matter, and to put an end to all the abuses in connection with the Jewish population. At the same time he

¹ De Testa, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 664 *et seq.*

² *Ibid.*, vol. v, pp. 700 *et seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, vol. x, pp. 419, 432, 436; *Parliamentary Papers*, 1867, vol. lxxiv, pp. 509 *et seq.*

called the attention of the legislators to the fact that because of the economic as well as the political situation, the time had come to reorganize the army.¹ With much pressure from without, especially from England and Austria, the Jewish question gradually quieted down and gave place to others.

During the years 1868 and 1869 the Turkish government frequently complained that, because Roumania failed to guard her Danubian frontier, bands of Bulgarians and others were being organized in Roumanian territory for the purpose of carrying on a revolutionary propaganda in the Sultan's nearby provinces. It was urged, moreover, from Constantinople, that the attitude of the Roumanian government already contributed towards a state of affairs that must soon threaten Turkish interests throughout the Balkan territory.² In reply, Roumania expressed her determination to continue the traditional hospitality of her territory; but at the same time, the government at Bucharest instructed the Roumanian prefects all along the Danube to maintain order there, and to prevent any acts in that region hostile to the Ottoman government.³

Notwithstanding the determination of Prince Charles, expressed in opening the Chambers in the fall of 1870, to hold his government to the maintenance of internal order as well as amicable relations with the Porte and the guaranteeing powers, there soon began to be very threatening manifestations of party spirit.⁴ The great land owners—the White or Conservative party—were open to Russian influence, and did not favor either the foreign prince or so-

¹ De Testa, *op. cit.*, vol. v, pp. 704, 706.

² De Testa, vol. x, pp. 438 *et seq.*

³ *Ibid.*, p. 471.

⁴ *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. lxi (1870), p. 1277.

cial reforms. Opposed to these were the Liberals (Red party) who looked to Germany and Austria for support, and demanded for the middle and lower classes a larger share in the government. The situation was still further complicated, meanwhile, by the aggressive attitude of some others, who boldly championed the cause of the French in their struggle against the Germans (1870-71).

In general, both of the leading parties openly manifested their disloyalty to Prince Charles. Indeed, their hostility became so pronounced that he even expressed his inclination to abdicate, and leave the country. A new loyal conservative ministry was formed, however, (under Catarji) and the influence of Germany and Austria, together with a timely reaction among his own people, dissuaded him.¹

After this change of attitude toward the prince, the Roumanians turned their attention more than ever to the improvement of internal conditions. As time went by, the Porte, although with the ostensible aid of the guaranteeing powers, failed to put down the Herzegovinian insurrection.² The Roumanian government issued a circular to its agents abroad (April, 1876) stating that the Roumanian policy was summed up in the one word "neutrality." Preparations there, however, for any eventuality were not neglected. The neutral attitude (if neutral at any time) was maintained for only a year, and then Roumania turned against the suzerain court and helped in the struggle that resulted in so many important changes in the relation between all the Balkan provinces and the Ottoman government.³

¹ *Annual Register*, 1871, p. 28; Seignobos, *op. cit.*, p. 645.

² Cf. *infra*, p. x.

³ *Parliamentary Papers*, 1876, vol. lxxxiv, p. 365.

CHANGES IN SERVIA

When Servia was taken under the protection of the European Concert (Treaty of Paris, 1856) that principality was already, as we have seen, fairly well organized under a native prince, Alexander, of the Karageorgevich dynasty. Some of the Servians complained that Prince Alexander was too submissive to Austrian influence and he soon became unpopular with the leaders in his government. He undertook to punish those who were accused of plotting against him, and was forced to abdicate (December, 1858).¹ By recalling now the aged Milosh, who, twenty years before had been driven to abdicate and to leave the country, the representatives of the people restored the Obrenovich dynasty.²

During the two years of Milosh's reign (1858-60), a considerable effort was made to obtain further concessions from the Sultan. In May, 1860, a deputation was sent to Constantinople with a *memorandum* requesting the Porte to make the princely dignity in Servia hereditary in the Obrenovitch family, to restrict the privileges of Mussulmans still living in that province, and to give to the Servians the right to change and elaborate the laws for regulating the internal administration of their country.³ Failing to receive a satisfactory reply, and contending that what was asked for had already been promised, the Servians then declared that they would regard the concessions called for in the memorandum as already acquired, and as being inviolable.⁴

Prince Milosh died in the fall of 1860, and was succeeded

¹ De Testa, *op. cit.*, vol. vii, p. 15.

² *Supra*, ch. i, p. 44.

³ De Testa, vol. vii, p. 19.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. vii, p. 31. As far back as 1830, and again in 1833, the Sultan had promised to Servia all and much more than was asked for in this memorandum. Cf. Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 842, 929.

by his son, Michael, who, as we have seen, had been forced to abdicate in 1842, to make way for the restoration of the Karageorgevich dynasty. The new administration now began an earnest effort with the Porte to bring about the removal from Servia of all Turks living outside the fortresses.¹ Firmans issued by the Sultan thirty years back had provided for such removal, but the instructions had never been carried out. The correspondence dragged on for more than a year, and finally it was agreed that a mixed commission (Turks and Servians) should arrange for indemnifying the Turks who would be dispossessed by the execution of these old firmans. Quite naturally the Servians became more and more exasperated when the Porte delayed the sending out of a commissioner; and in 1862, there were serious conflicts in Belgrade between the two races.² These disturbances were thought by some of the foreign consuls in Servia to have been the result not of accident but of "design and combination."³ The English consul was disposed to place a large share of the blame on the recently increased Servian police force. After the first few hours of confusion and some firing, on the evening of June 15th, the consuls of the guaranteeing powers resident in Belgrade, were instrumental in bringing about an agreement between the Servian and the Turkish authorities in the city.⁴ The Ottoman police retired to the citadel, and such other Turks as wished to do so were also allowed to take refuge there. Those of the Turks, however, who chose to remain outside were promised security of person and property. It appears

¹ De Testa, vol. vii, pp. 22 *et seq.*; Hertslet, vol. ii, pp. 842 *et seq.*

² There was an uprising, meanwhile, among people of the same races and religions in Herzegovina and Bosnia.

³ *State Papers*, vol. lvi, p. 438.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 409 *et seq.*; De Testa, *op. cit.*, vol. vii, pp. 81, 112.

that the following day some of the Servians began to plunder the houses of those who had gone to the citadel, and that, as a consequence, there was some firing on both sides. Then followed, without just provocation, as was generally held, the bombardment of the town. The Turkish garrison continued to fire on the city at intervals for four hours and then ceased on the earnest advice of the Austrian consul.

These events in the Servian capital were followed by conferences at Constantinople (July 23rd-September 4, 1862) at which all the contracting powers in the treaty of Paris (1856) were represented.¹ The result of these conferences was an agreement that the Porte should maintain four fortresses in Servia for the defense of the country, garrisoned with "only the number of men necessary for their defense," but that all other Turks must leave the principality. A mixed commission of Ottomans and Servians was provided for who were to decide questions of expropriation and indemnity, and this commission was allowed only four months in which to conclude its labors.² It was now expressly stated, moreover, that the officials of the citadels and the Servian authorities were not to interfere with each other in any way. Prince Michael was reminded by the guaranteeing powers that the new military organization of Servia had already created some apprehensions at Constantinople; and the international agreement added that he would find it easy to come to an understanding with the Porte as to the usual number of his effective force. The "Arrangement" also specified that the Porte would listen to demands made by Servia in a "just and friendly spirit," and that an answer to Servian requests or complaints would be returned by the Porte within the shortest possible time.

¹ Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 1515.

² De Testa, *op. cit.*, vol. vii, p. 126. (Aug., 1864.—Work of the commission not yet finished.)

Under the constitution which had been forced upon Servia by Turkey and Russia in 1838, the senators (17) could not be legally removed without the consent of the sultan, and hence they were often able to set the prince at defiance.¹ Soon after Michael's reign began (1860), however, the Servian government sent a representative to consult with the leading courts of Europe, and then enacted several laws that very materially modified that early constitution.² The senators were allowed to retain all their legislative functions, but they were now made amenable to the law courts, which were empowered to remove them for misconduct.³ At this time also a distinctively Servian coinage was begun.

The Turks failed to evacuate two positions on the Servian side of the frontier, and in the fall of 1866 Servia sent a "proper and conciliatory" note to the Porte requesting that the Turks be withdrawn from these places. The Sultan's government soon admitted that the right of the Turks to occupy these positions was not entirely clear; but the question became seriously complicated when the prince followed (October 29, 1866) the first request by soliciting the Porte either to make over to the Servians or demolish all the remaining fortresses in their territory. There were still four of these, and all were garrisoned by Turks.⁴ Prince Michael urged that a peaceful and contented Servia would be a far more effectual defense of the frontiers of the empire than the existing fortresses; and the Servian agent at the Porte, M. Ristich, declared that "if this one request were granted Servia would be content and would ask the Porte for nothing more." In the same communication, it

¹ See *supra*, ch. i, p. 46; Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 938.

² *Macmillan's Magazine* (London, 1863), vol. vii, "Servia in 1863."

³ Minchin, *Growth of Freedom in the Balkan Peninsula*, p. 73.

⁴ *Parliamentary Papers*, 1867, vol. lxxv, p. 6.

was pointed out to the Turkish authorities, likewise, that though four years had elapsed since the bombardment of Belgrade, fear and the feeling of insecurity in the Servian capital, had not subsided. The Servians contended, moreover, that their material interests, and their legitimate feelings of national pride, were at stake.

The protecting powers merely came to a sort of general agreement that the interests of all concerned required that a right feeling should be established between the Constantinople government and the Servians, and the Sultan was so advised. It was well understood that the feeling of animosity in the nearby Christian provinces against the Turkish rule there, made it highly advisable that the Servians should not have any good reason for concerting with their neighbors against the Porte. For some time, however, the Ottomans felt that they ought not to yield to the extent of giving up the fortress of Belgrade. The policy of the powers throughout was to refrain from making any collective or formal representations, thus leaving to the Sultan the possibility of winning the good will of the Servians by spontaneously satisfying the wishes, for the time being, most dear to their hearts.

It was not until five months after the prince's letter was received at Constantinople, that the Grand Vizier was ready to reply. But the answer was most welcome, for it announced the willingness of the Sultan to confide the custody of all the Servian fortresses to the prince, and to have Servian soldiers replace the Mussulman garrisons. This very important concession was granted with the one condition, that the fortress should continue to fly the Ottoman flag together with that of Servia.¹ The Sultan's firman of April 10, 1867, confirming these concessions, added the con-

¹ De Testa, *op. cit.*, vol. vii, pp. 138 *et seq.*

dition, however, that the opinion and consent of the Porte must be obtained before any changes should be made in the fortresses now given over to the Servians.¹

As early as 1861, the Servian government restricted the rights of the Jews in a way that was calculated to force them ultimately out of the interior of the country; and down to the end of Michael's reign (1868), an unavailing effort was kept up by the Jews in different parts of Europe to induce the powers to force Servia to modify these restrictions. This persecution was claimed by the Servians to be on the sole ground of commercial rivalry.²

Ever since Kara George fled from the country in 1813, the Servian people have been unfortunate, it would seem, in having had two dynasties—the Karageorgevich and the Obrenovich. The members of these two families have kept up almost a constant struggle for the highest office in the country. Prince Michael failed in his efforts to conciliate the partisans of the Karageorgevich family, consequently, only a year after his government had been so triumphant in having the last Mussulman garrison withdrawn from his country, he was assassinated (1868).³ But the plans of the plotters were foiled, and the National Assembly that was promptly summoned decreed that no member of the family of Kara George should ever again be eligible for the Servian throne. The Assembly then proceeded without delay to the election of the late prince's nephew, Milan, as hereditary Prince, under the title of Milan Obrenovich IV.⁴

The young prince was then but fourteen years old, conse-

¹ Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 1800; *Parliamentary Papers*, 1867, vol. lxxv, pp. 3 *et seq.*

² *Parliamentary Papers*, 1867, vol. lxxv.

³ De Testa, *op. cit.*, vol. vii. pp. 172, 191; *The Nation* (New York, 1868), vol. vii. p. 108.

⁴ *Fortnightly Review* (London, 1870), vol. xiii; (1873), vol. xix.

quently a Regency was formed. Ristich, the able leader of the Liberal party, was one of its three members. In full accord with the protecting powers the Sultan confirmed the election of Prince Milan, and also the regency as established (July 16, 1868); and a little later (August 4th), the Porte also confirmed the hereditary rights of the Obrenovich family.

In his opening address to the Skouptschtna (June, 1869) Ristich called attention to the suggestions made by the National Assembly the previous year, and to the work of the constitutional committee. He pointed out, moreover, that the time had come for the complete constitutional transformation of Servia.¹ These suggestions were promptly acted upon, and before the end of the year a constitution of one hundred and thirty-three articles had been framed and adopted. This new constitution represented an attempt to organize the Servian government on the plan of the European constitutional monarchies. The Skouptschtna now became a representative assembly, elected every three years, and holding sessions yearly. The voters elected the members of this Assembly on the general basis of one to every 3,000 population, and the prince was empowered to appoint one for every three thus elected. Each one of these deputies, however, was charged with the duty of acting as a judge of the needs of the whole country, in accordance with his own convictions and conscience. All legislative power was vested in the prince and this assembly, but every official act signed by the prince required the signature also of the competent minister. The Senate that originated in 1859 was now transformed into a Council of State composed of from twelve to fifteen members, appointed by the prince. Among other duties, this Council was expected to elaborate projects

¹ De Testa, *op. cit.*, vol. vii, pp. 18, 188, 202.

of laws, to settle conflicts involving administrative law, and to have general supervision over public expenditures. All questions looking toward important changes in the laws of the country were required, however, to be brought before a Grand National Assembly, made up of four times as many deputies as were regularly elected to the Skoupschtina.¹

Under this constitution Servia began to have a more clearly defined political life. Parties with European names now ranged themselves, in general, on the side of one or the other of the two main lines of national policy. The young prince had been a student in Paris, and it was but natural that he should gather about him men who favored the introduction of Western ways and the speedy development of the industrial interests of the principality. But there was a far more numerous party of those who cared little for internal improvements, and who strenuously opposed any considerable increase in taxation, unless the money were to be used for national defense or in the interest of territorial expansion.²

Back at the beginning of "New Servia", in 1804, the Serb population of that province was but a body of unlettered peasants. Very few if any of these could even read or write. It seems probable that neither of the two native chiefs whose names have been given to the two so-called dynasties of Servia, could read or knew how to write his own name. Nevertheless, both Kara George and Milosh Obrenovich knew how to organize and carry forward campaigns for the liberation of their people.

Down to 1840 there were not yet three thousand children in all the schools of the principality. The men who gave

¹For the text of the Servian constitution of 1869, see De Testa, *op. cit.*, vol. vii, pp. 204 *et seq.*

²Cf. Seignobos, *op. cit.*, p. 660; Müller, *Political History of Recent Times*, p. 517.

their time to the affairs of the government came to be called notables, but at the time of the new constitution (1869) Servia still contained an essentially peasant population. Cultivation of the soil, however, received slight attention, for the people still found it profitable to supply pigs, oxen and sheep to the foreign markets.¹ The principality had now come to have an area of about sixteen thousand square miles, with a population of nearly one and a half million, almost all of whom were Serbs in race, and members of their autocephalous national Church.² There were then about three hundred and sixty church edifices, and a few more schools with upwards of twelve thousand pupils.

The condition of the people had surely changed in many respects. But as yet they cared but little for material improvements; and they had been very slow about giving up their former ways of living. They regarded themselves as "being politically tributary to, but not dependent on the Ottoman Porte". Unfortunately, it must be admitted that the spirit of faction had been all too prevalent in their efforts at self-government, and had sadly marred their political life. Many of them cherished a lively hope of a "Greater Servia", and as they constituted a branch of the Orthodox Eastern Church, it was but natural perhaps that they should continue to look to Slavic and Orthodox Russia as their all sufficient source of future aid and protection.

Prince Milan reached his majority in 1872, and his people seem ever since to have treasured in their hearts this statement in his first speech from the throne: "It would be a great responsibility to lose the least of the acquisitions of our fathers, and little to our credit to add nothing to them."³

¹ *Macmillan's Magazine*, 1863, "Servia in 1863."

² Identical in creed with the Orthodox Greek Church.

³ Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 2404.

As we turn now to trace the affairs of the Montenegrins through this period we leave the Servians under the domination of the party of the people—the Radical Nationalists—and ready to join with their kinsmen in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Montenegro, in a determined struggle to secure further concessions from the Ottoman government.

THE SITUATION IN MONTENEGRO—1856 TO 1870¹

When the Sultan's representative declared to the plenipotentiaries of the powers in the Paris conference (March 26, 1856) that the Porte regarded Montenegro as an integral part of the Ottoman empire, the Montenegrin ruler exhibited solicitous surprise and mild indignation.² Prince Danilo at once protested to the powers, that the claim set forth by the Sultan's government was indefensible, and that Montenegro had a better claim to half of Albania and all of Herzegovina than Turkey had to Montenegro.³ At the same time he addressed a note to the European powers calling attention to the successful struggles of the Montenegrin people during four hundred and sixty-six years to hold their territory and maintain their liberty. He also asked for the diplomatic recognition of the independence of Montenegro, the extension of the frontiers toward Albania and Herzegovina, the definite settlement of the boundary towards Turkey and the annexation to the principality of the port of Antivari.⁴ Early the next year Prince Danilo visited Paris and presented his case to Emperor Napoleon III; but on his return to Montenegro he received a proposition from

¹ *The Nineteenth Century* (London, 1877) contains an excellent sketch of Montenegro by W. E. Gladstone.

² *Supra*, ch. i, p. 55; Martens, N. G. R., *op. cit.*, vol. xv, p. 738; *State Papers*, *op. cit.*, vol. xlvi, pp. 97, 104.

³ De Testa, *op. cit.*, vol. x, p. 374; *Edinburgh Review*, vol. cix, p. 484.

⁴ De Testa, vol. vi, p. 4; Hertslet, vol. ii, p. 1438.

the ambassadors of the great powers at Constantinople that as an offset for access to the sea, and some other unimportant concessions from the Sultan, Montenegro should recognize the supremacy of the Porte.¹ The prince was ready to follow the advice of the powers, but the Montenegrins refused to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Sultan.² Meanwhile a Turkish force, which was sent ostensibly to restore order on the frontier of Herzegovina, undertook to occupy the valley of Grahovo ("the Marathon of Montenegro"), which was then in the possession of the Montenegrins. The Turks were at once attacked and those of their number who escaped from the valley left behind them fourteen guns, their war supplies, and several thousand dead.³

The presence of Turkish troops in territory held by Montenegro at the time of the Congress of Paris (1856) placed the Porte in a very unfavorable position, considering the virtual promise by the Turkish government at that time to maintain the *status quo* in that province.⁴ With a view of preventing future conflicts such as that in the valley of Grahovo, France invited the powers to join in a conference for the purpose of considering the whole situation in relation to Montenegro.⁵ The result was that the ambassadors at Constantinople of Austria, France, Great Britain, Prussia and Russia held a meeting with the Turkish authorities (November, 1858), and it was agreed to send, in the following spring, a boundary commission of engineers to assist in placing posts that should fix the territorial limits of Albania, Herzegovina and Montenegro. The boundaries were

¹ Frilley and Wlahovitj, *Le Monténégro Contemporain*, p. 72; *Edinburgh Review*, vol. cix, p. 47.

² De Testa, *op. cit.*, vol. vi, p. 10.

³ Frilley and Wlahovitj, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

⁴ *Supra*, ch. i, p. 55; De Testa, *op. cit.*, vol. vi, p. 4.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 12.

to be fixed in strict accordance with the lines on a map previously prepared by the representatives of these powers.¹ Despite the protests of Turkey, a Montenegrin was made a member of this international Boundary Commission soon after its work had begun.²

This commission reported the outcome of its labors in March, 1860, and the Constantinople ambassadors, who originated this international body, then held another conference at the Turkish capital and agreed that if any further controversies likely to trouble the peace of the Montenegrin frontier should arise, the questions at issue must be referred to the consuls of these powers, at Scutari (Albania). It was also agreed that the Montenegrin prince was authorized to send a representative, in case the consuls at Scutari should have occasion to consider such questions.³

During the summer of 1860 Prince Danilo went down to the hamlet of Persano for the baths, and while walking on the promenade at Cattaro with Princess Darinka, he was shot by an exiled Montenegrin. Without delay, and in conformity with a decree of the Assembly passed in 1855, Princess Darinka proclaimed Nicholas Petrovic, a nephew of Danilo, the prince of Montenegro (Nicholas I).⁴

This change to a young prince, then but nineteen years of age, made very little difference for some time, however, in the policies of the principality. One who knew the young ruler intimately tells us that Nicholas I "set out with two fixed ideas—the first to prosecute the civilizing work among his people; the second, to liberate the sister Servian lands, still in servitude".⁵

¹ Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 1353.

² *Nineteenth Century* (1877), vol. i, p. 372.

³ Hertslet, vol. ii, p. 1439.

⁴ Denton, *Montenegro—Its People and Their History* (London, 1877), p. 287.

⁵ Frilley and Wlahovitj, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

The next year (1861), an insurrection in the sister Ser-vian province of Herzegovina called to the neighborhood of Montenegro a large Turkish force under Omer Pasha. The success of the insurgents during the fall of 1861 so awakened the enthusiasm and quickened the sympathies of the Montenegrins, that the Turkish general professed to be alarmed, and proclaimed the blockade of their country. In keeping with the urgent request of the powers, Prince Nicholas assumed a neutral attitude, and even allowed the Ottomans to pass through his province with provisions for a needy Turkish garrison in Herzegovina.

During the winter re-enforcements were sent to Omer Pasha. When spring opened, Turkey (March, 1862) informed the other parties to the treaty of Paris (1856) that Montenegro was in a state of revolt, and then sent to the Montenegrin capital a declaration of war.¹ The Montenegrins made a valiant resistance against the invading Ottomans, but this time they were no match for the Turkish force sent against them.² Realizing after a time that their capital was in danger, they bowed to the inevitable and promised to comply with the demands of the Turkish ultimatum, which was issued from Scutari (August 31, 1862).³ The internal administration of Montenegro was left as it had been before the invasion. But the prince was obliged to agree that his warrior father—Mirko—should be exiled, and that the road from Herzegovina to Scutari passing through the interior of his country, should be kept open to commerce by Turkish troops, to be quartered in guard-

¹ De Testa, *op. cit.*, vol. vi, p. 12.

² In the words of William E. Gladstone: "It was then found that an empire of 30,000,000 could gain the advantage of a tribe under 200,000." *Nineteenth Century* (1877), vol. i, p. 373.

³ Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 1512; *Archive Diplomatique* (1863), vol. iii, p. 269.

houses along the way. All senators, chiefs of natives, and other dignitaries in Montenegro, it was likewise agreed, would enter into a written agreement that the people of the conquered province would not make hostile excursions beyond their frontiers, and that in case of an uprising in neighboring districts, they would not afford either moral or material assistance. Furthermore, without a Turkish passport, no family was to be allowed to enter Montenegro; but the right of leasing land outside the province for agricultural purposes was accorded to the Montenegrins. Moreover, while the importation of war supplies was strictly prohibited, the port of Antivari was opened to them for the export and import of merchandise, free of duty.

Russia earnestly advised intervention in order to prevent the above conditions being imposed upon Montenegro. England, however, contended that the guaranteeing powers could not show any possible justification for intervening.¹ Turkey had been admitted, it was contended, as an independent state to participate in the advantages and duties of the European System (Concert),² and Lord Russell argued that therefore the Sultan had the right to impose upon the prince of Montenegro such conditions of peace as would be likely to deter that people from future aggressions.³ There was no formal intervention in this connection by the treaty powers. Nevertheless, the most offensive stipulations in the terms of peace were never enforced against Montenegro.

¹ *Archive Diplomatique* (1863), vol. iii, p. 271.

² By the Treaty of Paris (1856), art. vii.

³ For Russia's objections to Lord Russell's views, see *Archive Diplomatique* (1863), vol. iii, p. 273. Russia maintained that the Montenegrins had never recognized the suzerainty of the Sultan, and that therefore the terms of peace that Turkey was being permitted to impose upon Montenegro effected a radical change in the *status quo* there, and really resulted in subjecting a Christian State to Turkish dominion.

The Porte soon withdrew the demand for the exile of Mirko and eventually abandoned the idea of establishing guard-houses along the route through the interior of the province.¹

During their fourteen years of peace, following the war of 1862, the Montenegrins entered upon a new life in the matter of schools and military organization. Up to this time, almost no attention had been given there to education, and the soldier's preparation had consisted in unbounded patriotism and the art of shooting, supplemented now and then by experience on the field of battle.² In connection with Prince Nicholas' visit to Paris, St. Petersburg, Berlin and Vienna (1868-9), a new start was made in Montenegro in establishing schools for elementary instruction, and in providing the male population between the ages of seventeen and sixty with modern guns and with some military training.

In 1868 Prince Nicholas promulgated a new constitution, which, at least, made it convenient for him when he so desired, to leave with the senate the care of a considerable part of the internal affairs. Three years later, under the direction of a Professor from Odessa, there was a laudable effort also to bring the laws of the principality more into harmony with other European systems. Meanwhile, the Montenegrins rejoiced in the birth of a hereditary prince; and by naming this infant son Alexander (Danilo-Alexander) the parents afforded the Tsar of Russia, Alexander II, one more reason for interesting himself in behalf of this little mountain principality.

Thus did the Montenegrins make ready, in a measure,

¹ Frilley et Wlahovitj, *Le Monténégro Contemporain*, *op. cit.*, p. 311; *Nineteenth Century* (1877), vol. i, pp. 707-752. (Article by Lord Stratford de Radcliffe).

² A Montenegrin adage says: "Take my gun or take my brother, it's all one." Frilley et Wlahovitj, *Le Monténégro Contemporain*, p. 433.

for the Balkan struggle against the Porte; and they need not claim our further attention until we find them joined with their "sister Servian peoples" in forcing forward the contest (1876-78), which dealt so many death-blows to the Sultan's suzerainty.¹

THE BULGARIANS—AND THEIR RE-AWAKENING

Until the treaty of Paris (1856) was superseded, for the most part, by the treaty of Berlin (1878), as the public law of Europe in relation to the Ottoman empire, the Bulgarians had not secured any of the political rights and privileges that had been accorded from time to time, as we have seen, to the Roumanians, Servians and Montenegrins. While the territory inhabited by the latter peoples was contiguous to other European states, the Bulgarians dwelt in the interior of European Turkey, and were almost entirely shut off from contact with foreigners.² Being nearer, moreover, to the seat of the sultan's government, their subjection to Ottoman rule was, from the first, more unreservedly demanded and more uniformly enforced.³

The original Bulgarians ("dwellers by the Volga") were mainly, it appears, members of an Ugrian tribe of Finnish stock. About 680 A. D. they left their homes in the Volga region and found a new abiding-place along the

¹ Frilley et Wlahovitj, *op. cit.*, chs. xii, xiii; Miller, *The Balkans* (New York, 1896), ch. vii. See the *Nineteenth Century* (1877), vol. i, for "Montenegro," a sonnet, by Tennyson, in which the poet-laureate sings:

"O smallest among peoples! rough rock-throne
Of Freedom!
. never since thine own
Black ridges drew the cloud and brake the storm
Has breathed a race of mightier mountaineers."

² Ranke, *History of Servia*, p. 7.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 33, and ch. vi; Odysseus, *Turkey in Europe*, *op. cit.*, p. 75; Freeman, *Historical Geography of Europe*, p. 431.

south side of the lower Danube. This territory they found already in the possession of Slavic tribes, nominally under the rule of Constantinople. As time went on, the Bulgarians seem to have established a good degree of political unity among both populations.¹ About two hundred years after the migration of the dwellers by the Volga to the Danubian territory, the Slavic (Servian) apostles, Cyril and Methodius, taught the Christian religion throughout that region. By the middle of the thirteenth century the two peoples there had become practically amalgamated into one nation, retaining the language and the traditions of the Slavs, but calling themselves Vulgars or Bulgars.²

Under the leadership of the first great king (Simeon, 892-927) of these Slavo-Bulgarian peoples, they forced Constantinople to accept humiliating terms of peace, and Bulgaria came to include a large part of the Balkan peninsula.³ But a hundred years later the Greeks were the victors, and they continued for one hundred and fifty years afterwards to hold the Bulgarians in subjection. As time went on and no relief was granted from burdensome taxation for the support of the Constantinople Court, the Bulgarians rebelled. The strife between Eastern and Western Christians (so called) soon afforded the Bulgarian king an opportunity to strengthen his position, for a time, by seeming to espouse the cause of the Western Church.⁴ So when Assen II (1218-1240) came to the throne of Bulgaria, he found his kingdom free from Greek rule. However, he soon fell out with the Latin authorities in possession of Constanti-

¹ Bernard, *The Shade of the Balkans* (London, 1904), pp. 263, 292, 312-326; *Journal of the Anthropological Institute*, vol. viii, "Bulgarians": vol. xxxvi, p. 189.

² Bernard, *Shade of the Balkans*, p. 260; Finlay, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 337; vol. iv, p. 28.

³ Odysseus, *Turkey in Europe*, p. 32.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 35-36.

nople and allied himself with the Greeks, receiving in return for this new alliance the creation of the Patriarchate of Bulgaria.¹ The autocephalous Bulgarian Church thus established was not wholly overthrown until 1767. During the reign of Assen II, ancient Bulgaria reached the zenith of her power and splendor, and after his death (1241) the empire rapidly declined.

Then came the Servian ascendancy in the Balkan country, which resulted in the Bulgarians being held for some decades under Servian domination.² At different times Bulgarians, and also a party among the Greeks, joined with the Turks against the Servians. And only, when it was too late, did the Balkan peoples unite against the Osmanlis, to suffer the fatal defeat of 1389, at Kossovo.

With this general defeat of the Christians in 1389, and the burning of the Bulgarian capital (Tirnovo) four years later, the Bulgarians entered on their five centuries of existence as the Sultan's submissive subjects.³ Most fortunately for them, however, they were long permitted to retain their native hierarchy. That was an important factor in keeping alive their language, their traditions, and their sense of nationality. It was not until 1766-7 that the Phanariots, seeing the opportunity for extending hellenizing influences, and of replenishing the treasury of the Constantinople Patriarchate, successfully used their patronage at the Porte to bring about the overthrow of the Bulgarian Patriarchate, as well as that of Servia.⁴

After the Ottoman victory at Kossovo (1389) the term Bulgaria, as occasionally used, could not have had any very

¹ Finlay, *History of Greece*, vol. iii, p. 308; cf. *supra*, ch. i, p. 22.

² Odysseus, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

³ Odysseus, *Turkey in Europe*, p. 75.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 274-5; Ranke, *History of Servia*, p. 37.

fixed and definite signification until Russia announced (1878) her specifications for a greater Bulgaria, which were promptly modified, as will be seen later, by the European creation of a diminutive Bulgaria.¹

Following their incorporation with the Ottoman empire (1389), the Bulgarians seem gradually to have become more or less reconciled to living simple peasant lives, which appear to have been, for the most part, uneventful. Consequently we may take a long leap, so to speak, and direct our attention next to the re-awakening of the Bulgarian people, during the half-century preceding their political liberation (1878).² That re-awakening among these people first manifested itself almost wholly, for a period of nearly fifty years, in a strenuous effort to obtain again for themselves ecclesiastical autonomy. Native control over their own churches, and all that it signified, came to mean to them the all-important means for national development.

The important bearing of the determined efforts of the Bulgarians to regain the management of their own ecclesiastical affairs, and consequently of their educational institutions, was largely due to the outcome of the unique method adopted by the sultans for the control and oversight of their non-Moslem subjects. Mohammet II—"The Conqueror"—had not been in possession of Constantinople many days (1453) before he proclaimed himself the protector of the

¹ *Selected Writings of Viscount Strangford*, vol. i (London, 1869), p. 222; Freeman, *Historical Geography of Europe*, vol. i, pp. 423 *et seq.* Old Bulgaria had comprehended little or much territory, according to the fortunes of war. Later, that part of Turkey bounded, roughly speaking, by the Danube, the Black Sea, the Balkan Mountains and Servia was often conventionally called Bulgaria.

² After the formation of Eastern Roumelia and the principality of Bulgaria in 1878, however, there were many Bulgarians in European Turkey who were left as much as ever under the domination of the Moslems.

Orthodox Eastern Church (Greek).¹ He confirmed the election of the Greek patriarch, to whom he granted important immunities, empowering him, at the same time, to decide among his co-religionists, according to Greek customs, questions of both civil and ecclesiastical law.² From that time on, sultans have continued to recognize the division of their non-Moslem subjects into separate religious communities, or *millets*. The ecclesiastical head of each one of these *millets* (Orthodox Greek, Roman Catholic, Armenian, etc.—now eight) has ordinarily been held responsible, both by the members of his *millet* and by the sultan, as the official representative of his Community.³ These highest church officials in the various religious organizations, have often been able to exert a considerable influence over the projects of the Porte: and until within the last half-century some of them could exercise almost absolute power over those under their jurisdiction.⁴ The Mussulman Code, being at once both civil and religious in its nature, is not easily applicable to those of other religions; and, generally speaking, the Turks have been quite willing that the Christians and the Jews inhabiting the Ottoman dominions should settle many of their own affairs among themselves. As a consequence, especially in times when the European countries were not intimately concerned in Ottoman affairs, so long as the head of any of these re-

¹ Odysseus, *Turkey in Europe*, p. 267; Menzies, *Turkey Old and New*, pp. 86-87.

² Von Hammer, *Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches* (Pest, 1828), vol. ii, pp. 2-3; Finlay, *History of Greece*, vol. iii, p. 522.

³ It has been suggested that for more than four centuries Turkey came near being a "federation of theocracies under the sceptre of the Sultan." Cf. *Selected Writings of Viscount Strangford*, vol. i, p. 224.

⁴ Cf. Odysseus, *op. cit.*, ch. vi; Seignobos, *op. cit.*, p. 618.

ligious communities kept on good terms with the Mohammedan government, he could usually carry out his own policies in relation to his *millet*.¹

For centuries nearly all of the Bulgarians remained true to the Orthodox Eastern Church (Greek), and since 1767 they had been ecclesiastically under the Greek patriarch of Constantinople.² Consequently their few schools and practically all of their churches were in charge of Greeks, who, as a rule, either could not or would not make any use of the Bulgarian language. Moreover, as neither the Turks nor the Greeks were inclined to distinguish between Greek Orthodoxy and Greek nationality, the Bulgarians came to be generally referred to as Greeks.³ It is easy to see how their relation to the Greek Patriarchate became more and more strained. During the first half of the past century, there was a gradual growth of feeling and agitation among them, against the exactions and even the presence of Greek ecclesiastics and teachers.⁴

Soon after 1835 the Bulgarians in the Balkan territory began to open schools and to make their complaints and wishes known at Constantinople.⁵ This growing desire for national schools was concurrent with their increasing determination to have a national hierarchy. Earlier in the century, the realization of a free Greece and an autonomous Servia, had no doubt started the revival of a national spirit among the Bulgarians. They very soon discovered, however, that even an effort to bring about the general use and

¹ Creacy, *History of the Ottoman Turks* (New York, 1877), p. 207; Finlay, *History of Greece*, vol. v, pp. 209-210.

² Cf. *supra*, p. 22.

³ Finlay, vol. vi, pp. 1-12.

⁴ *The People of Turkey*, ed. by S. L.-Pool, London, 1878, vol. ii, p. 208 *et seq.*

⁵ Cf. Miller, *The Balkans*, ch. v; Odysseus, *Turkey in Europe*, *passim*.

the development of their own language would be almost hopeless while they remained under the domination of a foreign hierarchy. But down to 1870, at least, there does seem to have been among the Bulgarians, any very general feeling of disloyalty toward the sultan.¹

Shortly before the outbreak of the Crimean War, however, the Tsar of Russia tried to make it appear that the Bulgarians were even then ready for revolt. In his confidential talk at that time with the British ambassador at St. Petersburg (April, 1853), the Tsar Nicholas I is reported to have affirmed that only his efforts to check the manifestation of feelings of discontent among the Bulgarians had kept them from insurrection.² Nevertheless, their grievances against the Turks were generally attributed to the maladministration of the laws; and doubtless few among that essentially peasant people, even down into the seventies, were antagonistic towards the supreme Ottoman authority.³ But they did determine to rid themselves of the domination and the burdens of what they felt more and more keenly to be a wholly foreign and unsympathetic hierarchy.⁴ There were, in the meantime, quite active efforts by the Bulgarians along educational lines. In this work they were greatly aided by the services of some of their youths who were now beginning to be trained, especially in the schools of France and Germany, as well as in the near-by American institutions.⁵

¹ *The People of Turkey*, pp. 208-214; Finlay, *History of Greece*, vol. vii, p. 126; *Good Words* (1865), pp. 197-205.

² *Parliamentary Papers*, 1854, vol. lxxi, p. 846.

³ *Ibid.*, 1861, vol. lxvii, pp. 560, 597; 1867, vol. lxxv, p. 647; *Contemporary Review*, vol. xxxv, "The New Bulgaria," *loc. cit.*

⁴ *Selected Writings of Viscount Strangford*, vol. i, p. 223.

⁵ *The People of Turkey*, p. 219; St. Clair and Brophy, *The Eastern Question in Bulgaria* (London, 1877), p. 290. A considerable number attended schools in Russia also.

The sultan's decree in 1856 (noted in the treaty of Paris) of sweeping reforms and of an equal status for his subjects of whatever religion, had provided that the various ecclesiastical taxes should be replaced by regular salaries to all church officials.¹ The following year several Bulgarian towns petitioned the Ottoman government for the privilege of availing themselves of this part of the promised reforms; and they asked also for the appointment of a Bulgarian bishop. The Greek Patriarch, however, refused to sanction any such innovations. With a view of settling the controversy, an assembly, intended to be representative of the Orthodox community (Greek), was then called by the Porte. Of the twenty-eight representatives who assembled, however, only four were Bulgarians. Under these conditions, the Patriarch's party could not fail to win. So the assembly closed in 1860, after having particularly affirmed that in the appointment of bishops the Church could not take any account of the matter of race or nationality.²

Throughout the next decade, nevertheless, the Bulgarians kept up the struggle for ecclesiastical autonomy.³ By 1867 there was a wide breach between the Greek clergy and the Bulgarian population. Many places were then without bishops because the Bulgarians would no longer recognize the Greek ecclesiastics who were sent among them. It was not in any sense a question of doctrine or denomination, for the Bulgarians were merely seeking to free themselves from the tutelage of the Greeks, and to have a national synod with a representative at Constantinople.⁴

Meanwhile, apparently with a view of giving the non-

¹ Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 1243.

² Odysseus, *Turkey in Europe*, p. 283.

³ *Selected Writings of Viscount Strangford*, vol. i, pp. 218 *et seq.*

⁴ *Parliamentary Papers*, 1867, vol. lxvii, p. 597, and *passim*.

Mussulman element in the empire some share in judicial proceedings, the Porte made preparations for important changes in provincial administration. The reorganized pashaliks, or districts, were now (1864) called *vilayets*. By this new arrangement the large "vilayet of the Danube" was, in respect to population, a sort of Bulgarian province. Despite all obstacles, this part of the Balkan territory reaped some benefit from the new regulations relating to provincial administration. Under its first governor, the eminent Turkish reformer and statesman, Midhat Pasha,¹ a good start was made in that vilayet along several lines of reform. But, unfortunately for the Bulgarians, before his reform measures could be established there on a firm basis, he was called to Constantinople to preside over the Council of State.²

The continued opposition of the Greek hierarchy to the Bulgarian demands for ecclesiastical liberty, inclined some of the Bulgarians to favor a union with the Western Church (Catholic). The prospect of such a movement at that time very naturally roused the apprehensions of Orthodox Russia. Finally, after the failure of a number of compromise measures, and with the full accord of England and France, and the active support of Russia, the Sultan issued a firman (February, 1870) establishing the Bulgarian Exarchate, thus creating an autonomous Bulgarian Church.³ Two years passed, however, before the first exarch was elected; and then the Patriarchate declared the new Church schismatic and pronounced the sentence of excommunication against all who should desert the Orthodox Greek Community and place themselves under the ecclesiastical authority of the new Bulgarian Exarchate. Nevertheless, nearly all

¹ Ali Midhat, *Life of Midhat Pasha* (London, 1903), pp. 37 *et seq.*

² St. Clair and Brophy, *op. cit.*, chs. xii, xiii.

³ Odysseus, *Turkey in Europe*, pp. 283-85. For the English text of this firman, see Baker, *Turkey* (New York, 1879), pp. 435 *et seq.*

of the Bulgarians determined to brave the possible consequences of excommunication, and resolutely supported their native church organization.

The Bulgarians had now won what they at once regarded as ecclesiastical freedom, and in so doing they had gained the means and the inspiration for more general and effective efforts towards securing some degree of political liberty.¹ In creating the Bulgarian Exarchate, the Sultan had formed within his empire another religious community, or *millet*; and it was but natural, perhaps, that such a move should be regarded in the Balkans as a formal recognition of the Bulgarian nationality. When we remember the extent to which the affairs of each one of these religious communities were administered by its ecclesiastical head, we get some notion of what this victory meant to the Bulgarians. It is so common in the Orient for political and ecclesiastical authority to go hand in hand, that the right to manage their own Church, together with the accompanying civil jurisdiction, could not have failed to arouse and to sustain ardent desires among the Bulgarians, and to give to them anxious hopes for a still wider field of self-government. There are most conflicting accounts of the general feeling of the Bulgarians toward the Sultan's government, previous to the time when the approach of the Russian army became a certainty (1877). Nevertheless, there seems to be but little reason to doubt, that without the work of agitators, operating in Bulgaria from their headquarters in Servia, Roumania and Russia, the Bulgarian population would not, for some time at least, have risen in insurrection. The attempted revolt of some of the Bulgarians in 1876 was but a part of the general insurrectionary movement in the Balkans. That

¹ Minchin, *Growth of Freedom in the Balkan Peninsula*, p. 365; Finlay, *History of Greece*, vol. ii, p. 126.

being the case, all that need be said in reference to what has come to be known as the "Bulgarian atrocities" (1876) very naturally has a place in the more general account of the Balkan uprising (1875-78).¹

¹ Cf. Beaman, *Stambuloff* (London, 1985), ch. i.

CHAPTER III

INTERNATIONAL COMPLICATIONS, AND THE OUTCOME IN THE BALKANS—1870-1878

The quarter of a century following the signing of the treaty of Paris (1856) brought to Europe political transformations of far-reaching significance. Much of that eventful period, it will be remembered, was taken up with the final conflicts which cleared the field for the unification of both Italy and Germany.

Austria had but lately been defeated and humiliated, and the attention of Europe was absorbed by the Franco-German struggle, when in 1870, Tsar Alexander announced to the other signatory powers of the treaty of 1856, that he could no longer consent to be bound by such clauses of that treaty as were inimical to the interests of his empire. At the same time the Tsar pointed out that the powers had allowed parts of the agreement of 1856 to be disregarded, to the detriment of Russia. He contended that because the treaty had not stood the test of time, its neutralization of the Black Sea should not, and could not, by him, be accepted as any longer constituting a pledge of security to Russia's interests along her Black Sea frontier.¹ In short, the Tsar announced his intention to exercise Russia's sovereign rights in that sea, and to allow the Sultan to resume there whatever rights may have belonged, before 1856, to the Ottoman empire.

Without discussing the merits of Russia's reasons for being unwilling to stand by the stipulations in question, the British government, seconded by Austria, vigorously pro-

¹ Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. iii, p. 1892.

tested against the Tsar's assumption that one of the signatory powers could alone release herself and others from treaty obligations. The upshot of the controversy was that conferences of the treaty powers were held in London (January-March, 1871), and that all the restrictions in the treaty of Paris bearing on the military arrangements of Russia and Turkey in the Black Sea, were abrogated.¹ At the same time, however, all of the signatory powers recorded their recognition of the proposition that "it is an essential principle of the law of nations, that no power can liberate itself from the engagement of a treaty, nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the contracting powers."² Moreover, by renewing and confirming all the stipulations of the treaty of Paris not annulled by their new agreement—the treaty of London—it will be seen that the contracting powers attempted in 1871 to give a new lease of life to all that was left of the treaty of 1856.³

At a meeting in Berlin of the emperors of Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia, a year after the treaty of London settled the Black-Sea incident, most intimate relations were once again established between these three eastern governments. Although there was no formal alliance, as it appears, between these monarchs, there was, nevertheless, an understanding that the three courts would act in common in the settlement of questions subsequently arising in the East.⁴ Only three years passed before this agreement was to be put to the test. The Balkan insurrection that proved

¹The protocols of these six conferences may be seen in Martens, *Nouveau Recueil Général*, vol. xviii; also in *Parliamentary Papers*, 1871, vol. lxxii. The correspondence relating to the Black Sea incident is also in this volume of *Parliamentary Papers*.

²Hertslet, vol. iii, p. 1901.

³Ibid., p. 1922.

⁴Bismarck's *Autobiography*, trans. by Butler (New York and London, 1899), vol. ii, p. 251.

so fatal to the territorial integrity of the Ottoman empire broke out in 1875, and for more than a year these three powers took the initiative, collectively, in three successive plans, ostensibly intended to put an end to the disturbances.

In connection with reform projects looking towards the execution of the Hatti-Humayoun of 1856, Turkey had taken some steps, notably in 1862 and in 1867, to better her system of assessing and collecting taxes in the European provinces still wholly under Ottoman rule.¹ The plan of farming the tithes, however, had been allowed to go on in those districts without any satisfactory modifications. It was in connection with the working of that system, that a few peasants in Herzegovina commenced an armed resistance, in 1875, to what they represented to be the unjust exactions of local Ottoman officials. The beginnings of that very eventful contest of 1875-78 thus have reference to Turkish provinces not under consideration in this paper; but the European Concert soon became involved in the conflict; and, from its very beginning, Servia and Montenegro played important parts.

Under the lead of the signatory powers of the treaty of Paris, successive efforts were made to bring about an adjustment satisfactory to the insurgents, as well as to the Porte. Most generous promises and detailed projects of reforms, were announced from time to time by the Sultan's government; but there was suicidal delay in their execution. Month by month the number of insurgents increased, and Slavic sympathy became more and more demonstrative. Servian and Montenegrin armies battled with the Ottoman forces that had been waiting near the boundaries of these two principalities. And all this time the insurgents in Herzegovina and Bosnia steadfastly refused to lay down their

¹ *State Papers, op. cit.*, vol. lxiii, p. 1251.

arms until they should receive some satisfactory guarantee for the execution of promised reforms. Within two years after the insurrection started in Herzegovina, it had involved all the Balkan provinces; and inside of another year, the Russian armies terminated the contest, as is well known, and Turkey practically lost all of that territory.

About a month after the beginning of the insurrection in Herzegovina (1875), Austria-Hungary, Russia and Germany, presented to the Porte a *modus operandi*. The plan was to have these three courts send representatives into the disturbed districts for the purpose of informing the insurgents that no help would be given to them by either of these countries, or by Servia or Montenegro. A Turkish "High Commissioner" was to go along at the same time, and the foreign delegates were to advise the insurgents to make all their grievances known to this special representative of the Sultan. The duty of the Turkish commissioner would consist in hearing complaints and in correcting abuses; and thus he would be expected to carry forward the work of pacification. This project which originated with the three eastern courts was carried out (August), except that France, Italy and England also sent representatives, and the insurgents were accordingly told that they must not expect help or countenance from any source whatever.¹

This undertaking by the European powers, however, was doomed to failure. The insurgents absolutely refused to put any trust in Turkish promises, and required, before laying down their arms, either the execution of the most urgent reforms, or a guarantee for their execution from the foreign powers.

¹ The correspondence in connection with the various movements at this time may be found in *Parliamentary Papers*, 1876, vol. lxxxiv, pp. 143 *et seq.*

The desired guarantee was hopelessly out of the question; and the Turkish commissioner demanded, as a preliminary to any step towards the redress of grievances, that the insurgents should lay down their arms and return to their homes. Hence a deadlock ensued. Meanwhile, sympathy with the uprising grew apace in the surrounding territory. The situation became more and more threatening, and the Sultan issued decrees (October and December) ordering judicial and financial reforms, and granting certain immunities and favors to all Ottoman subjects.¹ But the officials in the disturbed districts either could not or would not go very far in carrying out the policies enunciated in these Imperial decrees.

The Turkish government was making so little progress in Herzegovina, either in reforming the administration or in subduing the insurgents, that Austria-Hungary, Russia and Germany again led the way in proposing a plan for helping forward, ostensibly, the work of pacification. By this time these three cabinets understood full well that it would be of no avail simply to enjoin Servia and Montenegro, or any of the Sultan's Christian subjects in that vicinity, to refrain from hostilities. Therefore, the purpose of this second project was to have the Porte "pledge itself to Europe" to execute in Bosnia and Herzegovina certain specified reforms.² Count Andrassy, the Austro-Hungarian minister, drew up the proposals, and they received a ready assent at Paris and Rome, but there was delay in London. The British government had protested at first against the earlier plans for sending representatives to Herzegovina, and had finally maintained the unity of the European Concert after

¹ Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, pp. 2407, 2409.

² The text of the Andrassy Note, as this communication was afterward called, may be found in *Parliamentary Papers*, 1876, vol. lxxxiv, p. 216; and in Hertslet, vol. iv, p. 2418.

being strongly urged by Turkey to do so.¹ The Porte importuned the London government to give its support likewise to the Andrassy Note. It was the policy of England all along to grant more time to the Ottomans in which to suppress the insurrection, and to thus avoid the possible dangers connected with the outside interference. Nevertheless, after a month's delay, the British ambassador at Constantinople, Sir Henry Elliot, was instructed (January, 1876) to give a general support to the proposals.

The note was then communicated to the Porte by the ambassadors from the three courts that originated the plan, and the ambassadors from France, England and Italy gave verbal assurances that their governments were in accord.² The Andrassy Note, as the communication has come to be called, demanded that the Porte establish religious liberty and abolish tax-farming in Bosnia and Herzegovina, employ in these provinces the taxes collected there, ameliorate the condition of the rural populations and provide for the election, by the inhabitants there, of an equal number of Christians and Mussulmans, to watch over the execution of all reforms thus far promised.

The primary object of these identic representations to the Porte had been to obtain from the Turkish government a written promise to the guaranteeing powers, that these specific reforms would be promptly executed. Such a formal agreement as that, some of the powers asserted, would enable the European Concert to induce the insurgents and their

¹ *Parliamentary Papers*, 1876, vol. lxxxiv, p. 239.

² Sir Henry Elliott reported to his home government that none but the Austro-Hungarian ambassador read the communication to the Turkish foreign minister. On the other hand the Turkish minister reported that it was read to him by the ambassadors of Austria-Hungary, Germany and Russia. *Parliamentary Papers*, 1876, vol. lxxxiv, pp. 248, 251-3.

sympathizers to open the way for reforms by completely abandoning hostilities. The English government, however, did not agree with the other five cabinets in regarding the Andrassy Note as being in the nature of a demand, but chose to refer to the communication that had been made to the Porte, by the use of such terms as "suggestions", "advice", and the like. In view of this attitude in London, it is not strange, perhaps, that Turkey adopted the same view of the Note, and framed a reply accordingly.¹ All the representations that were made to the Sultan's government in connection with the presentation of the Andrassy Note were received by the Porte without the least show of impatience or disapproval. And the brief response, communicated to the powers a little later, clearly indicated that the Note was regarded at Constantinople as a bit of friendly counsel.² The reply merely informed the powers that an irade³ had just been issued for the immediate execution of four out of the five proposed reforms. At the same time it was pointed out that the proposition for the local use of the revenues collected in the insurgent provinces could not well be adopted, but that a certain sum would be added to what had usually been allotted to these two districts.

This second plan (Jan., 1876) for putting an end to the insurrection proved to be the last concerted effort in this connection that received even a provisional acceptance by all parties concerned. The communication of this note to the Porte was followed by no lack of orders and instructions from Constantinople to Ottoman authorities in the insurgent territory. But the officials there were changed so often, and there were so many obstacles, that scarcely a beginning

¹ *Parliamentary Papers*, 1876, vol. lxxxiv, p. 239.

² *Ibid.*, 1876, vol. lxxxiv, p. 251.

³ A document expressing the Sultan's will and orders.

was made in these provinces towards the execution of any of the Imperial edicts. The time had gone by, however, when liberal promises or reform projects, as such, could have any favorable bearing on the situation. So the Andrassy note, of January, 1876, was followed, as spring came on, by a much more general hostile attitude towards Turkish authority throughout all of the Slavic provinces.¹

At the very commencement of this insurrection, the Turkish government had been impressed with its seriousness, and had looked upon it as but the beginning of a carefully worked out design.² The British government counseled Turkey, at that time, to regard the disturbance as a local affair, and to deal with it promptly and effectively, without any appeal for the support of the guaranteeing powers. At that time the central government at Constantinople already was weakened, it is true, by the approaching crisis that resulted in the dethronement of Sultan Aziz, in May, 1876. Nevertheless, Turkey's appeals to the guaranteeing powers when the insurrection was confined to a very limited area, may be taken to mean that the Porte was disposed to throw the responsibility of a settlement on the powers that had declared in such strong terms, that the sovereignty of the Sultan and the integrity of his empire must be maintained. Indeed, in the light of subsequent events, also, it becomes quite apparent that, all through this contest, the treaty of Paris and the declarations relating to certain parts of it, were stumbling-blocks to the Turks. The Ottomans had been led by these representations of the powers, it would appear, to feel far too sanguine respecting the ultimate security of their empire.³

¹ *Parliamentary Papers*, 1876, vol. lxxxiv, pp. 284, 290-305, 361.

² *Parliamentary Papers*, 1876, vol. lxxxiv, p. 147.

³ Musurus Pasha, the Turkish ambassador at London during this crisis, had held the post for about thirty years. "His great mistake," wrote

As the spring of 1876 advanced, Servia and Montenegro assumed a more hostile attitude toward the Ottoman government, and there were also threatening signs of an insurrection among the Bulgarians in the Adrianople district.¹ In April, the insurgent chiefs in Herzegovina made known their requests. No change in the political status of their people was even suggested; but they asked that a third of the land in that province be given to the Christians, that Turkey should rebuild their houses and churches that had been burned, and supply them with agricultural implements and food for at least a year. And they demanded, moreover, that a European commission should receive all money and supplies, and should have full charge in making use of the same, for these purposes.²

The cabinets of Russia, Austria-Hungary and Germany were engaged in preparing a third series of propositions to the Porte (the Berlin memorandum), when two startling events happened (May, 1876), which lessened Turkey's chances for favorable consideration at the European courts. A Mussulman mob at Salonica assassinated the French and German consuls (the latter an Englishman), and an insignificant insurrection among the Bulgarians was suppressed by irregular Turkish troops (Bashi-Bazouks), with frightful and indiscriminate slaughter. Nearly fifteen thousand Bulgarians were killed, and upwards of sixty villages were burned.³ Two months after this atrocious affair, Disraeli,

the Austro-Hungarian ambassador at London, "was that he still looked upon England as the England of the Crimean War, twenty years after that event." *Memoirs of Count Beust* (London, 1887), vol. ii, p. 309.

¹ *Parliamentary Papers*, 1876, vol. lxxxiv, p. 417.

² *Parliamentary Papers*, 1876, vol. lxxxiv, p. 361.

³ For reports based on investigations made by Turkish, English and American representatives, see *Parliamentary Papers*, 1877, vol. xc, pp. 143 *et seq.*

England's prime minister, was still not ready to give to the House the information that he had received concerning the uprising. His replies to inquiries, moreover, were lacking in seriousness; and he suggested that what had happened to the Bulgarians might be found to be "merely the usual accompaniment of a war of insurrection."¹ Yet, even before Mr. Gladstone's impassioned utterances in pamphlets and speeches against Disraeli's policy in supporting the Ottoman government, the British ambassador at Constantinople had been informed for his guidance, that the late events in Bulgaria had completely destroyed all sympathy in England with Turkey. In fact, the London Foreign Office went so far at that time (August, 1876) as to admit that if Russia were to declare war against Turkey, the British government would find it practically impossible to interfere in defense of the Ottoman empire.² In fact, back in May, when England refused to give her sanction to the Berlin memorandum, the British government had suggested to Turkey that the feeling in England had changed since the Crimean War, and that the Sultan's government could not "count upon more than the moral support" of the London government.³ In September of the same year, however, Ambassador Elliot wrote from Constantinople urging his Home government against allowing whatever number of Bulgarians had perished in connection with the insurrection to affect the policy of England in upholding her own interests, by firmly standing for the *status quo* in Turkey.⁴

¹ *Hansard's Debates* (1876), vol. ccxxx, p. 1181.

² Morley, *Life of Gladstone* (New York, 1903), vol. ii, ch. iv; *Parliamentary Papers*, 1877, vol. xc, p. 243; vol. xci, p. 405.

³ *Parliamentary Papers*, 1876, vol. lxxxiv, p. 464; 1877, vol. xci, p. 393.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1877, vol. xc, p. 197.

The proposal (commonly called the Berlin Memorandum), which the governments of the three powers mentioned above had already agreed upon, was communicated to the English, French and Italian ambassadors at Berlin, on May 13, 1876. The desire of the three courts that had taken the initiative was that the guaranteeing powers should make this a collective communication to the Porte. The first demand was to be for an armistice of two months. Then Turkey was to be asked to aid the returning refugees, and to provide for the election of the mixed commission, mentioned in the Andrassy note, so soon as hostilities were suspended. It was now required also that the president of this commission should be a Herzegovinian Christian. The particularly new departures, in this document, were the provisions for surveillance by the consuls or delegates of the powers over the application of reforms and the return of refugees; and there was also an intimation, that if somewhat satisfactory results were not worked out during the period of the armistice, the powers would then undertake more "efficacious measures."¹

The French and Italian governments at once signified their readiness to support these propositions; but the English government, while having no plan to propose, steadfastly refused to take any part whatever in presenting the Berlin memorandum to the Porte.² Within a few days, the purport of this document became known in some way at Constantinople, and the Porte let it be known in London that Turkey would not accept any propositions beyond those that had been agreed to by all parties only five months earlier (contained in the Andrassy note). The confusion at Constantinople, consequent upon the deposition of Sultan

¹ Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 2459.

² *Parliamentary Papers*, 1876, vol. lxxxiv, pp. 45, 428, 447.

Aziz, May 30, 1876, put an end, it would seem, to whatever confidence the five powers in accord may still have had in the Berlin proposals. At any rate, only a few days after that event, the three powers that had originated the "memorandum" concluded to postpone its presentation to the Porte.¹

There was a disposition on the part of some of the treaty powers to defer any further collective action until it should be seen what the new government under Murad V would be able to accomplish. Affairs with the insurgents moved on, however, much as before; and at the beginning of July, Servia and Montenegro declared war against Turkey. Fear for the safety of their own territory and the sympathy of their people for their brothers in Bosnia and Herzegovina, were the reasons that both princes assigned for this step.² A few days later the emperors of Russia and Austria-Hungary met and agreed, among other things, according to Count Bismarck, that in case Russia should go to war with Turkey, Austria-Hungary should acquire Bosnia, as an offset for Austro-Hungarian neutrality.³

The Montenegrins attacked the Turkish army in Herzegovina, and were victorious for the most part; but the Servian army was not strong enough to cope with the Ottoman forces. Consequently, on August 24th, the prince of Servia requested the guaranteeing powers to use their influence towards the re-establishment of peace between his people and the Turks.⁴

¹ *Parliamentary Papers*, 1876, vol. lxxxiv, pp. 460, 479, 571.

² Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, pp. 2471, 2475.

³ Bismarck's *Autobiography*, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 235; cf. Rose, *The Development of the European Nations* (New York, 1905), vol. ii, pp. 214, 218.

⁴ *Parliamentary Papers*, 1877, vol. xc, p. 89.

The tragic death of Aziz, a few days after his deposition, and the trying situation at Constantinople during the three months that followed, made a mental wreck of Murad, and on August 31st he was set aside, and his brother, Abdul Hamid, was called to the throne. On the 10th of September, Sultan Abdul Hamid II issued a decree in which he frankly admitted the pressing need of administrative, financial and judicial reforms, and he attributed all of Turkey's troubles, at the time, to one cause—that the laws had not been regularly and constantly observed.¹ He also drew the attention of his government to the need of effective measures for putting an end to the bloodshed in Bosnia, Herzegovina and Servia.

In keeping with the appeal of Prince Milan, of Servia, for the mediation of the powers. Sir Henry Elliot was instructed on September 1st to propose to the Porte at least a month's armistice, with the understanding that discussion by the treaty powers of the conditions of peace should immediately follow. Four days later, the Constantinople ambassadors of the other guaranteeing powers communicated to the Porte the support of their governments to this proposal. The Turks, however, thought that an armistice would be too favorable to Servia, and were unwilling to suspend hostilities before knowing what the terms of peace would be. Ambassador Elliot was then instructed to warn the Turkish ministers, that if they rejected the proposal for an armistice, the British government could do no more to avert the ruin that the Porte would thus have brought upon the Turkish empire. On its own behalf, France also communicated to the Porte the same kind of warning.² All combatants also were now to be included in the armistice.

¹ Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 2478.

² *Parliamentary Papers*, 1877, vol. xc, pp. 91, 108.

On September 11th, the prince of Montenegro likewise requested the powers to demand a suspension of hostilities. The same day the London government suggested, as bases for discussion by the European concert, peace with the *status quo ante* in Servia and Montenegro, something like local administrative autonomy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and some kind of a guarantee against future maladministration in Bulgaria. Austria, however, explained that because of the mixed population in Bosnia and Herzegovina, an attempt at anything like local administrative autonomy there would be almost sure to break down.¹

The Porte allowed two weeks to pass without making any reply to the proposition of the powers for an armistice. Russia and Austria then urged that the powers should simply *demand* a general armistice, for a month or six weeks. On September 14th, nevertheless, Turkey was so presumptuous as to present to the powers terms of peace, according to which Montenegro was to be left as before, but Servia was to be punished by being thrown back under the conditions that existed there in 1862.² At the same time the Porte communicated to the powers through the Austrian ambassador, that confidential orders had been issued to all Turkish military commanders to remain strictly on the defensive, up to the 25th instant. This period was later somewhat prolonged. Turkey finally accepted (October 12th) England's proposed bases for a European conference looking towards pacification, but offered at the same time to accept an armistice, not for six weeks, but for six months.³

It was at this time that the Sultan announced his intention to convoke, at Constantinople, a General Assembly, to be

¹ *Parliamentary Papers*, 1877, vol. xc, pp. 129, 205.

² *Supra*, p. 78. See also Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 2482.

³ *Parliamentary Papers*, 1877, vol. xc, p. 512.

elected by the people, and a Senate, to be nominated by the Porte. Everything would be done, it was promised, to bring about a "radical amelioration" and a "good administration," throughout the provinces. Russia and Italy refused to sanction so long an armistice as six months, and steadfastly held for one of a month or six weeks.¹ Neither Servia nor Montenegro would listen, either, to a suspension of hostilities for six months; and so little by little fighting was resumed. The Servians were being hard pressed by the Ottoman armies, and on October 31st the Russian ambassador at the Porte, General Ignatieff, gave Turkey only forty-eight hours in which to reply to his proposition for an unconditional armistice of six weeks or two months. Under these circumstances, the Porte abandoned its policy of delay and counter proposals, and promptly communicated its acceptance. General Ignatieff then telegraphed the princes of Servia and Montenegro, and they likewise accepted the armistice.²

For some months there had been unmistakable evidences that the Servians were receiving no little aid in men and money, from Russian sources. So on October 30th, Lord Loftus, the British ambassador at St. Petersburg, was instructed from London to obtain, if possible, definite information from the Tsar's government in regard to this matter.³ Accordingly, on the second of November, the ambassador had an audience with the Tsar Alexander. Lord Loftus reported that Alexander deeply deplored the "inveterate suspicion" in England respecting Russia's policy; and that the Tsar wished the British government to be assured that he did not "entertain either the wish or the intention" to possess Constantinople. Alexander was re-

¹ *Parliamentary Papers*, 1877, vol. xc, pp. 480-81, 559.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 562-3, 565, 573.

³ *Ibid.*, 1877, vol. xc, p. 554.

ported, likewise, to have referred at the same time to the "ineffectual attempts of collective Europe," thus far, to bring the war in Turkey to a close, and to have added that "he should be obliged to act alone, unless Europe was prepared to act with firmness and energy." The Tsar admitted, wrote Lord Loftus, that in order to quiet the agitation in Russia in behalf of the Servians, he had permitted some of his officers to leave the Russian service and go to Servia.¹

Four days after the Russian ultimatum of October 31st brought about the two months' armistice, England proposed a conference of the powers to settle the terms of peace, and suggested now that the bases for the deliberations in the conference should be (a) "the independence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman empire;" (b) a declaration that none of the guaranteeing powers would seek for exclusive influence or advantages for themselves; (c) and the proposals for pacification that had been suggested by the British government back in September.² A clue to the forecast in St. Petersburg of the final outcome of these complications may be gathered from the Tsar's expressed wish that the term "territorial," as here used, should be omitted.³ Somewhat earlier, the Russian government had suggested that, for the purpose of restoring order, there might be a provisional occupation of Bosnia by Austria, and of Bulgaria by Russia. And the Russian authorities still believed in the "ultimate necessity," as they expressed it, of such occupation.

Being well aware, by this time, of the unfavorable feeling among the powers towards the Ottomans, the Sultan's gov-

¹ *Parliamentary Papers*, 1877, vol. xc, pp. 642, 736.

² *Ibid.*, vol. xc, p. 708; *cf. supra*, p. 116.

³ *Ibid.*, 1877, vol. xc, p. 705.

ernment appealed to England, with the idea of avoiding if possible a European conference. The attitude of Russia was so well understood in London, however, that it was neither a guess nor a threat when the British government met these appeals by assuring the Porte that a settlement, either by such a conference or by Russia alone, was inevitable.¹

The plenipotentiaries of the signatory powers to the treaty of Paris (not including Turkey) now proceeded to mature their plans for the conference. They held nine preliminary meetings in Constantinople (December 11-22, 1876), and agreed on a somewhat elaborate plan for administering the Sultan's disturbed provinces, and for settling all the questions at issue. Then the full conference (including Ottoman representatives), likewise held nine meetings (December 23-January 20), during which the pre-arranged scheme underwent some modifications. For our present purpose, however, we shall need to notice only two requirements which the guaranteeing powers regarded as the most vital part of their plan, and which the Ottoman government would not accept. Although several of the plenipotentiaries warned the Sultan's government of the extreme dangers connected with its refusal, still Turkey would not consent that the proposed Governors-General (one for Bosnia and Herzegovina, and one for each of the two proposed Bulgarian *vilayets*) should be nominated by the Porte, with the previous approval of the six powers, and that the European Concert should nominate two international commissions, to inspect and assist in connection with the execution of proposed provincial regulations.² The Ottoman plenipotentiaries now referred to the

¹ *Parliamentary Papers*, 1877, vol. xc, pp. 659, 672, 709.

² *Ibid.*, 1877, vol. xci, gives the correspondence and the documents relating to these developments.

rights unanimously accorded to Turkey in the treaty of Paris, and to the first point in the bases for the deliberations of the conferences; and then they added, as a final word, that the Sublime Porte could not allow foreign interference in connection with the administration of its provinces. Thus the conference ended, having totally failed to accomplish its purpose.¹

Meanwhile, Turkey had been transformed, for the time being, into a constitutional monarchy. The Ottoman authorities had hoped that their new constitution might be accepted as a substantial guarantee for reforms, and that the powers would be content now to allow Turkey another period of probation.² But the failure of the conference was no sooner known, than the Russian cabinet addressed a circular despatch to the other guaranteeing powers inquiring for the limits within which these governments were willing to act, in meeting the refusal of the Porte to be governed by the wishes of Europe.³ Being disposed to allow the new constitutional régime in Turkey sufficient time to deal with the situation in the disturbed provinces, the British government delayed some weeks in sending a reply to St. Petersburg. Meanwhile, the Porte settled its difficulties with Servia by re-establishing the *status quo ante* in that principality and was in a fair way to make peace with Monte-

¹ *Parliamentary Papers*, 1877, vol. xci, p. 382; Turkish view of the outcome of the conference, p. 517. The first point in the bases was, "the independence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman empire." *Cf. supra*, p. 118.

² The Ottoman constitution of December, 1876, may be seen in English (not complete) in Hertslet, vol. iv; and in French—complete—in *State Papers*, *op. cit.*, vol. lxvii.

³ The special representative of England to the Conference, the Marquis of Salisbury, said that the principal object of his mission had been "the conclusion of a peace between Russia and Turkey." *Parl. Papers*, 1877, vol. xci, pp. 387, 410.

negro; and some reform measures were likewise put into operation.¹

Through the initiative of the Russian cabinet, representatives of Austria-Hungary, England, France, Germany, Italy and Russia signed at London (March 31, 1877) a fatal protocol. In keeping with this new agreement, these allies notified the Porte that they proposed to have their representatives in Turkey watch over the execution of reforms there; and they added, moreover, that if their hopes were to be "once more disappointed", they might then seek in concert some further means of looking after the interests of peace and of the Christians inhabiting the Sultan's dominions.² These declarations by the representatives of the six powers were met with an indignant reply from Constantinople. Appealing now to the guarantees in the treaty of Paris (1856), the Sultan's government branded the protocol as being "devoid of all equity", and unconditionally refused to be placed under any form of surveillance (April 9th).³

Representing that the Porte's rejection of the London protocol put an end to every means and to all hope of conciliation, the Tsar promptly arranged with the Roumanians for the passage of his troops through their territory (April 16th), and notified the treaty powers that his armies had been ordered to invade Turkey.⁴ The Russian chargé d'affaires was at once ordered by his government to leave Constantinople, and to cause all Russian consuls in Turkey to leave also. The Porte then appealed to the other powers for their mediation, under article viii of the treaty of Paris. None of the replies, however, held out any hope to the Otto-

¹ Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 2553; *Parliamentary Papers*, 1877, vol. xci, pp. 477, 483.

² *Ibid.*, vol. xci, p. 421.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. xci, p. 429.

⁴ Hertslet, *op. cit.*, iv, p. 2576.

mans.¹ On the other hand, Russia was assured after a little time of the somewhat conditional neutrality of the other guaranteeing powers. The British government strongly remonstrated against Russia's action in breaking away from the concert of the powers and precipitating hostilities, but finally stipulated that England's neutrality would continue so long as her interests in the Suez Canal, in Egypt, and in the Persian Gulf, were let alone; and while the Russians kept out of Constantinople.²

Because the Roumanians had permitted the Russian troops to pass through their country, Turkey refused to keep up diplomatic relations with the government of that principality; and in June, Roumania declared her independence, and turned her army against the Ottoman forces.

The Sultan appealed to all "zealous Mussulmans" to join in the "Holy War" to protect their country (June 30th);³ and it was not until well into December, that the invaders were able to make headway against the Turkish forces. The peace negotiations being carried on between Montenegro and the Porte, at the time of the London protocol (March), having proved futile, the Montenegrins were likewise advancing against those Turks who were in their vicinity. In December, Servia found a reason for declaring war, and she too set her army in motion against the Ottomans.⁴

How valiantly the Turks fought, especially in the Shipka Pass and at Plevna, and how they finally lost, is a familiar story. In despair because of her isolation and defeats, Turkey opened communications with the Russians at the beginning of the next year (1878), and within a month the

¹ *Parliamentary Papers*, 1877, vol. xci, pp. 101-105.

² *Hertslet, op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 2615.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. iv, p. 2643.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. iv, p. 2648.

preliminaries of peace were signed at Adrianople.¹ It will be remembered that the Russian forces did not halt then, but that they moved on slowly until they were within sight of Constantinople. It was to be expected, no doubt, that England would send troops and a fleet, as she did, to save Constantinople from the Russians; though it does not seem very clear yet that there was much reason for such extreme precautionary measures.²

Even before the preliminaries were signed at Adrianople, England notified the Russian government that she would not regard any settlement between Turkey and Russia, that should modify European treaties, as having any validity until it should be formally accepted by the parties to the treaty of Paris. Russia, on the other hand, was only willing that questions bearing on European interests should be submitted to the deliberation of the powers. Only four days after the preliminaries had been signed, Austria-Hungary invited the powers, signatories of the treaty of Paris, to hold a conference at Vienna for the purpose of determining what modifications should be made in relation to that treaty, and also to the treaty of London (1871).³

Notwithstanding this attitude of the other governments, however, Russia kept up her negotiations with Turkey, and on March third these two powers signed, in the treaty of San Stefano, their complete settlement of the whole matter. Austria-Hungary then withdrew her proposal for a conference, and suggested, instead, a congress to be held at

¹ *Parliamentary Papers*, 1878, vol. lxxxii, p. 704; Menzies, *Turkey Old and New*, chs. iv, v.

² For the substance of various confidential communications between London and St. Petersburg in reference to Russia's desire to either occupy or possess Constantinople, see *Parliamentary Papers* (1854), vol. xxi, pp. 835-868; (1877), vol. xc, pp. 642, 705, 736.

³ *Ibid.*, 1878, vol. lxxxii, p. 756.

Berlin.¹ For some time, the British government refused to take part in a congress, unless it were understood that every part of the treaty of San Stefano would be brought up for consideration. Russia was unyielding in her determination that only such terms in the treaty should be discussed as "affected European interests". Finally, after opposing each other up to the very verge of war, these two powers came to a secret agreement, in which Russia consented to some important modifications of her treaty with the Porte in relation to European Turkey, and England withdrew her opposition to a part of the arrangement respecting Asiatic Turkey.²

The way being now clear for collective action, it was time for the European Concert to perform its part. Accordingly, in the twenty sessions of the Berlin congress (June 13-July 13, 1878), representatives of the seven powers took up the Russo-Turkish agreement—the treaty of San Stefano—and made it over into the European settlement—the now well-known treaty of Berlin.

At the time of the Crimean War (1853-56), Russia had found herself isolated. She was defeated and humiliated. Turkey's allies, it will be remembered, undertook to make the outcome of that struggle far more than a military victory over the Russian armies. For the European treaty, at the close of that war, was intended to release Turkey

¹ The Prime Ministers of the powers would be expected to take part in a congress, but not in a conference.

² *Parliamentary Papers*, 1878, vol. lxxxii, pp. 757-771. Because Russia was expected to retain Batoum, Ardahan and Kars (in Asiatic Turkey) England entered into a defensive alliance with Turkey in order to prevent Russia from making other conquests in that vicinity. The right to occupy and administer Cyprus was now granted to England by Turkey, so that the former might be better prepared for carrying on military operations against Russia, if necessary, in Asia Minor. *Parl. Papers*, 1878, vol. lxxxii, pp. 3-23.

from Russia's grasp.¹ Moreover, the Ottoman government was then for the first time "admitted to participate in the advantages of the Public Law and System (Concert) of Europe". Furthermore, the avowed object of the treaty of 1856 was to render the peace more enduring by insuring the independence and integrity of the Ottoman empire.² Russia had been compelled at that time to promise the great powers of Europe that she abandoned every pretension to an exclusive protectorate over any of the Sultan's subjects.³ The European Concert then assumed the guardianship of the civil and religious privileges already accorded by the sultans to their Christian provinces. But this new protectorate, it will be observed, was expressly on the basis of a guaranteed respect for the independence and the territorial integrity of Turkey.

Three of the Sultan's so-called Christian provinces, it will be remembered, were then already well advanced on their way towards statehood. And near to these, were other peoples of like faith and race (in general), who were more than anxious to hurry forward their liberation, likewise, from local Turkish misrule. Under these conditions, discontent, racial sympathies and national ambitions, made it inevitable that the Eastern question would not stay regulated. Up to the very end of the régime (if we may call it such) of the treaty of Paris, the guaranteeing powers found it more convenient, to say the least, to induce the sultans to confirm successive changes in the Balkan provinces, than

¹ For the text of the treaties under which Russia exercised so much control in Turkey, from 1774 to 1856, see *Parliamentary Papers*, 1854, vol. lxxii, pp. 39-77.

² See the preamble and art. vii, Treaty of Paris (1856).

³ For the bases of conferences with Russia for re-establishment of peace, submitted by England, Austria and France (1854), see Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 1216, 1269.

to hold the discontented people there in restraint. And Turkey appeared, all this time, to stand so much in fear of dangers from within and from without, that she dared not undertake to fight these people to a finish.

There came a time, however, as we have seen, when the Porte would not be persuaded by peaceful means to accept the collective counsel of the other treaty powers. Even though these governments warned Turkey in the most solemn manner, she at last defiantly rejected their final proposals.¹ Russia was ready for just such an exigency. The advance of her armies led the Ottoman government to sue for peace, and the outcome, as already noted, was the peace treaty between Russia and Turkey, signed at San Stefano, and the political settlement, worked out a little later, in the Congress of Berlin.²

Although the conclusions of this congress superseded, for the most part, the agreement between Russia and Turkey at the close of the war (1878) still the European Concert accepted and affirmed the fundamental bases of the treaty of San Stefano—the recognition of the independence of Servia, Roumania and Montenegro, and the creation of an autonomous tributary principality of Bulgaria. The European settlement, to be sure, required that religious

¹ For Turkey's protest against the London Protocol (Apr., 1877), her Manifesto in answer to the Russian declaration of war, and her appeal to Mussulmans to fight in the "Holy War" against Russia, see Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. iv.

² As might have been expected, the powers sent their leading diplomats to this congress. Italy sent two, and Austria-Hungary, England, France, Germany, Russia and Turkey sent three each. The leaders of the congress appear to have been its president and "pacifier," Prince Bismarck, Disraeli (Lord Beaconsfield), Gortchakoff (Russian), Andrássy (Austrian), and Waddington (French). The minutes of the meetings, as well as the treaty, may be found in both English and French in *Parliamentary Papers*, 1878, vol. lxxxiii.

equality should be assured in Servia, Roumania and Montenegro, before their independence should be fully recognized.¹ That condition, however, was soon satisfied, and all three took their places in the European family of nations, as independent states. Though the Berlin congress permitted Montenegro to acquire only about half of the new territory that the abortive Russo-Turkish agreement would have given to her, still her area was more than doubled, and she was now to have an outlet to the sea.² After the changes by the European congress, Servia still received an increase in territory, equal to about one-fourth of her former area. Roumanian deputies were even permitted by the Berlin congress to express their protests there in person against the Russian plan to take Bessarabia from the Roumanians, and to give to them in return territory which they did not want. The powers, however, added a little to what Russia had offered, and Roumania was forced to submit.³

The Berlin congress made provision for Bosnia and Herzegovina, by simply arranging that these provinces should be "occupied and administered" by Austria-Hungary.⁴ Servia had to be threatened by the Dual Monarchy before she would abandon her active opposition to that arrangement. In 1880 the Servian ministry changed, however, and her resentment at what her people even then looked upon as the loss of Bosnia and Herzegovina, quieted down. In 1882,

¹ Holland, *European Concert in the Eastern Question*, pp. 220-241.

² For maps showing the territorial changes provided for in the treaty of San Stefano, and the final settlement in this connection in the Berlin treaty, see Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. iv.

³ The views expressed by the Russian plenipotentiaries and by the Roumanian delegates, in the Congress, in reference to that exchange may be read in *Parliamentary Papers*, 1878, vol. lxxxiii, pp. 527, 543.

⁴ See Protocol No. 8 of the Congress of Berlin. *Parliamentary Papers*, 1878, vol. lxxxiii, pp. 504 *et seq.*

with general consent, Prince Milan assumed the title of king; and since that time, this little monarchy has gone on playing her not always enviable part in the affairs of Europe. Roumania took the rank of a kingdom in 1881 and her history since has been marked by a gradual internal improvement.

The autonomous principality of Bulgaria, provided for by the European powers in the treaty of Berlin, was not much like the one that had been arranged for in the Russo-Turkish agreement.¹ The greater Bulgaria of the San Stefano treaty was divided by the European concert into three parts. The southern or Macedonian section was simply given back to Turkey, and the remainder was to constitute a Turkish province with "administrative autonomy"—Eastern Roumelia—and an "autonomous and tributary principality"—Bulgaria.² The course of events in relation to these two partly liberated districts will be followed up in a separate chapter.

¹ McCarthy, *History of Our Own Times*, vol. ii, ch. xv.

² The interesting discussions in four sessions of the Congress, respecting the formation of the Bulgarian principality, may be found in *Parliamentary Papers*, vol. lxxxiii, pp. 438-486.

CHAPTER IV

ORGANIZATION OF BULGARIA AND EASTERN ROUMELIA AND THE MOVEMENTS LEADING TO THEIR UNION AND INDEPENDENCE—1878-1909

THE agitation of more than three decades, which culminated in the creation of the Bulgarian national church (1870), was an important movement towards the unity of the Bulgarian-speaking race. It was principally in connection with that struggle for ecclesiastical liberation, accompanied as it was by an educational awakening, that the Bulgarians in the Balkans gained what little preparation they possessed for assuming the momentous responsibilities that were so soon to devolve upon them.

The principal battles of the war of 1877-78 were fought on what was considered Bulgarian soil, and the Bulgarian peasants helped the invading army in such ways as they could. There was not, however, any general rallying of Bulgarians to the aid of the armies sent against the Turks, though the five thousand and more volunteers who fought with the Russians and the Roumanians were not found wanting in sustained valor.

All Bulgarians had abundant reason for rejoicing over the concessions in their behalf which Russia obtained from Turkey in the treaty of peace (March, 1878). That agreement provided for a semi-independent Bulgaria with a territory considerably larger than that of any of the other Balkan states. And most ample provisions were made, like-

wise, for organizing and inaugurating the government of this new and greater Bulgaria, under the guidance and the protection of Russian authorities.¹

But the Russo-Turkish settlement, as we have seen, was not accepted by the European concert, and the Berlin congress decreed modifications that sadly disappointed the hopes and the expectations of the Bulgarians.

At the first sitting of the Congress, Prince Bismarck, as its president, suggested that in taking up the "work of San Stefano" for "free discussions" it would be well to consider first the questions of greatest importance—"the delimitation and the organization of Bulgaria." As this proposal met the approval of all the members, Lord Salisbury proposed at the second sitting that the new Bulgaria should be restricted to the part of Turkey lying between the Danube and the Balkan mountains, and that the territory south of the line of the Balkans should remain under the authority of the Sultan. He proposed at the same time, however, that some precautionary measures should be taken to secure the welfare of the populations in the latter territory. Again at the suggestion of Prince Bismarck, it was agreed that the representatives of Austria-Hungary, England and Russia —the powers specially interested in the Bulgarian question—should hold private meetings and try to prepare a plan that could be taken up in the congress as a basis for a settlement. Their report was ready for the fourth sitting; and at that time (June 2) it was determined that the principality of Bulgaria should be limited to the part north of the Balkans, and that a province should be formed south

¹ *Parl. Papers*, 1878, vol. lxxxiii, pp. 394 *et seq.* For the *Treaty of San Stefano*, see Holland, *The European Concert in the Eastern Question* (Oxford, 1885).

of the Balkans under the name of Eastern Roumelia.¹ The latter territory had usually been referred to as "South Bulgaria," and when Count Schouvaloff spoke in reference to this part of the agreement he said:

. . . the plenipotentiaries of Russia have accepted the division of Bulgaria by the line of the Balkans, in spite of the serious objections which this division, objectionable for many reasons, presents; the substitution of the name Eastern Roumelia for that of South Bulgaria, reserving, at the same time, to themselves on this point, which has been conceded by them with regret, full liberty of subsequent discussion at the congress; the retention of the word "Bulgaria" has been considered as a watchword or rallying point for dangerous aspirations. . . .²

The population of the new "Eastern Roumelia" had been deprived, he argued, of a name that rightfully belonged to them. And he likewise charged the congress with seeking to replace "ethnographical frontiers" by those that were intended to be "commercial and strategical."

The questions relating to the Bulgarians which occasioned the most discussion were those relating to the liberty that Turkey should have for using her troops in the new province of Eastern Roumelia, and to the duration of the Russian military occupation of that province and of the Bulgarian principality. The extent and plan of collective action to be followed in connection with the provisional control and the organization of the governments in these two provinces were also points on which an agreement was not easily reached. That one of the Russian plenipotentiaries,

¹ The Greeks and the Servians had strongly protested against the formation of such a large Bulgarian province as was provided for in the Treaty of San Stefano. Cf. Rose, *The Development of the European Nations* (New York, 1905), vol. i, p. 273.

² *Parl. Papers*, 1878, vol. lxxxiii, p. 439.

Count Schouvaloff, felt called upon to affirm that "Bulgaria would not become a Russian annex" is somewhat significant of the general trend in all of these discussions.¹

The Bulgarians were sadly disappointed, if not thoroughly exasperated, by the way in which their interests, according to their view, had been sacrificed in the Berlin congress. The territory of the new Bulgarian principality had there been cut down to but little more than a third of what Turkey had ceded to it in the San Stefano treaty. And, what was evidently still more grievous to them, the populations, mostly Bulgarians, in the part that was now seemingly lost to the principality, were to be left under the "direct political and military authority of the Sultan." In this new province of Eastern Roumelia, to the south of the principality, the people were to have a certain amount of self-government, it is true, under a Christian governor; but the congress had stipulated that the Sultan might keep as many Ottoman troops as he wished along the boundary between these two provinces.²

Although perhaps the Bulgarians did not then realize it, still there was for them another side to the work of the Berlin congress. Their affairs were thereby released from an exclusively Russian or Russo-Turkish control and oversight, and placed under the collective guardianship of the great powers of Europe.³ The best that can be said, per-

¹ *Parl. Papers*, 1878, vol. lxxiii, p. 451.

² The treaty of Berlin gave to Bulgaria an area of 24,360 square miles with a population of 1,100,000 Bulgarians, 50,000 Greeks, 9,000 Jews, 400,000 Moslems; and to Eastern Roumelia an area of 13,500 square miles with a population of 571,000 Bulgarians, 42,500 Greeks, 175,000 Moslems, 19,324 Gypsies, 4,177 Jews, 1,300 Armenians (approximately). Cf. *Parl. Papers*, 1880, vol. lxxxii, p. 195; Müller, *Political History of Recent Times*, p. 566.

³ See the fifth and sixth Protocols, *Parl. Papers* (1878), vol. lxxxiii, pp. 454-473.

haps, of the treaty of Berlin is that the signatory powers thereby asserted and assumed collective authority and responsibility for the entire settlement at the close of the Russo-Turkish War.¹ It is significant that before the final formulation of that treaty Prince Gortchakoff, following the Tsar's instructions, asked the Congress "by what principles and in what manner" it proposed "to insure the execution of its high decisions."² Finally a Russian proposal was offered which, being slightly changed by an Austrian amendment, called for a clause in the final agreement stating that the Congress would undertake to "control and superintend the execution" of all the stipulations of the treaty. Germany was favorable to the adoption of this proposal; but it was not accepted by the congress. The plenipotentiaries of England, France, Italy, and Turkey reserved their vote, expressing the conviction that the signatures to the treaty would furnish a sufficient guarantee for its execution.

But the extent to which the treaty of Berlin, as a whole, has stood the test of time does not fall within the scope of this chapter. It is desirable here merely to trace in some detail the process by which, under the protection of that treaty

¹ Up to the present, no one could be more competent, it would seem, to pass judgment on the work of the Berlin congress than Dr. George Washburn. Having been president of Robert College (American), at Constantinople, for more than thirty years, his duties and opportunities have enabled him to gain an intimate personal knowledge of what the Berlin treaty has meant to all parties concerned. "The Treaty of Berlin," he writes, ". . . humiliated Russia without helping Turkey, while it ignored the rights of the people of the provinces of which it disposed. It was a triumph for Lord Beaconsfield, but it was a misfortune for England, and has been a source of trouble in Europe ever since." Washburn, *Fifty Years in Constantinople* (Boston, 1909), Introduction.

² *Parl. Papers*, 1878, vol. lxxxiii, pp. 624 *et seq.* The protocols of the twenty sittings of the Berlin Congress, together with the Treaty of Berlin, may be found in *Parliamentary Papers*, 1878, vol. lxxxiii.

and yet in spite of some of its stipulations, the principality of Bulgaria and the province of Eastern Roumelia as constituted by the Congress of Berlin (1878) have united and have come to form the present kingdom of Bulgaria.

The Berlin congress left ample directions according to which representatives of the powers in the European concert were to attend to the work of organizing Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia. It was stipulated that within a period of nine months after the ratification of the treaty, these provinces should be duly prepared in respect to their organization to enter, within the limits of the treaty, upon the administration of their own affairs. During that time, Russian troops, not to exceed fifty thousand men, were to remain there as an army of occupation. Meanwhile the provisional direction of affairs in Bulgaria was entrusted to a Russian Commissioner, who was to be assisted by an Ottoman Commissioner and the resident consuls of the great powers. In case there should be a disagreement between this consular commission and either the Russian or Turkish Commissioner, the Constantinople representatives of the signatories would have the power of deciding the course of action. The organization of Eastern Roumelia, however, as well as the provisional financial administration of that province, was given over to a European Commission, that was expected to work in concert with the Porte. It was also provided that the boundaries of the two provinces should be traced by European commissioners representing the signatory powers.

Up to the very end of the provisional régime in the two districts, the Bulgarians of both provinces resorted to every means except open warfare to induce the powers to place the two sections under one government. In fact, so pronounced was the opposition to the separation of Eastern

Roumelia from the principality that the work of organizing the two provinces was greatly hampered.¹ The London government did not hesitate to accuse the Russian authorities in these provinces of acting in such a way as to cause the inhabitants to believe that the separation would not be carried out. Great Britain steadfastly held for the enforcement of the terms of the treaty, and refrained, in general, from any discussion with the Bulgarians respecting the possibility of union.²

However, as the time drew near when the Russian occupation of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia must come to an end, London and St. Petersburg came to an understanding respecting the latter province (March-April, 1879).³ In accordance with this agreement, the two governments urged upon the Porte, in writing, the necessity of maintaining inviolate the administrative rights and privileges that were to belong to that province under its constitution. Russia added the assurance, moreover, that she would not support the Bulgarian Roumeliotes in their opposition to the institutions which the treaty of Berlin provided for Eastern Roumelia, and that all the influence of the Russian government would be brought to bear upon these people in order to bring about their submission to the promised régime.⁴

The Bulgarians, however, still continued their unwavering opposition to one clause in the Berlin treaty. The apparent certainty that Ottoman troops would be strung along the boundary separating the two provinces was unbearable to the Bulgarian population on both sides. So they kept up their appeals to the powers for some arrangement that

¹ *Parl. Papers*, 1878-79, vol. lxxix, pp. 88, 441, 447; vol. lxxx, *passim*.

² *Ibid.*, 1878-79, vol. lxxx, pp. 3 *et seq.*; vol. lxxxi, p. 127.

³ *Ibid.*, 1878-79, vol. lxxx, *Turkey*, Nos. 1, 4.

⁴ *Parliamentary Papers*, 1878-79, vol. lxxx, pp. 291-95.

would hinder the Sultan from exercising his right, under the treaty, to place Turkish garrisons along that boundary.¹ It is not easy to determine how the matter was adjusted, but shortly before the time came for the Russian troops to leave these provinces (May, 1879) the Russian authorities were prepared to assure the Bulgarians that the Porte did not "see the immediate necessity of garrisoning the Balkans." And at the same time it was suggested to them that the strategical advantages of maintaining Turkish troops along the boundary between the two provinces were, seemingly, no longer thought of, and that it remained for the Roumeliotess to show by their future conduct that the presence of such garrisons was not politically necessary.²

Meanwhile, the stipulations of the Berlin congress were being carried out in respect to the organization of both provinces. The treaty set down as the basis of public law in Bulgaria that religious creeds were to have no bearing on the civil and political rights of the inhabitants. There was to be freedom for the exercise of all forms of worship; and there was to be no interference in relation to the hierarchical organization of the various religious communities. The treaty also made it inadmissible to select the prince from among the members of any of the reigning dynasties of the great powers of Europe.³

It will be remembered that the treaty of Berlin intrusted the provisional administration of Bulgarian affairs to a Russian commissioner, although consular delegates representing the signatory powers and a Turkish Commissioner were expected to exercise some control over the working of

¹ *Parl. Papers*, 1878-79, vol. lxxx, p. 299.

² For the Tsar's proclamation, and the address of his representative, see *Parl. Papers*, 1878-79, vol. lxxxii, p. 1046; *cf. infra*, p. 144.

³ Art. iii and Art. v of the Treaty of Berlin. *Parl. Papers*, 1878, vol. lxxxiii, or Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. iv.

the provisional régime.¹ The Tsar selected Prince Don-doukoff to carry on the provisional government in Bulgaria; and it was not long before this Imperial commissioner concentrated within himself the supreme civil and military authority in both Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia.² He organized local militias, and had the recruits from both provinces drilled practically as a combined force under Russian officers. In fact, the whole procedure of the Tsar's agents in the two provinces must have had an unmistakable bearing on the desire and the efforts of the Bulgarian populations there for union. From time to time the British government strongly protested to the St. Petersburg Cabinet against the methods employed by the provisional Russian authorities. Their entire civil and military system was of a nature, it was contended, to render more and more difficult and hopeless the task of putting into operation the decisions of the Berlin congress, which called for the entire separation of Eastern Roumelia from Bulgaria.³

The upshot of all the correspondence between the two cabinets on these matters, was the promise from St. Petersburg (April, 1879) that the influence of the Russian government would be exerted towards the peaceful organization of Eastern Roumelia in accordance with the terms of the Berlin treaty.⁴ Under the direction of the Russian gov-

¹ The treaty specified that the provisional régime should not extend beyond a period of nine months after the ratifications were exchanged. During the month of August (1878) all the contracting powers exchanged ratifications at Berlin.

² General Stolypin was nominally the Russian governor of the latter district.

³ *Parl. Papers*, 1878-9, vol. lxxxii, pp. 103, 127, *passim*. For the attitude of the European commission, engaged in drafting the Eastern Roumelian Constitution, see *ibid.*, p. 183.

⁴ Cf. *supra*, p. 135; also *Parl. Papers*, vol. lxxx, *Turkey*, Nos. 1, 4; also *Annual Register*, 1879, p. 179.

ernor-general of Bulgaria, Dondoukoff, a national assembly was convened (February 26, 1879) at the old Bulgarian capital, Tirnovo.¹ In opening the assembly Prince Dondoukoff presented for its consideration the draft of a constitution for the prospective principality. But with the Bulgarian representatives other matters claimed first attention. Sofia was determined upon as being the most suitable place for the new capital. Then, after about three weeks of speech-making, a vote was finally taken expressing the thanks of the Bulgarians to the Russian Emperor. It is somewhat significant, also, that this expression of gratitude to the Tsar was accompanied with a declaration of fears for the future in case Turkish troops were to be stationed along the boundary between the principality and Eastern Roumelia.² At this juncture, however, a mild reprimand from Prince Dondoukoff (conveyed through a messenger) brought his "skeleton constitution," as he called it, up for consideration (April 2).³ A committee of fifteen then spent about two weeks in revising the Russian project; and the assembly completed the work in about three weeks more. A number of important modifications were made in the original draft. A clause stating that the relations of the prince to the Porte should be those of a vassal, was rejected. Articles providing for a Council of State, and prohibiting any change in the constitution within five years, were likewise cut out. Articles were also added prohibiting slavery, and the giving of titles of rank in the principality. In closing the assembly, Prince Dondoukoff intimated that

¹ Beaman, *M. Stambuloff*, London, 1895, ch. i.

² *Appleton's Annual Cyclopedia* (New York, 1879).

³ The imperial commissioner had appointed a substitute to preside during the discussion of the constitution. The former exarch was elected the regular president of the Assembly.

the work accomplished by the deputies signified the possession of qualities that had not been known hitherto among Bulgarians.

Having now a constitution for Bulgaria, the next day (April 29th) a new assembly proceeded to elect a prince. Three candidates were named, and the deputies unanimously elected the one best known to them—Prince Alexander of Battenberg.¹

The constitution declared the principality of Bulgaria a hereditary and constitutional monarchy with a national representation. The prince was to be the chief representative of the state, and to bear the simple title of "Highness." He was to have his permanent residence within the principality, and both he and his heir-apparent were to be exempt from all taxes, state dues and fines. A sum equal to about \$120,000 was to be granted yearly by the Assembly to the prince and his court. It is interesting to note in this connection that the constitution declared that "neither the prince nor his relatives" could derive personal profit from any of the state property.

In the prince was vested the right of appointment to all government employments; and each appointee was to swear fidelity to the prince, as well as to the constitution. The executive authority, "under the high superintendence and direction of the prince," was vested in the six Ministers of State and their council. No official document signed by the prince was to be valid without the signature of one or more of his ministers. These ministers, to be appointed or

¹ The Assembly that revised the Russian draft of the constitution consisted of 286 members. The majority were elected by the inhabitants, and the remainder were deputies *ex officio* and appointees of the government. The Assembly that elected Prince Alexander consisted of 250 members, 22 of whom were Mohammedans. Cf. Müller, *Political History of Recent Times*, trans. by Peters (New York, 1882), p. 556.

discharged by the prince, were declared to be responsible "conjointly" to him and to the representative Assembly.

Representation in the government was confined to one House—the National Assembly, or Sobranje. Its members, one for every ten thousand of the population of either sex, were to be elected for three years, by universal manhood suffrage; and the constitution made it the duty of each member to represent the entire nation. It was definitely stated, also, that each member was to be entirely free to act in that capacity in accordance with "his own conscience and conviction."

Provision was likewise made for the election and convocation of a Grand Sobranje. This assembly was to be chosen like the other, except that it would contain double the number of the ordinary one. It was to be the only competent body to elect three regents when necessary, to select a new prince, or to settle questions involving a change in the constitution or in the territorial boundaries of the principality.

Bulgaria has been called the most democratic country in the world. It had neither an aristocracy nor a plutocracy; and it was made a part of the fundamental law that titles of nobility or rank, and likewise orders and decorations, could not be constituted in the principality. It is noteworthy, also, that while education had not yet become general outside the larger towns and villages, the constitution specified that primary education should be gratuitous and compulsory for all subjects. The constitution provided, moreover, for the freedom of the press, and the right of public assembly; and it proclaimed the inviolability of the rights of person and property. While the "Orthodox Eastern Confession" was mentioned as being the state religion, still full religious liberty was to be accorded to all.¹

¹For the full text of the constitution, see *Parl. Papers* (1878-79), vol. lxxx, *Turkey*, No. 8.

One of the most important features of the new constitution seems to have been the nice balance that was worked out in it between the representative assembly and the executive branch of the government. It has even been suggested that this relationship was due to the forethought of the Tsar's agents; their plan being, perhaps, to leave a way open whereby Russia could control the situation by maintaining a paramount influence over either the prince, the cabinet, or the people.¹ This system of checks and balances surely rendered it very difficult to make any headway in the government without the mutual agreement of these three governmental forces.

From the outset, the fortunes of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia were so closely interwoven that it will be well to watch, in going along, the progress of affairs in both provinces. The international commission, called for in the treaty of Berlin to work out a plan for organizing Eastern Roumelia, continued its sittings from September, 1878, to the end of April of the following year. This commission was also charged with the duty of provisionally administering the financial affairs of that district.

The eleven commissioners representing the signatory powers of the treaty did nearly all of their work at Philippopolis, where they could readily familiarize themselves with every phase of the situation.² The lengthy "Organic Statute" which they succeeded in elaborating was promptly and unhesitatingly accepted by all parties concerned.³ This

¹ Miller, *The Balkans* (New York, 1896), p. 216.

² Of the sixty-four sittings of the commission, while the statute was being drafted, only the last four were held in Constantinople. For a full account of these meetings, see *Parl. Papers*, 1878-79, vol. lxxxi.

³ The text of the 495 Articles, and as much more in "Annexes," may be seen in *Parl. Papers*, 1878-79, vol. lxxx, *Turkey*, No. 6.

document bears evidence of having been most carefully worked out in every detail. And it is not too much to add in this connection, that it proved to be peculiarly adapted, as we shall see, to suit the shifting relations of the people whose affairs were intended to be administered according to its provisions.

The treaty of Berlin had specified, as we have seen, that Eastern Roumelia should enjoy administrative autonomy, while remaining under the "direct political and military authority of the sultan." It fixed the term of the governor-general (belonging to the Christian faith) at five years.¹ It provided, likewise, that Eastern Roumelia should have a native police and a local militia. The chief officers of these two bodies were to be nominated by the sultan, but he was enjoined to pay due heed in his appointments to the religion of the people in the different localities. The organic statute empowered the sultan to select the Minister of the Interior from a list of three candidates (Christians) to be presented by the governor-general. The many other nominative offices were to be filled by appointees of the governor-general, subject to the approval of the sultan. It was provided, however, that the local appointments should be valid in case the Imperial decision were delayed for a month.

The statute provided as well for the usual departments of state, and for a Provincial Assembly. It contained ample provisions for safe-guarding within the province such liberties as are common under constitutional government. Primary and secondary schools were left, for the most part, to the direction and maintenance of the various religious organizations. In case a community should be too poor to maintain schools the government was directed to sup-

¹The governor-general to be nominated by the Sultan with the assent of the treaty powers.

ply certain grants from the national treasury; but schools receiving such aid were to be wholly under the control of the government. In fact the Director of Public Instruction was charged with the general oversight of all schools, public and private. Instruction to all children between the ages of seven and thirteen, inclusive, was made obligatory. Five years after the promulgation of the constitution, young men becoming twenty-one were not to be permitted to vote if unable to read and write Turkish, Bulgarian, or Greek.

The manufacture of gunpowder in Eastern Roumelia was strictly prohibited. The supply for the provincial magazines was to come from other Turkish provinces, and could not be imported without special authorization by the provincial assembly. The attention given by the framers of the organic statute to minor details is noticeable in the specification that such authorization should be given gratuitously.¹ A study of this extremely long and detailed constitution, worked out for the new and autonomous province in accordance with the treaty of Berlin, causes one to feel that scarcely any question could arise, connected with the complicated affairs in that province, that would not be covered by some provision in that document.

At the end of their prospective constitution, the European commissioners added a "*disposition finale*" intended to limit the activity of the provincial government in the matter of law-making. According to this final provision changes in the constitution, excepting in relation to two chapters bearing on the militia and the gendarmerie, could not be made without the consent of the seven governments concerned in the formulation of the statute.

¹ There was a strong impression in London and Vienna that the commission entered too much into detail respecting the internal administration of the province. *Parl. Papers* (1878-79), vol. lxxxi, p. 573.

While the organic statute was nearing completion, a delegation representing some of the Bulgarian leaders in Eastern Roumelia and Bulgaria was visiting the capitals of the signatories of the Berlin treaty. By this time many of the principal agitators for the immediate union of these two provinces had abandoned the hope of bringing about that result. The avowed purpose now was to obtain a sufficient modification of the treaty to allow Eastern Roumelia a European governor, and to prevent the placing of strictly Turkish garrisons along the boundary between the two provinces. In fact, there appears to have been all along an unwavering determination among the Bulgarians, especially those in Eastern Roumelia, never to submit to the exercise of the sultan's right respecting the Balkan garrisons.¹

It was at this juncture that the Tsar may be said to have come to the rescue. He now sent a special messenger, General Obrutcheff, to the Sultan and to the Bulgarians.² General Obrutcheff's mission to Constantinople was successful to the extent that the Sultan pledged himself "provisionally," not to exercise his treaty right of garrisoning the roadways between Eastern Roumelia and Bulgaria.³

Having received this most comforting promise from the Turkish government, the Tsar's envoy hurried on in order to deliver his messages to the Bulgarians. In various centers throughout Eastern Roumelia he read to the people his master's "Proclamation to the Bulgarians." He told his hearers, likewise, of his audience with the Sultan, and as-

¹ *Parl. Papers* (1878-79), vol. lxxxii, pp. 734 *et seq.*

² *Ibid.*, p. 995; also vol. lxxx, p. 299.

³ It is said that the Sultan's pledge was obtained as an offset to the Tsar's pledge for the maintenance of order in Eastern Roumelia, and for the remission of about four million dollars of Turkey's indebtedness to Russia. Müller, *Political History of Recent Times*, p. 557. Cf. *supra*, p. 136.

sured them that they had nothing to fear from Turkish troops. He pointed out to them, moreover, that with the exception of their governor-general—one of their own race—no Turkish official would be seen in their country. These assurances, taken in connection with the Tsar's expressed disapproval of any disorderly opposition to the organization being worked out for them, did much to clear the way for a fair trial in Eastern Roumelia under the statute about to be presented by the International Commission.¹

The "Organic Statute" was completed and signed by the commissioners on April 26, 1879, at Constantinople. The Sultan's nomination (April 14th) of Alexander Vogorides (Aleko Pasha) as governor-general of Eastern Roumelia for five years, had already been accepted by the governments in the European Concert.² It will be seen that the first governor's name clearly indicates that he had a Greek ancestry; but frequent reference is found to him as being of Bulgarian blood.³ He recognized the ecclesiastical authority of the Bulgarian Exarch, and thus he is commonly called a Bulgarian Christian. Aleko Pasha spoke both Bulgarian and Greek, and he had formerly been Turkish ambassador, at Vienna.⁴

The disappointment of the Bulgarians in Eastern Roumelia over this separation from Bulgaria, and the racial and religious prejudices, all too apparent throughout the province, rendered the situation there anything but promising.⁵ Russia's army of occupation was expected to withdraw as

¹ *Parl. Papers*, 1878-79, vol. lxxxii, pp. 1044 *et seq.* Cf. *supra*, p. 136.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 877, 944.

³ Washburn, *Fifty Years in Constantinople*, p. 148. *Parl. Papers*, 1878-79, vol. lxxxii, p. 1059, *passim*.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 1013.

⁵ *Parl. Papers*, 1878, vol. lxxxii, *Turkey*, No. 49.

soon as the new government should be organized. Under these circumstances, it became evident to the powers that it would not be advisable to leave the responsibility of inaugurating the new régime solely to the authorities provided for in the constitution. Austria and Great Britain were quite determined that the Russian occupation should not be prolonged. Finally, in accordance with the Sultan's proposition, the international commission, just finishing the draft of the constitution, was continued for another year. The commissioners were then instructed by their governments to proceed to the capital of the new province (Philippopolis), and to act there in conjunction with their associates as an advisory council to the governor-general. It was well understood, at the same time, that the administrative head of the provincial government was to pay due heed to the advice of this international body.¹ The Sultan issued firmans (May 18th), with rather unusual promptness, confirming the appointment of Aleko Pasha, and sanctioning the constitution.² As the governor was about to leave for Philippopolis, it appears that the Sultan ordered him to wear the Turkish fez, at his installation. Owing to the feeling in the province, however, it seems that after crossing the frontier he discarded the fez for the Bulgarian cap.

On Aleko Pasha's arrival (May 27) at Philippopolis, he was greeted by a band playing the Bulgarian hymn, which was also sung by boys from the Bulgarian school. Two days later, when the ceremony connected with the reading of the Sultan's firman took place, the governor felt obliged to defer to the popular desire and did not display the Turkish flag.³

¹ *Parl. Papers*, 1878-9, vol. lxxxi, pp. 1020 *et seq.*

² For the texts of the imperial firmans, see *ibid.*, vol. lxxx, p. 423.

³ *Parl. Papers*, 1878-79, vol. lxxxi, pp. 1061 *et seq.* The governor's acquiescence was in keeping with the advice of the European commission.

A German, Mr. M. A. Schmidt, had already rendered valuable service in caring for the financial affairs of the province under the direction of the international commission. Taking note of the sentiment favoring his retention, the governor appointed him Director of Finance. Most of the other appointive offices were filled with Bulgarians.

With the Russian troops rapidly departing, leaving a local militia already quite well organized, drilled and equipped, by the Russians, and with the presence of the European commission in the capital, Eastern Roumelia was now started on her brief period of autonomy.¹

While this preparatory work had been going on in relation to Eastern Roumelia, the provisional government in Bulgaria was putting matters in order there for the inauguration of the new régime. The man selected to be the first prince of this new tributary state was but twenty-two years of age, and, at the time of his election (April 29, 1879), he was serving as an officer in the Prussian *garde du corps* at Potsdam. He was a son of Alexander of Hesse, by a Morganatic marriage which that prince contracted with a Polish lady, who was made Princess Battenberg. Through marriages contracted by other members of the Hessian and Battenberg families, he was connected with the British royal family. He was also a nephew of the Russian empress.² His education and military training had been obtained at Berlin; and as he had accompanied the invading army that fought its way towards Constantinople in 1877-78, he was not without some very practical knowledge of warfare.

The parties to the treaty of Berlin readily assented to the election of Prince Alexander of Battenberg; and he visited the principal European courts before going to Bulgaria.

¹ *Parl. Papers*, 1878-79, vol. lxxxii, p. 882.

² *Annual Register*, 1879, p. 180; Müller, *op. cit.*, p. 557.

He went first to Russia to pay his respects to his Imperial uncle, Tsar Alexander II. It was there that he received from a Bulgarian deputation the official notification of his election to the princely dignity in the new state. Finally he journeyed from Rome to Constantinople, where he received his investiture (July 5th) from the Sultan. He then went on to Bulgaria, and was received there with no lack of enthusiasm. On July 9th, at the old capital—Turnovo—, he took the oath of fidelity to the constitution; and a few days later he entered the new capital—Sofia—and proceeded to set in motion the governmental machinery of the new principality.¹

Prince Dondoukoff departed at once, and within a month the Russian army of occupation had left the country. A very liberal supply of Russian officers remained behind, however, in care of the native militia.

Within a week after entering his capital Prince Alexander selected his first cabinet. He made choice of five conservative Bulgarians, and one Russian—the Minister of War—General Barantzoff. The elections for the Sobranje came on in the fall, and when the Assembly convened (November 8th) it was found to contain a large majority of Liberals.²

For some little time the national parties were, for the most part, passing through formative stages. It is not easy, therefore, to characterize them with any considerable

¹ See ch. vii of the Constitution; also *Appleton's Annual Cyclopedia*, New Series, vol. iv.

² The one-chambered legislative assembly.

Annual Register, 1879, p. 159; Washburn, *op. cit.*, p. 152. Dr. Washburn speaks from personal knowledge when he says: ". . . there were no leaders who had had any experience in government, and the National Assembly chosen by the people was hopelessly ignorant and unmanageable." But he sympathetically adds, "I suppose nothing better could have been expected of a people suddenly emancipated from Turkish rule."

definiteness. It may be said, however, that, generally speaking, the Conservatives were willing to follow the lead of Russian advisers, while the Liberals held that the Bulgarians could and should exercise their share of authority and responsibility in the affairs of the principality. Being a favorite nephew of Tsar Alexander II, Prince Alexander very naturally worked for some time quite in harmony with Russia's agents, and thus in accord with the Conservatives.

But there was at the same time another line of cleavage, which caused more or less overlapping in respect to these two national parties. A vigorous agitation was being kept up among the Bulgarians in the principality, as well as in Eastern Roumelia, for the early union of the two territories. Some of the Liberals favored a temporizing policy on the part of the Bulgarian government towards the object of this agitation; and in this attitude they were in full accord with the Conservatives. But there were other would-be leaders among the Liberals who were supremely interested in pressing upon the Government the expediency of taking immediate steps looking towards the consummation of the union.¹ It was not long before a keen rivalry sprang up between the leaders of these two Liberal factions, Zankoff and Caraveloff, and that added somewhat, also, to the party complications.²

The prince found that he could not make any headway with the Sobranje and he dissolved the assembly (December 5th). The second elections were held in the spring of 1880, and resulted in greatly increasing the Liberal majority. Prince Alexander determined now to try a Liberal Ministry, and he picked Zankoff to form a Cabinet.³

¹ Cf. Beaman, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

² Minchin, *The Balkan Peninsula*, ch. xiv.

³ Zankoff called himself a Constitutional Liberal. His chief anxiety was to see the principality organized and administered in strict accord-

These gains for the Liberals greatly strengthened the unionist movement. The chief agitators held a mass meeting (May 29) at Slivno, in Bulgaria, and the prince sent two delegates, in order that he might have definite information regarding the situation. As the head of the new Liberal Ministry in England, Mr. Gladstone had let it be known that the sympathy of the British government for the Christian nationalities of the Balkans was dependent on the good use that they should make of the liberties that Europe had already secured for them. This declaration, coupled with the efforts, particularly of English and Austrian officials in the two provinces, had a most favorable influence in dissuading Bulgarians, both north and south of the Balkans, from taking any decisive steps at this juncture to bring about the union. Prince Alexander's delegates returned from the Slivno conference to report that the time had not arrived yet for a general unionist movement; and for the next two or three years the question seems to have been kept more in the background.¹

The internal conditions in Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia were still anything but promising. Brigandage had sprung up anew, and there were many instances of racial and religious strife in which neither the Bulgarians, the Greeks, nor the Moslems seem to have been blameless. There were difficult problems, likewise, to be solved in connection with the financial needs of the two impoverished provinces.²

Throughout the year 1880, the premier, Zankoff, failed to get along well with the Russian War Minister (now

ance with the constitution. *Parl. Papers*, 1880, vol. lxxxi, p. 438; Minchin, *op. cit.*, p. 234.

¹ *Parl. Papers*, 1880, vol. lxxxi, pp. 445 *et seq.*; Beaman, *op. cit.*, ch. ii.

² *Parl. Papers*, 1880, *Turkey*, No. 19; 1881, *Turkey*, No. 4; *Appleton's Cyclopedia*, 1879, "Bulgaria," *loc. cit.*; *ibid.*, 1880, p. 74.

General Ernroth) at Sofia; and in December the prince gave the premiership to Caraveloff.¹ Under these Liberal cabinets a considerable number of important legislative bills were passed. Provisions were made for a better system of national education and for ecclesiastical reforms intended to place a limit on hierarchical domination, and the rights and duties of village magistrates were better defined. But when the Liberals set on foot a movement to reduce the number and the rank of Russian officials in Bulgaria and manifested strong socialistic tendencies, the prince was ready to break with the Liberals and to resort to rather high-handed measures.²

In March, 1881, Tsar Alexander II, the uncle and patron of Prince Alexander of Bulgaria, was assassinated. Prince Alexander attended the funeral of his Imperial uncle, and then visited the courts of Berlin and Vienna. After an absence of about six weeks, he returned, and shortly afterwards (May 10th) dismissed the ministry and appointed the Russian War Minister, General Ernroth, premier. He announced at the same time his determination to surrender his crown unless a Grand Sobranje should decide in accordance with his views. Then he submitted three proposals which were to be acted upon by the Grand Assembly. He asked to be invested for seven years with "extraordinary powers" enabling him to create new institutions, and empowering him to summon a Grand Sobranje within the seven years, so that the constitution might be revised on the basis of such institutions as he had created. Also, the ordinary Assembly, then in session, was to be suspended.

¹ Caraveloff was at this time a moderate Liberal, or Nationalist. He was in general more interested in looking after internal affairs, and bringing about the union of Eastern Roumelia with the principality, than in opposing Russian interference.

² *Annual Register*, 1881; *Appleton's Cyclopedie*, 1881, "Bulgaria," *loc. cit.*

Prince Alexander and his Russian helpers arranged for most careful oversight of the elections, and a Grand Assembly was convened that accepted the prince's proposals without delay or opposition.¹ Whether or not the prince effected this *coup d'état* as a result of advice proffered to him at St. Petersburg, Berlin and Vienna, it is certain that the Russians were in full accord with the movement.²

It appears that the prince feared he had weakened his prestige in Bulgaria, for he asked Russia to send him two ministers. The Tsar replied by sending General Sobóleff, who became Minister of the Interior, General Kaulbars, who was made Minister of War, and General Tioharoff, who became Minister of Justice.³

Bulgaria was now practically, so far as the government was concerned, a Russian province. The Russians in the Ministry claimed to receive their orders from the Tsar; and they soon made it plain to the prince that, though he might continue to reign, he would not be permitted to rule.⁴ But Prince Alexander was not the man to be forced into submission to subordinate officials. Hence there was for a little time something like a three-cornered fight. The Bulgarian leaders were bitter towards the prince for having set aside the constitution, and the exploitation of their country by Russian commercial speculators tended to increase their opposition to Russian domination.

With the accession of Alexander III to the Russian throne (1881), a new element had been introduced into the situation in Bulgaria. Up to the time of his death,

¹ Cf. *Annual Register*, 1881; Beaman, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

² Cf. Müller, *op. cit.*, p. 557; Minchin, *op. cit.*, p. 234.

³ Koch, *Fürst Alexander von Bulgaria* (Darmstadt, 1887), p. 104.

⁴ Beaman, *op. cit.*, p. 48; Leonoff, *Documents Secrets* (Berlin, 1893), *passim*. Minchin, *op. cit.*, p. 238.

Alexander II manifested a fatherly interest in the success of his favorite nephew's reign. But the son (Alexander III) is said to have cherished an enmity towards his cousin, Prince Alexander. This dislike, it seems, was due to some unpleasantness that came up between them during their youth.¹ The young Tsar's animosity is thought to have at least encouraged the Russian officials in the principality in manifesting unfriendliness and arrogance towards the prince, as soon as he presumed to slight their counsel.²

Throughout the year 1882, the Bulgarians were greatly agitated over the loss of many of their liberties through the suspension of the constitution. In fact, the country was so near the verge of revolution that martial law was declared. Meanwhile, the prince was taking a more and more decided stand against the dictation of his Russian officials. Even the threats of dethronement failed to hold him longer in check, and from this time until his abdication the breach between him and the Tsar widened more and more.³

Finding that Prince Alexander was slipping his halter, the Russian ministers undertook to ingratiate themselves with the Liberals.⁴ The St. Petersburg government, or rather the Tsar, had now determined that the union of Eastern Roumelia with Bulgaria should not be brought about until Prince Alexander could be forced to abdicate. The leaders of the popular party in Bulgaria were told that the prince was the principal obstacle in the way of union. The Bulgarians, however, were just now most intent on the re-establishment of constitutional government. Consequently,

¹ Washburn, *op. cit.*, pp. 161, 183; Koch, *op. cit.*, p. 81; *Bismarck's Autobiography*, Eng. trans., vol. ii, p. 117.

² Dicey, *The Peasant State* (London, 1894), p. 23.

³ Beaman, *op. cit.*, p. 49; *Appleton's Annual Cyclopedia*, 1882.

⁴ *The Contemporary Review* for 1886 contains an article dealing quite fully with this period.

Russia's next move was to call upon the prince to give up his autocratic power and restore the constitution, on pain of losing his throne.¹

Meanwhile, the prince had been leaning more and more on the counsel of the moderate Liberal leaders. He had hesitated about trying again to govern with a radical ministry and assembly, but when there was no alternative except the humiliation of submitting to the dictation of Russian agents, he determined to follow his own plans in restoring the constitution. He found the leaders of all the Bulgarian parties ready to join with him, and arrangements for the restoration of constitutional government were quickly matured. The "small assembly" petitioned the prince to restore the constitution of 1879, and he at once issued a proclamation to that effect (September, 1883).

The Russian ministers had not been consulted in reference to this step. They were taken unawares, and in their surprise and anger, they resigned. Zankoff (Liberal) was asked now to form a ministry.² The elections for the Sobranje, however, resulted in a sweeping victory for the partisans of his rival, Caraveloff, and Zankoff resigned. Zankoff had earlier expressed himself as wanting neither "Russia's honey nor Russia's sting."³ From this time, however, he became an out-and-out Russophil, and we shall see a little later what an important and shameful part he played in helping to bring about the abdication of Prince Alexander. The Caraveloff ministry and the prince, in spite

¹ Leonoff, *op. cit.*, *passim*; cf. Rose, *op. cit.*, p. 310.

² Appleton's *Annual Cyclopaedia*, 1883. One of England's representatives at Philippopolis has expressed the opinion that "up to this time (1883) the prince seemed to listen to every one and to find in every one a broken reed; but since 1883 the prince has relied upon himself alone, and has hardly ever made a mistake." Minchin, *op. cit.*, p. 297.

³ Koch, *op. cit.*, p. 45.

of stormy times in the government, managed to maintain a firm grasp on the situation until the unionist outbreak in September, 1885.

In Eastern Roumelia Aleko Pasha's term of office expired in 1884, and his deputy, M. Christovitch, was appointed by the Sultan with the unanimous consent of the great powers. The new governor-general, officially called Gavril Pasha, was a Bulgarian, had been educated in Paris and had a Greek wife. He was understood to be opposed to the revolutionary tendencies in Eastern Roumelia, and consequently, for the time being, he was sure of Russian support.¹ He proceeded to dismiss many of the Liberal officials who were known to be zealous in the cause of the union. This line of action merely increased the agitation, and led at the same time to greater secrecy in the formation of a unionist plot. In the spring of 1885 a secret movement was regularly organized in the southern province with the object of overthrowing the government of Gavril Pasha and effecting a union with Bulgaria. September 26th was the day fixed upon for the uprising, but the government undertook to arrest some of the agitators, and this hastened the outbreak. It appears that Prince Alexander was informed about September 9th of the secret plans of the revolutionary committee. He claimed to have strongly disapproved of the undertaking, and to have told the representative of the committee that Russia would not countenance the movement. And, moreover, he urged that he had given positive assurances to the Emperor of Austria-Hungary that tranquillity would be maintained for the present.² He seems to have thought that after these representations on his part the plot would not be carried out. At the same time, his

¹ *Annual Register*, 1884, 1885.

² *Parl. Papers*, 1886, vol. lxxv, pp. 39, 133 (*Turkey*, No. 1).

premier, Caraveloff, was looked upon by some of the people in Philippopolis as the principal organizer of the movement.

The prince was at his summer home (at Varna) near the coast of the Black Sea, when, on the morning of September 18th, he was apprised of the fact that the "foreign government of Roumelia" had been overthrown, and that a provisional government had proclaimed the union of that province with Bulgaria, under his sceptre. On the afternoon of the same day, a resolution was adopted at a meeting in Sofia calling upon Prince Alexander to sanction the union. On the same day, also, the militia of both provinces declared for the union under Prince Alexander.

The prince and Caraveloff left Varna the same evening, arriving at Tirnovo the next day. From there—the old capital of Bulgaria—the prince issued, on the 20th, a manifesto proclaiming the union, and assuming, "by the grace of God and the national will," the title of "Prince of Northern and Southern Bulgaria." The next day, he was enthusiastically received at Philippopolis.¹ He telegraphed immediately to Constantinople announcing what had been done, and affirming that there was no hostile intention towards the Ottoman government, whose suzerainty he recognized. He likewise requested the Sultan and the Porte to sanction the union, adding that the people were determined to defend with their lives the new state of affairs.

The Tsar at once expressed his entire disapproval (September 21) of what had been done and forbade the Russian officers in the armies of Northern and Southern Bulgaria to take any part whatever in the movement. A little later, all these officers were called home. All the great powers were taken by surprise, and there was a general expression of opinion that the mode in which the union had been ef-

¹ *Parl. Papers*, 1886, vol. lxxv, p. 43 (*Turkey*, No. 1).

fected should be strongly condemned. On the 24th, Russia proposed that an informal conference of the Constantinople ambassadors be held in order to reach some common ground in relation to the situation. The prince had already declared himself responsible for the tranquillity of the two districts now united; but the Bulgarian and Turkish armies were soon facing each other along the frontier. The situation was rendered still more critical, also, by the threatening attitude of Greece and Servia, in opposition to the enlargement of Bulgaria.

Shortly before the prince had arrived in Philippopolis on the 21st, the President of the provisional government, Dr. Stransky, took great care to point out to British representatives that "the revolution was directed against Russian tutelage." And he added the assurance, that "united Bulgaria" could stand alone.¹ It became evident in London that these united provinces meant to be self-governing, and hence, within a week after the union was proclaimed, the British ambassador at Constantinople was instructed to take part there in an informal conference of the ambassadors, and to advise that the Sultan should abstain from military intervention and that Prince Alexander of Bulgaria should be governor-general for life of Eastern Roumelia.²

After deliberating for more than two weeks, the Constantinople ambassadors agreed on a "Declaration," to be presented to the Porte and to Bulgaria. The note, in substance, merely disapproved what had transpired in Eastern Roumelia, and suggested that the Bulgarians should cease military preparations and take care not to spread the agita-

¹ *Parl. Papers*, 1886, vol. lxxv, p. 51 (*Turkey*, No. 1).

² *Parl. Papers*, 1886, vol. lxxv, p. 29 (*Turkey*, No. 1); Edwards, *Sir William White* (London, 1902), ch. xviii.

tion.¹ In reply to this note, the Porte expressed the wish that the powers would request Prince Alexander to restore without delay the *status quo*.

At the joint suggestion of the courts of St. Petersburg and Vienna, the Porte requested the powers to instruct their ambassadors at Constantinople to form a conference, in which Turkey should take part, for settling the troubles in Southern Bulgaria, on the basis of the treaty of Berlin. The first meeting of the conference was held on November 4th. England's ambassador was instructed to move for a consideration of the means of meeting the wishes of the population, before discussing a return to the *status quo*. He was to refer to his government for further instructions on any proposal looking towards a return to the former situation in relation to the two provinces. The seventh and last sitting of the conference, until the final one of the following April, was held on November 25th. All of the powers except England were practically agreed at the seventh sitting, that Turkey might go on and re-establish a separate government in Eastern Roumelia, in accordance with the organic statute.²

Meanwhile, Servia had broken away from all restraint and declared war on Bulgaria (November 14th).³ Servia had evidently expected that the threatening attitude of the Turkish forces gathered along the Roumelian frontier would result in holding a large part of the Bulgarian force in that quarter. Such was not the case, however. Prince Alexander put himself at the head of an army representing united Bulgaria, and in less than two weeks his forces had driven

¹ *Parl. Papers*, 1886, vol. lxxv, p. 141 (*Turkey*, No. 1).

² The protocols of the conference may be found in *Parl. Papers*, 1886, *Turkey*, No. 1.

³ For the Servian and Bulgarian declarations, see Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. iv.

the Servian army under King Milan out of Bulgaria and ten miles over the frontier towards the Servian capital. Austria-Hungary checked the further advance of the Bulgarian army, and a military commission, representing the seven treaty powers, aided Bulgaria and Servia in fixing the terms of an armistice (Nov. 28-Dec. 21), and in concluding a treaty of peace (March 3, 1886).¹

As soon as the ambassadors at Constantinople ceased to meet in conference, without having reached any full agreement, the Porte dispatched two delegates to Eastern Roumelia in order to prepare the minds of the people there for the re-establishment of a separate government in that province. The delegates carried with them a proclamation from the Sultan which pointed out that a few "evil-disposed persons" had "disturbed the order and tranquility of the country," and promised entire amnesty and all good things for the province, under a governor-general to be appointed.² These Turkish commissioners were told at Philippopolis that the only qualified representatives of Southern Bulgaria, were the prince and the government at Sofia. After a stay of four days, therefore, they left without having even been allowed to circulate the Sultan's proclamation.³

Before the end of December (1885) Turkey began to urge again the desirability of the powers uniting on some line of action. Lord Salisbury took occasion at this time to suggest to the Turkish ambassador in London that "a Bulgaria, friendly to the Porte, and jealous of foreign influence, would be a far surer bulwark against possible ag-

¹ *Parl. Papers*, 1886, vol. lxxv, *passim*.

² The proclamation may be found in *Parl. Papers*, 1886, vol. lxxv, p. 422.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 21 (*Turkey*, No. 2).

gression than two Bulgarias, severed in administration, but united in considering the Porte as the only obstacle to their national development." The English Foreign Secretary suggested, moreover, that it was coming more and more to be the wish of the powers that the Porte should find some solution of the Bulgarian question by direct communication with Prince Alexander.¹ The month had not closed before Russia admitted that the union had been effected and could not be undone, and that it only needed to be "regularized." Then, almost simultaneously, the Sultan expressed his readiness to negotiate with Prince Alexander directly and to sanction some form of union.²

By the end of January, an agreement was reached between the Porte and the Bulgarian foreign minister. The settlement was delayed, however, for two months longer, mainly because Prince Alexander was unwilling to accept an appointment as governor-general of Eastern Roumelia under Article XVII of the treaty of Berlin, which required re-appointment by the sultan every five years, with the assent of the powers. The conference of the Constantinople ambassadors was called together at last, April 5th, and the settlement was signed, regardless of the prince's objections. Fortunately, Prince Alexander's name was not in the arrangement. The governor-generalship of Eastern Roumelia was entrusted to the *prince of Bulgaria*, in accordance with the above-mentioned article of the treaty of Berlin. The British government, nevertheless, reserved the right of proposing at the end of the first five years the re-nomination of Prince Alexander. Two other important points in this settlement, were the separation of the Mussulman villages of Kirdjali and the Rhodope district from

¹ *Parl. Papers*, 1886, vol. lxxv, p. 424.

² *Ibid.*, 1886, vol. lxxv, p. 22 (*Turkey*, No. 2).

Eastern Roumelia, and the relinquishment by the Porte, in return, of the right to provide for the defense of the land and sea frontiers of Eastern Roumelia.¹

The union as thus defined was only the minimum of what the Bulgarians had intended to secure. As the head of the Eastern Roumelian government, the prince was looked upon by some of his people as merely a Turkish functionary. One party now began to clamor for a more complete union, another for an attempt to regain the friendship of Russia, and still another for determined resistance to any form of Russian aggression. From April 5th to August 21st, party spirit in both provinces was at high tide. The powers had sanctioned a merely personal union between Eastern Roumelia and Bulgaria. Nevertheless, the prince set about the work of making the union political and administrative as well. As a beginning in that direction, the southern province was ordered to elect deputies to the Bulgarian national assembly.

Party antagonism caused some serious disturbances in the June election. On his tour through the southern province, the prince had proclaimed that only Bulgarian would be recognized as an official language there. That attitude towards the languages of the minorities in Eastern Roumelia still further alienated the Greeks and the Turks and caused many of them to refrain from voting. In general, however, the election may be regarded as having been a struggle between the rival adherents of the prince and the Tsar. The Russian government complained most bitterly to the Porte that the prince had grossly misused his author-

¹ *Parl. Papers*, 1886, vol. lxxv, *Turkey*, No. 2; Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. iv. It will be remembered that the right given to Turkey by the Treaty of Berlin (art. xv) to garrison the frontiers of this province had been, for some months, one of the chief obstacles in the way of a peaceful organization of Eastern Roumelia and Bulgaria. Cf. *supra*, p. 135.

ity, by putting every obstacle in the way of an expression of public opinion at the polls. The fact seems to be, however, that neither the government nor the opposition was in any sense blameless in connection with the serious disturbances during the elections.

When the Sobranje convened, on June 14th, it was found that the majority were prepared to support the prince and his ministry. In opening the Assembly, the prince seems to have been most unfortunate, from some points of view, both in what he said and in what he omitted to say. He declared to the deputies from both sides of the Balkans, representing, as he said, the "Bulgarian nation," that the union of the two Bulgarias was already accomplished. As a proof that the union was complete, he pointed out that the "general national Bulgarian assembly" would henceforth care for the interests of the united country. But beyond all this, the prince failed to make the accustomed reference to Russia, as the "liberator" of the Bulgarians. So, taken as a whole, the speech was disappointing, not to say annoying, to all except the most radical Bulgarians in the "united country."

But Prince Alexander's struggles with Bulgarian affairs were now nearly ended. In the early hours of August 21st, a small band of Bulgarian conspirators gained entrance to the palace, forced him to sign an illegible paper, spirited him out of the country, and conveyed him through Roumania and Russia, to Lemburg (Austria). In the actual execution of the plot, the leader appears to have been the director of the military school, Major Grueff. His principal associates were likewise connected with the army, and several of them had personal grievances against the prince.¹

¹ For a detailed account of the plot and its execution, see *Quarterly Review* (London, 1886); see also Minchin, *op. cit.*, ch. xv. In his

Now was the opportunity for the Russophil Zankoff, and his followers. In the early dawn, Zankoff led the way in denouncing the prince as "a German foreigner, who had tried to estrange Russia."¹ The Zankoffists at once telegraphed everywhere,—"Prince Battenberg dethroned . . . Make army take oath to the provisional government." In order to give the proceedings the appearance of a national movement, they forged the names of several of the nationalist leaders. By evening it became clear to the leaders in this first provisional government that the men whose names had been made use of without their consent, could not be counted upon as even friends of the new régime. Then a government was formed exclusively of Zankoff's followers; and a proclamation was issued to the effect that "Prince Alexander of Battenberg had abdicated forever the throne of Bulgaria, owing to his firm conviction that a continuation of his reign would only bring about the ruin of the Bulgarian people." This proclamation closed with the significant assurance to the Bulgarian people that the Tsar, "the Protector of Bulgaria," would not cease to afford his powerful aid and protection to their country.² The local head of the Bulgarian Church was the president of this second ministry, and Zankoff was Minister of the Interior, with Major Grueff commander-in-chief of the army.³

This proclamation was issued on Saturday. The next

biography of Stambouloff, the author claims that "it is not proved that official Russia had any cognizance of the plot, though . . . the conspirators were sure of having the most complete approval from St. Petersburg if they succeeded." Beaman, *op. cit.*, p. 88.

¹ *Parl. Papers*, 1887, vol. xci, p. 124 (*Turkey*, No. 1).

² Beaman, *op. cit.*, p. 92.

³ There were six in the ministry. An English writer names Zankoff and the president of this government, Metropolitan Clement, as the civil leaders in the plot to abduct the prince. Minchin, *op. cit.*, p. 254.

Monday, Stambuloff, who was at Tirnovo, issued a counter-proclamation.¹ In the name of Prince Alexander, and of the National Assembly, of which he had been president, he declared the members of the provisional government to be outlaws, and that anyone who should obey their orders would be punished by military law. At the same time he appointed Colonel Mutkuroff, then in command of the troops at Philippopolis, to be commander-in-chief of all the Bulgarian forces. The English consul at Philippopolis, Captain H. Jones, had already appealed to Mutkuroff not to take the oath of allegiance to the revolutionary government.² Mutkuroff soon determined not to recognize the government of the traitors to the prince, and when Stambuloff's proclamation reached him, on Monday (23rd), he was preparing to march on Sofia.

Stambuloff's proclamation and the movement of Mutkuroff's army towards Sofia, caused the members of the revolutionary government to lose all hope, and they resigned and disappeared (24th). Prince Alexander's late premier, Caraveloff, now formed a government at Sofia; but a regency of three, with Stambuloff as the leading member, was constituted three days later, to last until the prince could be found and brought back.³

On reaching Lemburg (P. M. 27th), Prince Alexander learned that a government loyal to him had been established in Bulgaria. He found a dispatch from Stambuloff awaiting his arrival, stating that "the whole of Bulgaria was

¹ At this time Stambuloff was practicing law. He was a staunch nationalist and had been active in agitation for the national cause since 1876. See Beaman, *op. cit.*, *Stambuloff*.

² *Parl. Papers*, 1887, vol. xci, p. 155 (*Turkey*, No. 1); Minchin, *op. cit.*, ch. xvi.

³ *Parl. Papers*, 1887, vol. xci, p. 143; Beaman, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

longing for his return.”¹ Realizing now that the ordeal he had undergone was the work of a band of conspirators, and feeling that he had the sympathy of western Europe, the prince left the next day for Sofia. His entire journey back, by way of Bucharest, has been described as a “triumphal progress.”

On the northern boundary of Bulgaria, at Rustchuk, the prince was enthusiastically greeted (30th) by an official Bulgarian deputation, in the presence of local foreign representatives. And it was before proceeding further that Prince Alexander committed what some of his faithful friends and ardent admirers have styled his fatal blunder.² We have seen how he had started out three years earlier to dispense with the counsel of Russia’s agents. From that time the breach between the prince and the Tsar had constantly widened.³ But now, on his way back to take up again at this critical juncture the reins of government in Bulgaria, he seemed willing to stake his all, as the ruler of that country, on an appeal to the magnanimity of his Imperial cousin, Alexander III.⁴ In his now well-known telegram to the Tsar, he said, among other things:

“My first act on assuming my legitimate authority is to announce to your Imperial Majesty my firm intention to spare no sacrifice in order to aid your Imperial Majesty’s magnanimous intention to terminate the present grave crisis through which Bulgaria is passing. . . . I shall be happy to be able to give your Imperial Majesty decisive proof of my unalterable devotion to your august person. The prin-

¹ Beaman, *op. cit.*, p. 96.

² *Quarterly Review*, *op. cit.*, 1886; Beaman, *op. cit.*, pp. 98, 101; Minchin, *op. cit.*, pp. 280 *et seq.*

³ Koch, *Fürst Alexander von Bulgaren, passim.*

⁴ *The Saturday Review* (London, 1887), vol. lxiv, p. 93.

ciple of monarchy has compelled me to re-establish a legal government in Bulgaria and Roumelia. Russia gave me my crown: I am ready to return it into the hands of her sovereign."

Three days later, on reaching Philippopolis, the prince received from the Tsar the following reply:

"Have received your Highness' telegram. Cannot approve your return to Bulgaria, foreseeing disastrous consequences to country already so severely tried . . . I shall refrain from all interference with the sad state to which Bulgaria has been brought as long as you remain there. Your Highness will judge what is your proper course. I reserve my decision as to my future action, which will be in conformity with the obligations imposed on me by the venerated memory of my father, the interests of Russia, and the peace of the East."¹

The same day that this telegram was received by the prince (September 2) the London government suggested to the German and Austrian governments that the treaty powers consult together with a view of giving their support to Prince Alexander. Neither Berlin nor Vienna gave any encouragement, however, towards such a project, and the idea seems to have been abandoned.²

Prince Alexander passed on the next day (September 3)

¹ It has been said that the Russian consul at Rustchuk induced the prince to send the telegram to the Tsar. The Bulgarian officials knew nothing of this message until the Tsar's reply was received at Philippopolis. "Then the prince confessed his thoughtless action, and admitted to the full the enormity of his fault." Beaman, *Stambuloff*, p. 101. The consul had just informed the prince that a Russian general was already on the way to look after the administration of Bulgaria, in the Tsar's name. Minchin, *op. cit.*, pp. 282 *et seq.*; *Parl. Papers*, 1887, vol. xci, p. 136.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 127 *et seq.*

to his capital, and the hearty greetings of the populace voiced the confidence and approval of his people. With the Tsar's telegram before him, however, and with the feeling that a large number of the army officers had been implicated in the plot against him, he at once expressed his determination to appoint a regency and leave Bulgaria.¹ All the arguments that some of the members of his government could bring to bear failed to persuade him to alter his purpose. A meeting of political leaders was then held at which the decision was reached to accept the formal abdication of the prince, providing the great powers would give some guarantee that Russia would not occupy Bulgaria, and that further foreign interference in the internal affairs should not be permitted.²

On the 7th, the foreign representatives were called to the palace to take leave of the prince. In his parting address to the diplomatic corps, he said he had returned to Bulgaria in order that "he might be able to leave it by the light of day instead of being dragged like a malefactor through the streets at the dead of night." The Constantinople settlement appointing him a Turkish functionary in Eastern Roumelia had been fatal to him, he contended. He had made every effort to save himself from that misfortune; but "it was not possible," he added, "for one man alone to stand against Europe."³ Then followed Prince Alexander's last official announcement to the "Bulgarian nation"—his proclamation—giving notice of the formation of a regency and of his abdication. The first few lines are very significant:

"We, Alexander, etc.—Being convinced of the painful truth that our departure from Bulgaria will facilitate the

¹ *Parl. Papers, 1877, Turkey*, No. 1, pp. 134 *et seq.*

² *Ibid., Turkey*, No. 1, pp. 148–160.

³ *Ibid., Turkey*, No. 1, p. 149; *cf. supra*, p. 160.

restoration of good relations between Bulgaria and her liberator Russia, and having received an assurance from the government of His Imperial Majesty the Russian Emperor that the rights, freedom and independence of our State shall remain intact, and that no one shall meddle in its internal affairs:

“Do hereby announce to our beloved people that we renounce the Bulgarian throne.”¹

Prince Alexander is said to have borne himself with manly dignity throughout these trying hours. At four o’clock of the same day, he rode out of the city, with Stambuloff, through the crowded streets. His carriage was repeatedly stopped by the efforts of the long line of people to kiss his hand. At last he called back, “Long live Bulgaria,” and passed on with a number of carriages following to the Austrian frontier.²

The regents named by the prince before his abdication were S. Stambuloff, P. Caraveloff, and Colonel Mutkuroff. The regency announced without delay the intention of calling for the election of a Grand Sobranje to choose a prince.³ The Chamber met on September 13th and approved the measures taken for convoking the larger assembly. October

¹ Léonoff, *Documents Secrets*, pp. 98 et seq.; *Parl. Papers*, 1887, vol. xci, *Turkey*, No. 1, pp. 166, 169.

² *Parl. Papers*, 1887, vol. xci, *Turkey*, No. 1, p. 173. In the Hungarian Chamber of Deputies it was asked how it came about that the hostility of Russia alone could have compelled a popular prince to abdicate, and that the empire was enabled to interfere in the internal affairs of the principality. The questioner also wished to know how the support given by German diplomacy to Russian interest had effected the close friendly relations between Austria-Hungary and Germany. *Parl. Papers*, 1887, *Turkey*, No. 1, pp. 183, 190.

³ The Grande Sobranje, or National Assembly, it will be remembered, was made up of double the number of deputies in the ordinary sobranje. Cf. *supra*, p. 140.

10th was appointed as the day for holding the elections. On the 25th (September), General Kaulbars arrived in Sofia as the Russian diplomatic agent, with instructions to "assist" the Bulgarians in relation to their affairs.¹ The same day he demanded the postponement of the elections for the Grand Assembly, together with the immediate raising of the state of siege and the release of all persons implicated in the late conspiracy.² The ministers replied (October 1st) that the latter demands were accepted, but that the elections announced were in strict accordance with the requirements of the Bulgarian constitution, and could not therefore be postponed.

Despite the opposition of General Kaulbars, the elections were held, and passed off without very serious disturbances. Of the 450 deputies, only about one-sixth were Zankoffists. The Grand Sobranje opened on October 31st and in spite of protests from Constantinople deputies from Eastern Roumelia formed a part of the assembly. A brother of the Empress of Russia, Prince Waldemar of Denmark, was elected Prince of Bulgaria by acclamation (November 10). Two days later the reply came that Prince Waldemar would not accept the honor without the approval of the Tsar, and must therefore decline.³ The Sobranje now appointed a deputation of three to visit various European courts in search of a prince, and then adjourned. General Kaulbars failed to persuade what he termed the *de facto*

¹ The brother of the General Kaulbars who was so officious as the Russian War Minister in Bulgaria, 1881-1883.

² *Parl. Papers*, 1887, *Turkey*, No. 1, pp. 183, 193. As an explanation of General Kaulbars' mission, the St. Petersburg government urged "special duty and moral obligation incumbent on Russia as having called Bulgaria into existence."

³ Beaman, *Stambuloff*, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

government to listen to his "advice," so he left, together with all the Russian consuls in Northern and Southern Bulgaria (November 19).¹

Early in December Russia proposed to the Porte Prince Mingrelia, a Russian subject, as a candidate for prince. A little later, however, Bulgaria notified the Porte that she would not accept Russia's candidate, as all of the Bulgarians were opposed to him. It was not true that all the Bulgarians were opposed to him, for Zankoff and his followers were anxious for his election.²

By the middle of December Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg was understood to be a candidate, and the emperor of Austria-Hungary was reported as having given his assent.³ Prince Bismarck thought Prince Ferdinand's candidature out of the question for the reason that the Tsar would not be likely to give his consent.

During the following months, one plot succeeded another in Bulgaria; and several projects looking toward foreign occupation were considered. Finally, another Grand Sobranje was elected. The opening session was held at Tirkovo, on July 4th (1887), and on the 7th Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg was elected prince of Bulgaria. The prince replied on the 8th that he would go to Bulgaria and devote his life to that nation as soon as the approval of the Porte and the powers should be given.⁴

¹ For the reasons assigned by the St. Petersburg government, see *Parl. Papers*, 1887, *Turkey*, No. 2, p. 3.

² *Parl. Papers*, 1888, vol. cix, *Turkey*, No. 1, p. 16.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 3. Prince Ferdinand, born 1861, was serving at this time in the Hungarian army. His father was Prince Augustus of Saxe-Coburg (an Austrian) and his mother was a daughter of Louis Philippe (King of France, 1830-48).

⁴ For an account of some of the plots against the regency, see Beaman, *Stambuloff*, pp. 118 *et seq.*

Russia alone among the powers held that the elections for the Grand Sobranje had been illegal, and that she could not therefore even consider the question of recognizing any person as prince of Bulgaria who might be elected by that body. Russia now proposed to the Porte that General Ernroth be appointed sole regent of the two Bulgarians.¹ The Porte procrastinated in relation to this proposition. Meanwhile, Prince Ferdinand of Coburg determined to accept the reiterated call of the Bulgarians, and to become their prince. In making his decision known to Europe, he pointed out that he had waited for the replies of the great powers to the Porte, and ascertaining that none of the treaty powers had expressed any hostility to him personally, he had resolved to "take in hand the destinies" of the Bulgarian people. He was resolved, he said, "to work for the consolidation of order and peace" in his new country, and he expressed an "unwavering hope that His Majesty the Sultan would contribute to that end by hastening to confirm his election."²

Prince Ferdinand entered Bulgaria August 11th, and on the 14th he took the constitutional oath before the Grand Sobranje, at Tirnovo. In his proclamation to the Bulgarian nation, he made no reference to any foreign power, and closed with—"Long live free and independent Bulgaria." On the 23rd, when the prince arrived in Sofia, none of the foreign diplomatic agents were present at his reception. All of the signatory powers to the treaty of Berlin had already instructed their representatives in Bulgaria to avoid any official recognition whatever of the newly installed prince. Russia had refused to recognize the legality of his election on the ground that existing conditions in Bulgaria ren-

¹ General Ernroth (Russian) was formerly minister of war at Sofia (1882).

² *Parl. Papers*, 1888, vol. cix, *Turkey*, No. 1, p. 126.

dered impossible any trustworthy expression there of the popular will. Now all the other powers refused to recognize him in his new capacity, because he had gone to Bulgaria without the approval of the Sultan and the assent of the treaty powers. This relationship between Prince Ferdinand's "*de facto*" government and the great powers was destined to continue, as we shall see, for nearly ten years.

After some days of effort a ministry was formed (September 1) in which Stambuloff became President and Minister of the Interior, and Mutkuroff the Minister of War. Elections for the Sobranje were held on October 9th and resulted in a sweeping victory for the government party (National).

Russia complained bitterly of the "terrorism" of the new government, and put forth renewed efforts to secure the appointment of General Ernroth as regent or governor of Bulgaria. The Porte requested Germany to take the initiative in bringing this proposal to the attention of the powers. Germany, however, referred the matter back to the Porte. Stambuloff and his followers let it be known that Bulgaria would not allow General Ernroth to cross her frontier unless he were able to fight his way into the country. Russia counted on European unanimity to bring the Bulgarian government under submission; but England and Austria, in particular, favored a "let alone" policy, and so nothing was done. Before the end of the year, Russia's Foreign Minister, M. de Giers, was ready to say in reference to the Bulgarians: "They may do anything and everything they please, from cutting each other's throats to declaring themselves an empire. We shall not move a finger to prevent them. We wash our hands of the whole concern."¹

¹ For the attitude of the powers in relation to the Bulgarian question, see *Parl. Papers*, 1888, *Turkey*, No. 1. A writer who has an intimate

Back in 1881, Turkey had ceded to her foreign bondholders the income from the Eastern Roumelian tribute. This tribute to Turkey had been fixed in the organic statute (1879) at about one million dollars per year, representing three-tenths of the estimated provincial revenues. Any tribute that might be received from the principality of Bulgaria was also ceded at that time to these bondholders. The treaty of Berlin left the amount of the annual tribute due from Bulgaria to be fixed by the treaty powers within one year after the beginning of the new organization in the principality. But the powers never "fixed" the amount to be paid by Bulgaria. The new government under Prince Ferdinand now made early arrangements (November 3, 1887) for paying the arrears due on account of the Eastern Roumelian tribute. The government declared, however, that three-tenths of the income of the province amounted now to only something more than a half a million dollars per year, and Turkey agreed to the reduction.¹

Six months after Prince Ferdinand went to Bulgaria, Russia made one more abortive effort to force him out of the principality. This plan, emanating from St. Petersburg, was to have the treaty powers join in a collective note to the Porte declaring the present situation in Bulgaria illegal. The Porte would then be expected to notify the Bulgarian government that Prince Ferdinand's presence as the head of the government of the principality was held to be illegal and contrary to the treaty of Berlin. Russia's agents at least pretended to believe that Prince Ferdinand would

knowledge of every phase of this part of Bulgaria's history has expressed the opinion that "there is nothing more pathetic in the history of Europe and nothing more diabolical in the history of Russia than the story of the events in Bulgaria which followed the Philippopolis revolution" (1885). Washburn, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

¹ See Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. iv, *passim*.

leave when he found that all the great powers were opposed to his remaining. England, Austria and Italy refused to countenance the St. Petersburg proposal, but Germany and France joined with Russia, with the result that the Porte sent the desired notification to Sofia (March 5, 1888). The communication was sent to M. Stambuloff, and merely stated that Prince Ferdinand (of Coburg) had been informed when he first arrived in Bulgaria that his election had not received the assent of the powers nor the sanction of the Porte, and was therefore illegal. The note pointed out also that the Porte still held Prince Ferdinand's position in Bulgaria to be contrary to the treaty of Berlin. As soon as this declaration was dispatched from Constantinople, Russia's Foreign Minister (de Giers) said that the policy of his country now was "to return to her passive attitude and await events." After the lapse of nearly a month, the Sofia government decided not to take any official notice whatever of the above communication. It is evident that the Porte forwarded the declaration to the Bulgarian government at the instigation of the St. Petersburg authorities, and hence there was no need of England's warning against "any further imprudent action" at Constantinople. This episode proved to be the last attempt from without, of any considerable magnitude, to thwart the will of the majority in Bulgaria.¹

For nearly seven years (1887-1894) Stambuloff remained at the head of Prince Ferdinand's government. He was ever a staunch nationalist, and during his premiership everything was done to establish friendly relations with Turkey rather than with Russia. There were always those

¹ For the correspondence in connection with this final diplomatic attempt of Russia to bring the Bulgarians under subjection, see *Parl. Papers*, 1889, vol. lxxxvii, *Turkey*, No. 3.

who stood out against the dictatorial and even despotic methods, perhaps too often employed by the patriotic Stambuloff. The prince finally joined with the opponents of his Russophobe premier, and Stambuloff was forced to resign (1894).¹

There was already a growing desire in Bulgaria for reconciliation with Russia. The death of Alexander III (1894), the arch enemy of the late Prince Alexander and of those who followed him in the Bulgarian government, may be said to have cleared the way in a large measure for a restoration of friendly relations between these two kindred peoples.²

In 1894 there was great rejoicing throughout Bulgaria over the birth of a son to the royal family. The prince and his consort were Catholics, however, and according to the Bulgarian constitution the heir to the throne must profess the Orthodox Eastern faith. Two years later Prince Ferdinand announced to the National Assembly that he had resolved "to lay on the altar of the Fatherland the greatest and heaviest of sacrifices," and to have the rite of holy confirmation administered to the heir-apparent, Prince Boris, according to the usages of the (Bulgarian) National Orthodox Church. In reply to a request from Prince Ferdinand to the Emperor Nicholas II for the presence of a Russian representative at the ceremony, the Tsar, "inspired with sentiments of magnanimity and sincere good will for the Bulgarian people," delegated a member of the Imperial staff to attend in his name. All the powers now signified their

¹ Beaman, *Stambuloff*, ch. x. Stambuloff was most cruelly assassinated in Sofia the following year. He has often been referred to as the "Bismarck of Bulgaria."

² Prince Alexander died in 1893, and an imposing ceremony took place in Sofia when his body was taken there for interment.

recognition of Prince Ferdinand as the lawful ruler of Bulgaria, and within a few months he was most cordially received at Constantinople by the Sultan, and at St. Petersburg by the royal family.¹

Throughout the remaining dozen years, in the political life of the principality, the Macedonian question continued seriously to disturb the relations of Bulgaria and her people with the outside world. Roughly speaking, Macedonia lies between Servia and Bulgaria on the north, and Greece and the Aegean sea on the south. The population near to Bulgaria and Servia is undoubtedly made up mostly of Bulgarians and Servians, while in the extreme south the Greeks are clearly in the majority. For the most part, however, the nationality of the people in central Macedonia appears to be hopelessly mixed, so far as race characteristics are concerned.²

The treaty of Berlin provided that there should be a sort of European supervision over the introduction of new laws which Turkey promised to settle upon for her remaining European provinces.³ During the eighties, many of the Slavs in Macedonia became weary of waiting for the new organization in that territory and migrated in considerable numbers, especially to the new principality of Bulgaria. Under the influence, perhaps, of some of these emigrants, the idea of a revolutionary movement in Macedonia aiming at autonomy for that province began to gain adherents rapidly after about 1897. Bulgarians, Servians and Greeks appear to have joined together for a time in helping to work up the revolutionary propaganda. There was such an

¹ *Annual Register*, 1896; Miller, *The Balkans*, *op. cit.*, ch. vii.

² Odysseus, *Turkey in Europe* (London, 1900), ch. viii; Upward, *The East End of Europe* (London, 1908), *passim*.

³ Article xxiii. See Hertslet, *op. cit.*, vol. iv.

active sympathy in Bulgaria with this movement that by 1901 Sofia had become the headquarters of the revolutionary Macedonian Committee.

In 1897 Russia and Austria-Hungary had entered into a compact with a view of maintaining the *status quo* in Eastern Europe, and in 1901, under the pressure of these two countries, the Bulgarian government arrested some members of the Macedonian committee and undertook to keep the troops and civil officials from taking any part in the agitation. About this time, also, the Bulgarians and the Greeks began to fall apart in connection with the movement in Macedonia. So when the armed uprising came in 1902-1903 the Turkish forces had little trouble in suppressing the revolts.¹

Not long after the Turkish troops were set in motion to put an end to the revolutionary movement for autonomy in Macedonia, Russia and Austria-Hungary determined to send each a civil agent to Macedonia, accompanied by a foreign officer to have general charge of the police force there. This action by the two powers put an end, in the main, to the movement for an autonomous Macedonia. From that time (1903) down to the change of government in Turkey, (1908) a most cruel religious and racial war was carried on in the heart of Macedonia. Armed bands of Bulgarians and of Greeks have vied with each other in a resort to ruthless and murderous methods in carrying forward their respective propagandas. As allegiance to the Bulgarian Exarchate or to the Greek Patriarchate signifies in general either Bulgarian or Greek nationality, this proselytizing had a political or national end in view.² We are here

¹ *Annual Register*, 1897, 1901.

² The two sides in relation to this most destructive warfare may be found in Upward, *op. cit.*, and in *The Near East* (anonymous) (New York, 1907). See also Villari, *The Balkan Question* (London, 1905).

concerned mainly with the fact, however, that Bulgaria was greatly disturbed by reason of this agitation and warfare in Macedonia, and that the principality was thereby brought several times to the verge of war with Turkey.

The renewal of the appointment of Prince Ferdinand to the governor-generalship of Eastern Roumelia was gradually discontinued, and that province had come to be quite generally regarded as merely the southern part of Bulgaria.¹ By a process of historic growth, the status of the Bulgarian government had now passed far beyond the bounds fixed for the principality in the treaty of Berlin. At the courts of the European powers there were Bulgarian diplomatic agents representing their country, with scarcely ever an intimation from any quarter that they represented a vassal state. In 1899 Turkey sanctioned the sending of Bulgarian delegates to the first Hague Conference. These delegates were required, nevertheless, to have seats at that time back of those occupied by the Sultan's representatives, and to sign official documents after the signatures of Turkey's delegates. When the second conference was held in 1907, however, Bulgaria again sent her own delegates, and they now took equal rank so far as seats and signatures were concerned, with those from Constantinople.²

As a matter of fact, at the close of thirty years after the settlement in the Berlin congress (1878), the Bulgarian principality had come to exercise so many of the functions of an independent state that any act on the part of Turkey signifying her intention to assert her suzerainty over Bulgaria was a source of alarm and irritation to the Bulgarian government. The Porte found various ways, however, of keeping up the appearance of claiming the territory of the

¹ *New International Year Book* (New York, 1908), "Bulgaria," *loc. cit.*

² Hull, *The Two Hague Conferences* (Boston, 1908), pp. 11, 14; *Fortnightly Review* (London, 1908), vol. xc, p. 866.

principality as a part of the Ottoman empire. During the latter part of Abdul Hamid's reign, anybody who wished to travel about from place to place in the empire was required to have a permit (*teskereh*), properly signed by the Turkish authorities. In the various towns the police kept a close watch and no one was free to go or come without a properly endorsed *teskereh*. In this matter, the Turkish authorities were unwilling to make any exception whatever in the case of persons going to or coming from Bulgaria. This, of course, was but one of the many ways in which the Turkish government kept alive the claim to Bulgaria as an integral part of the Ottoman domains.

In working their way towards actual independence the Bulgarians and their rulers may be said to have been, on the whole, moderately though constantly aggressive. While they have shown, at times, a willingness to wait for advancement on the way towards statehood, they have all along invariably manifested an unwavering determination never to relinquish any acquisition in that direction. For some years past, the jealous watchfulness in the two capitals for any signs of a change of attitude towards the existing relations between the governments has frequently given rise to disquieting apprehensions. Irrespective of the European regulations (notably of 1878 and 1886), there had grown up such a strained relationship between the two countries that the tension; not to mention the ever present danger of direful eventualities, had come to be a standing menace to both parties. Except for the outgrown and almost obsolete formula embodied in the treaty of Berlin—a European document already shattered in several particulars—there was little reason why Bulgaria should not openly and resolutely take her place among the sovereign nations of the world.¹ That a sufficient cause existed for a recognition on

¹ *The Nineteenth Century* (New York, 1908), vol. lxiv, pp. 705 *et seq.*

the one side, or a declaration on the other, of the independence of Bulgaria, has not been appreciably questioned. Considering all the circumstances, it was too much to expect, no doubt, that the Porte would take the initiative in such a measure. It was but natural then that Bulgarian authorities should watch for some seemingly justifiable occasion for taking the final step.¹

In the late summer and fall of 1908, a combination of events was readily turned to account at Sofia and made to furnish the desired occasion for putting an end to the theoretical vassalage of the Bulgarian principality.² The Young Turk Revolution came on in July, and the restoration of constitutional government in Turkey caused some doubt among the Bulgarians as to the effect of this movement upon the acquired *status* of their country. Then early in September the Sultan's Foreign Minister, Tewfik Pasha, created a stir by omitting to invite the Bulgarian representative at the Porte, M. Gueshoff, to a dinner in honor of the Constantinople diplomats. This omission being quite unusual, a protest followed, and the Porte explained that only representatives of sovereign states had been invited. Although the Turkish authorities proffered other amends for the neglect, M. Gueshoff was not invited, and his government recalled him from the Turkish capital. Some days following this incident a strike was declared on the Eastern Roumelian section of the Oriental Railway, and the Bulgarian government sent troops and employees to look after the operation of the line. Three days later (September 21) the strike was terminated, but Bulgaria continued her military occupation. When the southern province became practically united with the principality of Bulgaria in 1886

¹ *Spectator* (London, 1908), vol. 101, *passim*.

² *Annual Register*, 1908, "Bulgaria," *loc. cit.*

no new arrangement was made affecting Turkey's ownership of the railway in Eastern Roumelia; consequently, by the terms of the treaty of Berlin, Bulgaria possessed no proprietary rights in that part of the line.

Subjects of Germany and Austria-Hungary being among the principal shareholders in the company that had been operating the line under a lease from Turkey, these two countries, together with Turkey, made strong protests against the continued Bulgarian occupation of the road. Bulgaria contended that her interests rendered it necessary that she should control that section of the railway, and suggested the possibility of some arrangement with the company.¹ This question, however, was soon merged with others of even more serious moment.

Two days after the termination of the strike, Prince Ferdinand was received at Budapest by Emperor Francis Joseph, and the prince is said to have been apprised at this time of the Austro-Hungarian plans for the annexation in the near future (December 2) of Bosnia and Herzegovina. There seems to be some reason for believing that this information hastened the action of Prince Ferdinand.² However that may be, he surprised Europe somewhat by issuing a declaration from Tirnovo, October 5th, proclaiming the independence of Bulgaria.

In the rather brief declaration read by Prince Ferdinand at the old capital, he pointed out that "practically independent, the nation was impeded by certain illusions and formal limitations which resulted in a coldness of relations between Bulgaria and Turkey. "Turkey and Bulgaria," he continued, "free and entirely independent of each other, may exist under conditions that will allow them to strengthen

¹ *Contemporary Review* (London, 1908), vol. xciv, pp. 513 *et seq.*

² *The Fortnightly Review* (London, 1909), vol. xci, pp. 224 *et seq.*

their friendly relations and to devote themselves to peaceable internal development." In this declaration he fore stalled any question relating to the territory of Eastern Roumelia (Southern Bulgaria) by proclaiming "Bulgaria, united since September, 1885, as an independent kingdom."¹

Prince Ferdinand and his government were criticised, especially by England, for having proclaimed the independence of Bulgaria at a time when its realization might seriously discredit the Young Turk Party that was making such worthy efforts to regenerate the disordered Ottoman empire. There does not seem, however, to have been any expression in Europe of an intention to try to undo what the prince had done.²

Two days after Prince Ferdinand's proclamation was issued, Austria-Hungary formally announced the annexation to that empire of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These two Turkish provinces, as is well known, were placed by the Berlin congress under the administrative control of the Dual Monarchy. The complete absorption now of the two provinces into the Austro-Hungarian empire was held at Vienna to be necessary in order to put into operation there certain much-needed and radical reforms. Emperor Francis Joseph's government was unwilling that the validity of this action should be questioned in a European conference, so any joint action by the treaty powers bearing on the whole situation was delayed.³

The Turkish authorities took rather a calm view of the

¹ For the text of the proclamation, see *The International Year Book* (New York, 1908), "Bulgaria," *loc. cit.*

² *Spectator*, *op. cit.*, vol. 101, *passim*.

³ Early in 1909 Turkey accepted about eleven million dollars, ostensibly for property she possessed in the two provinces, and allowed Austria-Hungary to keep Bosnia and Herzegovina. *The Outlook* (New York, 1909), vol. xci, *passim*.

Bulgarian declaration. A general recognition of the independence of the principality appears to have been, almost from the first, a foregone conclusion. Because of the Eastern Roumelian annual tribute due to Turkey, and the Porte's ownership of the railroad through that province, however, there was a necessity for a settlement between the principality and Turkey on the basis of compensation from Bulgaria. Happily, the government at Sofia was ready to discuss the question of compensation to Turkey. Before the end of the month, England, France and Russia joined (October 27) in a communication, which was approved by Italy and Germany, advising Bulgaria to undertake direct negotiations with the Porte. The Sofia government promptly acted on this advice, and sent a representative, M. Dimitroff, to Constantinople.¹ Within another month, the negotiations at the Turkish capital had resulted in an agreement on the principles that were to form the basis of a settlement.

The chief difficulty proved now to be the difference of opinion between the two parties respecting the amount of total indemnity due to Turkey. After several weeks, Bulgaria offered to pay about \$16,400,000; but in the fore part of February, 1909, the Turkish government declined to accept that amount, and demanded a lump sum of \$24,000,000. Bulgaria complained, as she had done before, of Turkey's uncompromising attitude, and refused to pay any more than she had already offered. The efforts of the treaty powers to bring about some compromise utterly failed, for a time, and both Turkey and Bulgaria renewed their war-like demonstrations. After about a fortnight, however, the Russian government hit upon a plan for relieving the tension, and made a definite financial proposition to both governments.

¹ *The New International Year Book*, 1908, "Bulgaria," *loc. cit.*

Turkey was bound by treaty to pay an annual war indemnity to Russia (on account of Russo-Turkish War, 1877-1878) of about \$1,600,000 without interest.¹ Russia now proposed to relieve Turkey of the obligation to make these yearly payments until the total sum remitted should amount to \$24,000,000—Turkey's claim against Bulgaria. Then, as an offset to this, Russia proposed to accept from Bulgaria in annual installments, with interest, a sum aggregating \$16,400,000—the amount of Bulgaria's offer to Turkey.² Turkey accepted Russia's proposal, and an agreement to that effect was signed by the Constantinople and St. Petersburg governments, on March 16th. Bulgaria likewise agreed to the proposition and signed protocols accordingly on April 19th, with Russia and Turkey.³

The signing of these international documents settled all the claims at issue between the parties. King Ferdinand was the recipient of personal congratulations from European rulers; and within a few days the governments of the great powers formally recognized Bulgaria as an independent kingdom.⁴

This new kingdom has, in general, a fertile soil and a favorable climate; and, with rare exceptions, abundant crops are harvested. During their thirty years of semi-independent political life, these people, who are now legally recognized as being their own masters, have won the reputation of being industrious, generally progressive and zealous in the pursuit of knowledge. By their persistent and patriotic

¹ Hertslet, *Map of Europe by Treaty*, vol. iv.

² The amounts stated here in American money are not strictly exact. For the terms of settlement, see *Outlook*, vol. xci, p. 375.

³ The signing of the protocol with the Porte implied the recognition by Turkey of Bulgarian independence. *Saturday Review* (April, 1909), vol. cvii.

⁴ *Review of Reviews* (New York, 1909), vol. xxxix, *passim*.

efforts throughout these years and with the help of their two foreign rulers, they have won their independence without much sacrifice in warfare. They begin their history as an independent people with the good-will of the great powers, and without carrying over any serious impediment to mar the tranquillity or impede the progress of the Bulgarian kingdom.¹

¹ *The Nineteenth Century* (1908), vol. lxiv, pp. 705-723; *The New International Encyclopedia*, vol. iii, "Bulgaria." For a fuller consideration of the characteristics of the Bulgarians and of their country, see Dicey, *The Peasant State*, London, 1894.

CHAPTER V

SUMMARY—PRESENT SITUATION IN THE BALKAN STATES

THE phenomenal success of the Young Turk party in overthrowing the autocracy and establishing constitutional government in Turkey satisfied in a measure, for the time being, the aspirations of the people in Macedonia. The promise of an equality of races and religions throughout the empire, in local as well as national affairs, leaves the people of that heretofore disordered province slight excuse at the present for further insurrection. Turkey in Europe then, as a whole, is for once both nominally and in reality an integral part of the Ottoman Empire.¹

We have seen above (ch. i) that Montenegro and the provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia were never more than loosely united to Turkey. During a period of about three hundred years previous to 1774, there were spasmodic efforts in these three provinces, as in Servia, to lessen their submission to Ottoman authorities. The beginning, however, of a continuous and progressive movement towards self-government in one or more of the Sultan's Balkan provinces was inaugurated in 1774, by the terms of the treaty of Kainardji between Russia and Turkey. The Russian army had been victorious over the Turkish forces; and in restoring Moldavia and Wallachia to Turkey Catherine II exacted from the Sultan favorable stipulations for the gov-

¹ *Annual Register* (1908), pp. 312 *et seq.* For the constitution of the Ottoman empire, see *British and Foreign State Papers*, vol. lxvii.

ernment of these provinces. Moreover, she exacted from the Sultan and his government the solemn promise that Russia might henceforth watch over the rights of a part of Turkey's Christian subjects.¹

The consummation of Bulgarian independence (April, 1909) stands at the other end, as it were, of the series of events which may be said to have grown out of the situation created by the treaty of Kainardji. Thus it will be seen that for nearly a century and a half an almost incessant struggle had been kept up by one or more of the Sultan's Balkan provinces to secure added privileges and rights in the direction of self-government. It would indeed be difficult to estimate, even approximately, the weight of foreign influence in connection with these struggles. The people in these provinces are certainly entitled to their full share of credit or of blame for what has transpired in the course of this prolonged contest. It would not be safe, perhaps, to conclude that the outcome—the independence of the four Balkan states—would not have been brought about without foreign interference; nevertheless it is true that foreign intervention has repeatedly rendered these aggressive groups of people secure from any retrogression in connection with their advancement towards statehood.

Another result of foreign intervention has been to divide this extended and almost continuous agitation and unrest in some parts of the Balkan country, into three quite distinct periods. From the treaty of Kainardji to the treaty of Paris (1774-1856) Russia maintained her sole guardianship over the rights and interests of the groups that were then contending for a greater and greater degree of local

¹This referred to the Orthodox Eastern Christians, and included the Greeks, as well as Catherine II's co-religionists in the Balkan country, who are likewise of a kindred race with the Russians. *Cf. supra*, ch. i, p. 13.

self-government. The policy of the European powers as set forth in the treaty of 1856 was to create a radically different situation. Russia was accordingly forced to surrender whatever exclusive rights she had acquired to interfere in the affairs of Turkey; and such privileges and immunities as Wallachia, Moldavia and Servia already possessed were placed under the "guarantee" of the seven signatory powers. The Sublime Porte was now formally admitted into the "concert"; and, what might well have seemed still more formidable to the aspiring Balkan peoples, the rulers of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, France, Sardinia and Russia, engaged, "each on his part, to respect the independence and the territorial integrity of the Ottoman empire," and guaranteed in common the strict observance of this engagement. Then, two weeks later, Great Britain, Austria and France guaranteed "jointly and severally the independence and integrity" of Turkey, and promised to consider any infraction of the treaty of Paris (1856) as a *casus belli*.¹

Doubtless the struggles in Europe occasioned by the unification of Italy and of Germany had a derogatory influence on the effectiveness of the treaty of Paris (1856) in relation to political affairs in Turkey. At any rate, it required but two decades to wear out the high-sounding "engagements" in this treaty respecting the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman empire. Insurrection spread throughout the Balkans (1875-1876); the Sultan refused to grant certain concessions which were advised collectively by the other powers in the European concert; Russia's army, aided by the Roumanians, forced its way

¹Copies of the various documents covering this period may be seen in Hertslet, *Map of Europe by Treaty*, vol. ii.

against the stubborn resistance of the Turkish forces and encamped within sight of the Sultan's capital.¹

In the final settlement after this war, the Sultan was forced to grant independence to Roumania, Servia and Montenegro, comprising considerably more territory than Turkey actually kept for herself in Europe. She was compelled, likewise, to assent to the formation of two new semi-independent provinces — Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia. Then, also, the way was opened for the loss to Austria-Hungary of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This second period of struggle in the Balkan country (1856-1878) had been carried on under the supervision of the European concert, and in the face of the avowed policy of the great powers to protect Turkey in the matter of her sovereignty and of her territorial possessions. But the lapse of twenty-two years found the contracting parties holding another European congress, this time at the capital of the German empire, where the agreement was somewhat readily reached virtually to strip Turkey of fully two-thirds of her European territory.

The Berlin settlement placed Bulgarian and Eastern Roumelian affairs under the supervision of the European Concert. But this time the treaty contained no intimation of an intention on the part of any of the signatory powers to guard either the sovereignty or the territorial integrity of the Ottoman empire. It took only thirty years, as we have seen, to wear out the stipulations of this treaty, respecting Turkey's remaining Balkan provinces. The development

¹ Russia's loss in this war was reported as being 321,000 men. A Russian church-monument, a few miles from Constantinople, marks the place where something more than 10,000 Russians were buried who died of sickness in Turkey during the war. Cf. Müller, *Political History of Recent Times*, trans. by Peters (New York, 1882).

of Eastern Roumelia and Bulgaria into an independent kingdom, and the complete absorption of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, during this third and last period of the long struggle in the Balkan country, put an end to at least one phase of the troublesome Eastern Question.

Under the wise and rather conservative leadership of King Charles I, Roumania has steadily progressed, practically along all lines.¹ In general it has been the national policy to care for internal improvements, and to protect the independence of the country by keeping clear of foreign entanglements. The capital—Bucharest—is now much like the better European cities of similar size, about three hundred thousand population. The country covers an area of nearly fifty-one thousand square miles. The population now is something more than six and a half million, as against practically five million when Roumania became independent, thirty years ago. Neither King Charles nor his invalid consort has any liking for show or pomp. Queen Elizabeth, whose pen-name, as is well known, is Carmen Silva, is held in high repute as a writer of poems and dramas.

Montenegro has the distinction of being one of the smallest of independent nations. Although the provisions of the treaty of Berlin more than doubled the size of the principality, still the area is only a little more than three and a half thousand square miles—about one-thirteenth the size of New York State. The added territory, however, supplied the little group of mountaineers with a good stretch of excellent pasture land, together with a harbor and thirty miles of seaboard. The present ruler, Nicholas I, has been at the head of the government for fifty years. Through the

¹ Prince Charles (Karl) of Hohenzollern, elected prince of Roumania in 1866, has borne the title of king since 1881.

marriages of his daughters, his dynasty has become connected with the royal families of Russia and Italy. The efforts of King Victor Emanuel's consort in helping to relieve the sufferings of the Messina earthquake victims has now made the name of the former Montenegrin princess, Queen Helena, a household word in many parts of the world.

During the past few years much has been done in Montenegro to improve the public highways. In 1908 the first line of railway, only eleven miles long, was opened. The chief source of livelihood for a great number of the people is in the rearing of all kinds of live stock. Elementary instruction is free and compulsory, but not much has been done by the Montenegrins to provide facilities for secondary and higher education.

Of the four Balkan constitutional monarchies that have been carved out of Ottoman territory, largely under the supervision of the great powers, the case of Servia seems to be the most unsettled and unpromising. For nearly a hundred years now, more or less frequent disturbances there have resulted from rivalry and intrigues in connection with the two native dynasties (Karageorgevich and Obrenovich).¹ The revolting incidents connected with the most recent and the most horrifying tragedy in the little kingdom—the murder of King Alexander (Obrenovich) and Queen Draga, 1903—lost for the Servian nation, in a large measure, the sympathy and support of Europe. The present king, Peter Karageorgevich, was called to the throne at that time. During his reign, however, there have been so many changes in the ministry that the country can not be said to have had anything like a stable government. Nevertheless, the economic conditions throughout the country have grown

¹ Miller, *The Balkans*, pp. 309-351; Mijatovitch, *A Royal Tragedy* (London, 1906).

more and more promising. The people in the main lead a pastoral and an agricultural life. Practically every family outside the larger cities owns and cultivates a piece of ground; and the country has not a great number who are unemployed, or who suffer from extreme poverty.¹

Being a small kingdom that comprises only a minor portion of the Serbs, the Servians have strained every nerve during the past three decades to obtain concessions from some quarter that would enlarge their borders and unite with them other groups of the Serb race.² This national ambition had led them to hope that they might obtain at least a part of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and thus make their territory contiguous with that of their kinsfolk in Montenegro. Then, also, one of the three *villayets* that make up what is now commonly called Macedonia contains, for the most part, a Serb population.³ The people of the present kingdom of Servia have greatly desired also that that part of Macedonia—the *villayet* of Kossova—should form a part of what they have dared to hope for and have earnestly striven to realize—a Greater Servia.

For some years past Servia's foreign policy has frequently revealed her Pan-Serbian aspirations. At no time, however, had she felt forced to take an open and determined stand in this connection, until by annexing Bosnia and

¹ *Am. Review of Reviews* (1909), vol. xxix, p. 741. Only eight or ten of the Servian cities have a population above ten thousand.

² The Servian kingdom has a population of nearly three millions and covers an area of nearly nineteen thousand square miles. There are said to be altogether about ten million Serbs, scattered through Slavonia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro, Servia, Dalmatia, Kossovo and some parts of Hungary. Cf. *The Forum*, vol. xli, p. 104.

³ *Odysseus, Turkey in Europe*, p. 373; *The Near East* (New York, 1907), p. 147.

Herzegovina, Austria-Hungary virtually eliminated every possibility of Servian expansion in that direction. Servia's appeal to the European powers for "compensation," and her preparations for an appeal to arms against her mammoth neighbor to the north, are well known. But when there was none to help, what could the little kingdom do except to submit?¹ Meanwhile, with the passing of their cherished hopes for a union with some part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and thus with Montenegro, the Servians are rather forced by the turn of events to abandon all hope of bringing the Serb district in Macedonia into their kingdom.

If it were merely somewhat vague national aspirations inspired by race sentiment among the Serbs that had been doomed to failure by recent events, the case would scarcely merit any mention here. A glance, however, at Servia's geographical situation is likely to convince an unbiased observer that there were, after all, something more than sentimental grounds for the determined opposition of the Servians to the recent settlement in the Balkans. Doubtless there are good grounds for the argument that the temperament and the rather obstinate restlessness of the Servians only serve to aggravate the dangers of their position. But the fact remains, nevertheless, that these people are now hemmed in, as it were, by a geographical combination that threatens to become at any moment a serious menace to their national existence.² The complete triumph, in one sense, of Austro-Hungarian diplomacy in relation to the

¹ A discussion of the Servian and the Austro-Hungarian views may be found in *Nineteenth Century* (1908), vol. lxiv, pp. 705 *et seq.*; and *Fortnightly Review* (1909), vol. xci, pp. 1, 1040; *The Am. Review of Reviews* (1909), vol. xxxix, pp. 411, 537.

² This small kingdom has no passage to the sea and is surrounded by vastly stronger states to which, in view of past relations, the Servians may not naturally look for support. *Blackwood's Magazine* (New York, 1909), p. 579.

taking over of Bosnia and Herzegovina has not only blasted the hopes of the Servians for a union with other groups of Serbs, but has left them in fear for the future welfare and even the safety of their own kingdom.

In view of the present outlook in Servia, it is no doubt quite natural that her people should revive the idea of a federation of the Balkan states.¹ So far as is generally known, however, the representations intended to urge the expediency and even the necessity of such a movement have not met, lately, with any particular response.

If the people in the Balkan peninsula could at once accept the attempt now being made to establish constitutional government in Turkey as furnishing a final solution of the Macedonian question, then the present outlook for a Balkan confederation might seem more favorable. But there are indications already (Feb., 1910) that some of the states bordering on Macedonia are inclined to interfere with the administration of affairs there under the new Turkish régime.² It is well known at the same time that for several years past strife has been engendered between some of these states by the overlapping of their claims to the loyalty of parts of the mixed Macedonian population. In view of all this, unless there should be some real danger from without, a federation of these states seems for the time being quite improbable. It may be said then that the present situation in relation to Macedonia, as well as to Servia, presents the problems that now appear most likely to disturb the tranquillity of one or more of the Balkan states.³

¹ *Fortnightly Review* (1909), vol. xci, pp. 1040 *et seq.*; *Outlook* (New York, 1909), vol. xcii, pp. 353 *et seq.*

² *London Times*, Feb. 3, 1910.

³ In addition to references already cited, see *The Nation* (New York, 1909), vol. lxxxviii, Balkans (index); *Fortnightly Review* (1909), vol. xci, p. 609.

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¹ It will be understood that this bibliography is necessarily incomplete. This list of books and articles is intended, however, to be fairly representative of the writings on the Eastern Question. For other publications dealing with topics in this field see the bibliographies in Lavis and Rambaud, *Histoire Générale*, Vols. X-XII, and in the Cambridge Modern History, Vols. X-XI. Also Poole's Index to Periodical Literature and Bengescu, G., *Essai d'une notice Bibliographique sur la Question d'Orient, 1821-1897.* (Brussels and Paris, 1897.)

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
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
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